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ABSTRACT 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT WITH FOCUS ON 
THE IMPACT OF STATE ELITES, GLOBALIZATION AND 
EUROPEANIZATION 
Köni, Hakan 
PhD, Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ioannis Grigoriadis 
April 2012 
 
This dissertation is aims to analyze the change of Turkish religious right from Na-
tional View parties to the Justice and Development Party in its goal and issue orien-
tation in terms of the importance given to religion, and the influence of state elites, 
globalization and Europeanization in this process. This analysis will become possible 
with the help of a set of theoretical approaches offered to explain the causes and na-
ture of party change particularly those of them examining the role of environmental 
changes in the change of party ideology or policy.  
 
Based on a detailed examination of the views and policies of relevant parties on is-
sues of foreign policy and domestic politics, it is observed that Turkish religious 
right has evolved from a conservative religious movement with occasional radical 
tendencies to a moderate conservative one. The impact of state elites in this change is 
detected to be related with their secularist conception and applications which could 
be explained in short as opposition to the presence of religion in public life in sub-
stantial ways. Globalization and Europeanization, secondly, is explored to be associ-
ated with the process with the strong propensity and willingness they bring in to reli-
gious right towards the adoption and promotion of western political, economic and 
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cultural norms, principles and institutions, and establishment of deeper and closer 
relations with the west.     
 
In foreign policy, the movement has shown a gradual shift from a substantially cul-
turalist to a pragmatist and rational approach. While the National View parties fol-
lowed a foreign policy program defending the necessity of establishing close ties 
with the Muslim world and minimizing relations with the West; the Justice and De-
velopment Party is with the idea of leading Turkey into a process of greater integra-
tion and cooperation with the west. The JDP has not turned its back to the Muslim 
world, but concerns for political, legal and social reforms have started to occupy a 
more important place in its Middle East agenda compared to traditional cultural con-
cerns.  
 
In domestic politics, secondly, the most remarkable change is detected in transition 
from a succession of parties aiming to introduce Islamic norms and principles in pub-
lic life to a party aiming to introduce rights and freedoms for its conservative elec-
torate through the mechanisms provided by liberal democratic systems with clear 
detachment from the goal of introducing Islamic law and state.   
 
Keywords: Party Change, Secularist State Elites, Globalization, Europeanization, 
Turkish Religious Right, Foreign Policy, Religion and Secularism     
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ÖZET 
TURKİYE’DE DİNİ SAĞIN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ VE DEVLET SEÇKİNLERİ, 
KÜRESELLEŞME VE AVRUPALILAŞMA FAKTÖRLERİNİN BUNA ETKİSİ  
Köni, Hakan 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç. Ioannis Grigoriadis 
April 2012 
 
Bu doktora tezi Türkiye’de Milli Görüş partilerinden Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisine 
dini sağın hedef ve konu yöneliminde dine yapılan vurgu noktasında geçirmiş olduğu 
değişimi ve devlet seçkinleri, küreselleşme ve Avrupalılaşma faktörlerinin bu 
süreçteki etkisini analiz etmek amacıyla yazılmıştır. Bu analiz, parti değişiminin 
nedenleri ve şeklini açıklamak için ortaya atılan bir grup teorik yaklaşımdan, 
özellikle çevresel değişikliklerin parti ideolojisinde veya siyasetinde meydana gelen 
değişikliler üzerindeki rolünü inceleyen yaklaşımlardan, yararlanılarak yapılacaktır.    
 
İlgili partilerin dış ve iç politika meseleleri konusundaki görüş ve icraatlarının detaylı 
bir incelemesi sonucunda, Türkiye’de dini sağın kimi zaman radikal eğilimleri olan 
muhafazakar dini bir hareketten ılımlı muhafazakar bir harekete dönüştüğü 
gözlenmiştir. Bu değişimde devlet seçkinlerinin etkisinin desteklemiş oldukları, 
kısaca dinin kamusal alanda varlık göstermesine ciddi oranda karşıtlık olarak 
açıklanabilecek, laiklik anlayışı ve uygulamalarıyla alakalı olduğu görülmektedir. 
Küreselleşme ve Avrupalılaşmanın söz konusu süreçteki etkisiyse dini sağa 
kazandırdıkları batılı siyasi, iktisadi ve kültürel norm, ilke ve kurumların kabul görüp 
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desteklenmesi, batıyla daha köklü ve samimi ilişkiler kurulması yönündeki eğilim ve 
isteklilikte görülmektedir.  
 
Dış politikada hareket oldukça kültürel bir yaklaşımdan giderek pragmatist ve 
rasyonel bir yaklaşıma doğru kayma göstermiştir. Milli Görüş partileri İslam 
dünyasıyla yakın ilişkiler kurma ve batıyla ilişkileri minimize etme gereğini savunan 
bir dış politika programı desteklerken Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Türkiye’nin batıyla 
daha derin bir entegrasyon ve işbirliği sürecine girmesinden yanadır. AKP İslam 
dünyasına arkasını dönmemiştir fakat siyasi, hukuki ve sosyal reform kaygıları 
partinin Ortadoğu programında geleneksel kültürel kaygılardan daha önemli bir yer 
tutmaya başlamıştır. 
 
İç siyasetteyse en dikkat çekici değişiklik kamusal hayatta İslami normlar ve ilkeler 
tesis etmeye çalışan bir partiler silsilesinden muhafazakar seçmen tabakası için 
liberal demokratik sistemlerin sağladığı mekanizmalar aracılığıyla haklar ve 
özgürlükler getirmeye çalışan, İslam hukuku ve devleti gayelerinden tamamen 
uzaklaşmış bir harekete doğru geçişte gözlenmektedir.      
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Parti Değişimi, Laik Devlet Seçkinleri, Küreselleşme, 
Avrupalılaşma, Türkiye’de Dini Sağ, Dış Politika, Din ve Laiklik      
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation work is carried out with a purpose to make an in-depth analysis into 
the causes and aspects of the change in the goal and issue orientation of successive 
parties of Turkish religious right concerning the importance assigned to conservative 
religious concerns. The argument of this dissertation is that the Turkish religious 
right has recast itself from a conservative religious movement endeavoring to titivate 
the state and society with a sort of Islamic character, reaching to campaigns for es-
tablishing an Islamic state in some cases, to a relatively moderate one that aims to 
introduce rights and freedoms for the conservative segments of the society within the 
limits provided by secular democratic system (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 322-328; Çınar 
and Duran, 2008: 20-22; Dağı, 2004: 136-143; Öniş, 2001: 291-292; Öniş, 2006: 
123-125; Toprak, 2005: 170); and that the state elites, globalization and Europeaniza-
tion have been some of the most important actors and factors producing this change. 
The state elites are observed to be involved in the process with the type of secularism 
they support, often compared to French secularism, and the mechanisms of tutelary 
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powers they enjoy in Turkish political life (Özbudun, 1994: 189-205; Hale and 
Özbudun, 2009: 3-29; Dağı, 2005: 26-27; Heper, June 2005: 216-220; Kuru, 2009: 
161-235). Globalization and Europeanization, secondly, are explored to be effective 
in the process in a number of ways that include the socialization of Turkish religious 
right in line with global political values, principles and institutions and its production 
of a moderate middle class of entrepreneurs, intellectuals and opinion leaders (Öniş, 
2006a; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010; Dağı, 2004).   
 
The members of Turkish religious right that will be taken under scrutiny in this dis-
sertation to search for the proposed change will be the National Order Party, the Na-
tional Salvation Party, the Welfare Party – which will be named as National View 
parties in general – the Virtue Party and the Justice and Development Party. Chapters 
of the dissertation will be assigned to the review of the theories on the causes and 
aspects of party change, particularly those of them examining the impact of environ-
mental changes on party policy or ideology, with a purpose to draw the theoretical 
framework of the dissertation (Chapter 2); historical, legal and political underpin-
nings of the secularist character of the Turkish state elites (Chapter 3); the impact of 
the 28 February secularist reaction on the moderation of Turkish religious right 
(Chapter 4); globalization and Europeanization with regard to their impact on the 
same effect (Chapter 5); the change in religious right’s foreign policy orientation 
(Chapter 6); and the change in its approach to various domestic political issues relat-
ed with religion and secularism (Chapter 7).        
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Theoretical studies of party change proliferate over the causes that lead to party 
change. A group of variables which include leadership change, dominant party coali-
tion change and environmental change are incorporated in the broader literature as 
factors associated with party change (Harmel et. al., 1995: 4-7; Harmel and Janda, 
1994: 266-268; Wilson, 1994: 275; Panebianco, 1988: 240-241; Harmel and Tan, 
2003: 410-412; Harmel et. al., 1995: 7-8). In a research over the impact of environ-
mental factors on the prospects of party change, which is the main theoretical dimen-
sion of our dissertation topic, Harmel and Janda measure a significant correlation 
between (1) the factors of regime opposition, economic development and income 
distribution and (2) party ideological extremism (Harmel and Janda, 1982). In this 
dissertation, the variable of regime opposition/tolerance is employed in the opera-
tionalization of the strong secularist character of the state elites who are legally iden-
tified as the guardians of the regime in Turkey. Harmel and Janda theorize that in 
democratic systems where there is a powerful coalition of regime defenders, political 
parties tend to steer clear of ideological extremism for they could face with heavy 
chastisements due to their potential threat to foundations of the state. Again, in the 
case of the later two variables, Harmel and Janda observe that in a country which 
experiences a remarkable economic development with a gained trend towards a more 
egalitarian income distribution, parties with extreme ideological programs are likely 
to have less of an appeal (Harmel and Janda, 1982). This last two factors, economic 
growth and more egalitarian income distribution, will be reprocessed here in this 
dissertation to be operationalized in the factors of globalization and Europeanization 
by augmenting their explanatory powers with some political and social assets.      
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Chapter Three is thus assigned to the examination of the secularist state elites in Tur-
key with a perspective to their historical origins, their view to the place of religion in 
the state and society, and the ways and mechanisms they utilize for political activism. 
The emergence of the secularist state elites in Turkey dates back to westernizing 
trends of Ottoman reform policies first introduced to renovate the Ottoman army but 
gradually maintaining with the adoption of western political, intellectual and social 
traditions as a process supported by a class of secular bureaucracy and west-oriented 
intellectuals. The process of political and social westernization initiated by Ottoman 
reforms and restructuring went on after the establishment of the Republic with the 
adoption of a principle of secularism more rigid than many of its examples in the 
west aspiring to minimize the space of action and appearance to religion in social and 
public life (Bellah, 1958: 3). Led by the Turkish Armed Forces, the judiciary, the 
Republican Peoples Party, and some media and civil society organizations, the secu-
larist state elites in contemporary Turkish politics have been the key force demarcat-
ing the space of action for conservative concerns of Turkish religious right. The 
secularist state elites have particularly been opposed to attempts to introduce Islamic 
statehood, norms and principles in public life.  
 
In Chapter Four, a detailed analysis is offered to the political activism of the state 
elites for secularist purposes after their perception of a rising threat of Islamic fun-
damentalism – actuated with the issuance of a warning and a list of resolutions to the 
government during 28 February 1997 NSC Meeting, opening of a closure case 
against the WP, and then against the VP, introduction of various political bans and 
punishments to the party organization etc. – particularly concerning the impact that it 
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generated for the canalization of the religious right in favor of a more moderate and 
centrists political line (Mardin, 1983: 139-149; Cizre, 1996: 232-247; Kuru, 2009: 
202-231). As a product of successive hits received from the state elites, the parties of 
Turkish religious right have been motivated to reform their party goals and programs.    
 
Chapter Five will offer an analysis of the transformative forces of globalization and 
Europeanization. The chapter will first be given to the theoretical examination of 
globalization in economic, political, social and cultural domains, and various tenden-
cies and reactions that it produces in the countries with which it interacts. Briefly 
defining globalization as liberalization, internationalization and universalization in 
various domains, an attempt is made in Chapter Five to explore the ways it has trans-
formed Turkish sociopolitical and economic life by its production of a moderate 
middle class of entrepreneurs, intellectuals and civil society and the entrance of 
Turkish religious right to a process of political socialization in line with global values 
and norms. Europeanization, analyzed in the second part of the chapter and identified 
as a regulated, formalized and specialized form of globalization, is observed to pro-
duce a trend of moderation in Turkish religious right with the adaptive pressures that 
it applies to Turkey for the harmonization of the movement with global values and 
principles promoted by Europe.  
  
Chapter Six will examine the change in foreign policy vision of the Turkish religious 
right. It will be stated that a major change is observed from a cultural vision to a ra-
tional and pragmatist one. The National View parties advocated that it was in Tur-
key’s best interest to strengthen its ties with the Muslim countries of the Middle East 
 6 
 
and to minimize relations with the West. The union and cooperation among the west-
ern states was perceived as substantially formed around membership to Judeo-
Christian traditions, which was in many cases characterized as inimical towards Is-
lam. For National View, Turkey’s integration with the Middle East promised greater 
gains and advantages which would also mean to respect our common historical and 
cultural heritage with the Middle East. (Erbakan, 1975: 229-270; NOP Party Pro-
gram, Articles 98-100; NSP Party Program, 41-43; WP Party Program, Article 28).  
 
The Justice and Development Party has transformed this traditional foreign vision. 
The idea that west was united around Christianity and that it was inimical to Islam is 
quitted in JDP. The role and effect of religion is relatively minimized in the party 
program. The party regards Turkey’s integration and partnership with the West and 
the East both as vital to Turkey’s national interest. For Turkey’s economic, political 
and social development, JDP governments actively participate in UN and NATO 
missions, and it has paid great efforts to in Turkey’s road to EU membership. The 
party works for improved relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East for 
political and economic reasons in addition to traditional cultural concerns of being 
the members of the Islamic civilization. The JDP’s foreign policy vision could be 
best described in short as multilateral, multidimensional, pragmatic and rational dis-
playing a strong similarity with global trends and realities (Davutoğlu, 2009: 501; 
Davutoğlu, 2004; Usul, 2006: 205-215; Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 139-141).       
 
The second area of change examined in this dissertation, in Chapter Seven, is the 
view and policies of the movement concerning some domestic political issues about 
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religion and secularism. The National View campaigned to introduce extensive 
rights, freedoms, opportunities, norms and institutions in Turkey in service to tradi-
tional religious concerns. For National View, secularism was a guarantee for freedom 
of belief and conscience, protection from oppression of the religious and separation 
of politics from religion (NOP Program, Article 6; Erbakan, 1975: 49-56; WP Party 
Program, Article 4; Öniş, 1997: 754). The National View construed religion and mo-
rality as a prerequisite of political, economic and industrial development, and as the 
source of order and peace in society. The most controversial issues raised by the Na-
tional View were its calls for the establishment of an Islamic regime and introduction 
of some Islamic norms in various public places (Erbakan, 1975: 92-93, 109-111, 
149-157; Karakaş, 2007: 24-26; Mecham, 2004: 343-347; Öniş, 2001: 286-288).    
 
The role of religion in the program and the goals of the JDP is relatively minimized. 
JDP resembles the Welfare Party in its interpretation of secularism as promoting 
freedom of conscience, belief and thought, but it lacks the idea of establishing an 
Islamic regime. The major issues of concern to the party concerning conservative 
politics have been to introduce headscarf freedom in universities, repudiate the lower 
coefficient barrier applied to graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, and minimize the 
obstacles imposed on the religious education in Quran Courses and public schools. 
The party declares its strong support for liberal democracy, secularism, human rights, 
and rule of law. It runs its campaign for these aspects of conservative politics in the 
context of the rights and freedoms provided by the democratic constitutional system 
(Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 20-21; Kuru, 2009: 176-187; Dağı, 2006: 89; Çınar and 
Duran, 2008: 33; Duran, 2008: 82-83; Dağı, 2005: 30).  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO PARTY CHANGE: FRAMING THE  
THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
This chapter frames the theoretical structure of the dissertation after an extensive 
literature review process conducted on theories of party change. In the part of the 
chapter on literature review, the focus will be on identifying the concept of party 
change and the group of causes which are presented to be associated with party 
change. But greater attention will be given to the analysis of reasons that produce 
party change which include leadership change, dominant coalition change and envi-
ronmental change. The factor of environmental change is going to be processed in 
greater detail for it will constitute the major theoretical foundation of the work to 
explain the set of changes observed in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish reli-
gious right. Based on this, the dependent variable of the dissertation will be ex-
plained as the change in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish religious right in 
terms of the importance given to religious concerns. And the independent variables 
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presented to explain this dependent variable will be the state elites, globalization and 
Europeanization.    
 
 
2.1. The Research Question 
 
This dissertation is devoted to the study of the change of Turkish religious right in 
terms of its goal and issue orientation from National View parties of the 1970s to 
today’s Justice and Development Party with a view to its causes and the aspects. As 
the research has shown during the course of this dissertation work, there is a plenty 
of causes which have been associated with the change of the movement. The work in 
hand is due to bend on the analysis of a number of causes which are considered to be 
more important than the others which include (1) the rigid secularism of the state 
elites and (2) the process of globalization and Europeanization that the country is 
undergoing. While analyzing these factors, an attempt will be made to explore how 
these causes have come to be and in what ways they intervene in the configuration of 
the proposed change in the Turkish religious right. After the examination of the 
causes, the work will continue with the examination of the aspects of change in the 
movement. In the last two chapters, we will try to explain the process of change in 
foreign and domestic political domains regarding the importance given to various 
conservative religious concerns. And all of this will be done at a more general level 
in the light of the theories of party change which provide us with a rich set of analyt-
ical tools to figure out the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the changes that 
parties may experience under the impact of various developments.     
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2.2. Literature Review 
 
 
2.2.1. Describing Party Change 
 
Harmel and Janda describe party change as “any variation, alteration or modification 
in how parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw up-
on, what they stand for and what they do,” implying, more generally, any change in 
party organization, program, goals and strategies (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 275). At 
an earlier work, Janda offers a more systematic examination of the concept of party 
change: By making use of the conceptual framework that he developed on the organ-
izational characteristics of the parties, Janda incorporates a thorough design for the 
set of specific changes that parties can witness in reaction to various agents, devel-
opments and events that they encounter (Janda, 1980). The propositions are summed 
under six headings that include changes in political tactics, organizational structure, 
issue orientation, organizational identity, goal orientation as well as organizational 
death.  
 
Janda maintains that in the domain of political tactics, a party can change its cam-
paign tactics in search of greater electoral competitiveness by building direct contact 
with individual voters, organizing public meetings and mass rallies, using mass me-
dia, registering voters and transporting them to the ballot box. At other times, parties 
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can devise tactics to restrict competitiveness of other parties or they can develop 
strategies to break down the government to try their chances in an early election. 
Secondly, a party can recast its organizational structure by changing the complexity 
of the organization, centralization of the power, relations with other organizations, 
and incentive systems. Thirdly, a party can change its traditional issue orientation on 
major political issues and ideological matters. Fourthly, a party can change its organ-
izational identity by adopting a different name, splitting into a number of parties or 
merging with another party. Fifthly, a party can reform its goal orientation by reori-
enting its basic political strategy in favor of competing for votes in elections against 
other parties, trying to restrict the competitiveness of other parties and subverting the 
government in power. Finally, a party can meet with its organizational death by ter-
minating through a split, losing most of its activists, being absorbed into another par-
ty, or voluntarily dissolving itself (Janda, 1990: 15-16).    
 
 
2.2.2. Review of Independent Variables of Party Change 
 
 
2.2.2.1. Leadership Change 
 
Theoretical approaches to the party change judge leadership change as one of the 
most important developments that could be associated with party change for a num-
ber of reasons. First, people can have differences in their abilities, orientation and 
willingness by nature and, depending on this, transition of the party leadership from 
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one person to another could bring in many changes in a party. Party change could be 
more pronounced if the office of party leader is decorated with extensive powers to 
determine the party agenda; assemble relevant party organs; disseminate views on 
issues; determine new strategies, policies and organizational structures; and sign and 
approve the final documents issued in the party (Wilson, 1994: 275-281; Janda, 
1990: 12-13; Deschouewer, 1992: 13; Harmel and Janda, 1994: 266).   
 
Second, change in party leadership could accompany a set of other changes in the 
party for the reason that a new leader elected can try to leave his/her personal mark 
in party’s list of achievements during his tenor. For party leadership elections are 
usually held very frequently, a new leader can be motivated to move quickly to put 
his sign on the records of party by also featuring his personal goals and interests 
(Harmel et. al. 1995: 5). The new party leader can try to establish new offices and 
replace traditional office holders with new party members who are closer to him and 
who will work to materialize his goals and motivations, for instance (Panebianco, 
1988: 244).  
 
Third, the aptitude of a party leader to effectively communicate with and persuade 
the voters, activists and members could at times be an important factor facilitating 
party change particularly in cases where there is a structural need for the support of 
party organization for the purpose as a rule described in party regulations. In these 
cases, the difference between successive party leaders in their aptitude to rally the 
support and agreement of the party organization for his desired goals will become an 
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important factor shaping the prospects of party change which could end up with suc-
cess or failure depending on the talents of the leaders (Harmel et. al. 1995: 4-5).    
 
Lastly, leadership change could appear as a destabilizing development from an or-
ganizational point of view too. It is often regarded as a natural entry point for change 
in organizational theories. It stands as an occasion to reconsider the party agenda, 
those strategies not adopted in the past, and the plans prepared for future purposes. 
Leadership change is thus regarded as a volatile phenomenon in the life cycle of the 
parties for restructuring and regression (Gilmore, 1988: 10-14). Gilmore states that: 
The most dramatic example of the opportunity of a new leader to set a new 
agenda is the political transition. In a political campaign, we explicitly link 
the debate about critical issues to the single choice of a new executive. New 
ideas are put forth and priorities are reordered. Patterns of coalition are often 
realigned and new alliances are formed (Gilmore: 11). 
 
Based on these, Harmel et. al. put forward two hypotheses by which they propose 
that (1) leadership change could produce party change no matter how the party per-
forms in elections and that (2) leadership change produces a greater propensity of 
party change if the party has a strong leadership structure.   
 
 
2.2.2.2. Change of the Dominant Coalition 
 
Dominant party coalition refers to the company of a majority or plurality of members 
in a party with their agreement and action in unison about the decisions and policies 
adopted in a party, thereby becoming the major base of power in the party. Harmel 
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and Tan argue that for such large organizations as political parties tend to resist 
change; there must be some good reasons for them to introduce changes and a power 
configuration that facilitates change (Harmel and Tan, 2003: 410). Wolinets similarly 
points out that party change is closely associated with the presence or absence of a 
dominant coalition in control of power and its view towards change (Wolinets, 1996: 
125).  
 
Harmel and Tan observe, based on a study on seven cases of dominant coalition 
change in British and German political systems and their corresponding impacts on 
party change, that if there is an intense factional rivalry originating from some ideo-
logical, strategic and organizational preferences in a party, and if the traditional party 
coalition gets defeated to its rival, a period of extensive party change could be ex-
pected over various domains. And they maintain that if the change in dominant coali-
tion is accompanied with a change in party leadership, a more substantial set of 
changes could take place in the party (Harmel and Tan, 2003; also see Harmel et. al. 
1995: 7-8, 15-17 for an earlier version of these findings).         
 
At an earlier work, Harmel and Janda, with a more assertive style, detect, in an arti-
cle titled as “An Integrated Theory of Party Change,” by making an analysis of some 
selected party change examples that party change could occur only with an imposi-
tion from the dominant coalition. They maintain that dominant coalitions are likely to 
introduce changes when it is estimated that the benefits of the change are greater than 
its costs. The benefits could be the consolidation or the preservation of the domi-
nance of the dominant coalition or the advancement of the goals of the party (Harmel 
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and Janda, 1994). Harmel and Janda’s theory is applied to Latin America’s volatile 
party systems in a work in 2007 for testing and refinement as a result of which a 
number of other correlations are found concerning the relationship between dominant 
coalition change and party change. By examining a large pool of non-consolidated 
Latin American democracies, Harmel and Taylor-Robinson discover that the ability 
of the dominant coalition to introduce beneficial changes will be minimized if there 
are threats to democratic regime. That is because uncertainties and fears of political 
discontinuity generate a foggy environment that blurs the vision, willingness and 
punctuality of the decision-makers. Secondly, the ability of the dominant coalition to 
make cost-benefit analysis of electoral or office failure is weakened in case of high 
electoral volatility. And finally, in party systems where the loss of government is 
accompanied with exclusion from the parliament, the dominant coalition can find it 
difficult to make cost-benefit analysis for a prospective party change due to their 
excessively marginalized political existence (Harmel and Taylor-Rabinson, 2007).    
 
 
2.2.2.3. Environmental Change  
 
Environmental changes are those variations in the exterior of the party that generate a 
tide of change on various domains of the party. Its examples may include a decline in 
electoral support, failure to be incorporated in a coalition government, events and 
phenomena with tremendous political and ideological impact, or some other devel-
opments that inhibit democratic traditions within the party. Harmel and Janda exam-
ine the effect of environmental changes on party change with reference to the impact 
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they exert on the abilities of the parties to achieve their primary goals (Harmel and 
Janda, 1994: 267-268). While doing this, they adopt a scheme of party classification 
borrowed from some theoretical work developed on classifying parties according to 
their primary goals (Strom, 1990: 566-570; Bruce et. al., 1991). By also making 
some additions, they group parties as vote-maximizing, office-maximizing, poli-
cy/ideology advocating and intra-party democracy maximizing parties.      
 
For vote-maximizing parties, firstly, a major decline in the electoral share of the par-
ty is postulated as the main environmental change stimulating party change. As the 
main goal of these parties is to win the votes or the elections, a decline in electoral 
share motivates the party organization to adapt to the changing environment so that 
the loss of the public profile could be compensated. If these parties experience an 
increase in the ratio of votes, they can be emboldened towards gauging more radical 
policies (Janda, 1990: 6-8; Janda et. al. 1994: 2-3). For office-maximizing parties, 
secondly, the leading external stimulus is pointed out as any environmental condition 
that impedes the party’s participation in the government, such as the reluctance of 
other parties to invite the party in a coalition formation, electoral defeat of a tradi-
tional coalition partner, or the differentiation of other parties in ideological terms and 
therefore increased likelihood of exclusion from government coalitions. For poli-
cy/ideology-advocating parties, thirdly, which are distinguished with their concern 
for policy purity and implementation of a particular program notwithstanding elec-
toral defeat or exclusion from the government, external stimuli may include such 
events and phenomena as the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the ensuing decline 
of the appeal of communism as a party program; political pressures from other do-
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mestic ideological, political and constitutional power blocs; international terrorism; 
economic and political interdependence; globalization; and the rise of environmental 
concerns among many others. Finally, for intraparty-democracy maximizing parties 
concerned for a broad representation of the views of the most party members possi-
ble, external factors that could produce party change could be changes in party mem-
bership numbers, change in the character of party members (e.g., from agrarian to 
industrial classes), or general changes in the views of party members (Harmel and 
Janda, 1994: 269-271, 280-281; and also Harmel and Taylor-Robinson, 2007).      
 
Strom maintains that contemporary political parties display characteristics associated 
with all of these types, but often one of them leads in front of the others. Based on 
this, the party behavior can be symbolized as follows in formulation: 
B = w1V+w2O+w3P+w4I = 1 
Where 
B = Party behavior 
V = Vote-seeking behavior 
O = Office-seeking behavior 
P = Policy-seeking behavior 
I = Intra-party democracy maximizing behavior   
w1 through w4 are coefficients representing the weight of each factor on party 
behavior, ranging up to 1. 
w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 = 1 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
2.2.2.3.1. Examples to Party Changes Originating from Environmental Changes 
 
Deschouwer argues that there have been a number of environmental changes after 
the Second World War that forced the parties to adaptation. Erosion of traditional 
social and religious bonds was one of the environmental changes compelling many 
parties to adjust their organization and strategies. Parties that based their ideological 
stance on social and religious traditions were now to tune down their ideological par-
ty profile, introduce a strong leadership, and enlarge the party base and organization 
by sharing some power, traditionally in firm central control, with the masses. Anoth-
er change in the party environment, which affected leftist parties in particular, was 
the emergence of the welfare state. The welfare state was instrumental in weakening 
collectivism as a party characteristic as the state was now more successful at meeting 
the people’s needs. The parties had thus lost their traditional authority stemming 
from stability and trust and were now compelled to supply the electorate with solid 
benefits (Deschouwer, 1996: 274-276). 
 
In a case study conducted on the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) of the Nether-
lands, for instance, a party formed from the unification of three confessional parties 
in 1980, which shows the characteristics of an office-seeking party and, to a lesser 
extent, a policy-advocating party, it is observed that due to unsatisfactory electoral 
results and exclusion from the government, the party was motivated to introduce a 
number of modifications in its policy platform. The external shock, the 1994 elec-
toral defeat, motivated the CDA to slightly mitigate its hard core religious conserva-
tive stance, for which religion was no longer a political guide, but more often an ap-
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peal to defend principles of justice, awareness of responsibility, solidarity and stew-
ardship. With the introduction of a new program, called “new ways, firm values,” 
that involved modifications in the party’s traditional policy vision, the party’s loss of 
popular support was to be compensated. Though the party reiterated its concerns for 
traditional Christian democratic values such as family life and social security, it now 
favored a more decentralized state incorporating more liberal policies in areas such 
as drug use, marriage and immigration (Duncan, 2007: 72-76, 78-81). 
 
In another research on eight predominantly vote-seeking parties from Germany, Brit-
ain and the USA, which are analyzed through 78 adjacent elections to investigate the 
effect of poor electoral performance on party identity change, Janda et. al. observe 
that there is very high correlation between decline in electoral support and change in 
the party manifesto. Setting a table of codes involving particular policy orientations 
between liberal-conservative and left-right policies that parties make attributions in 
their election manifestos, it is demonstrated that parties tend to recast their policy 
programs and platform in reverse proportion to the degree of satisfaction from elec-
toral results (Janda et. al., 1995). 
 
In “Party Policy Change: The Case of the Democrats and Taxes, 1956-1968,” John 
Burns investigates the alteration of the tax policy of the Democrat Party in the USA 
between 1956-68 vis-à-vis external and internal causes. Inflation, decrease in the 
average growth of per capita income, and the public opinion being the main external 
factors and elite actions being the internal factor examined, he explains that econom-
ic crisis had a direct effect on the proposed change and that elite policies were also 
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important in the sense that their perceptions, motivations, planning and initiatives 
were influential even in the absence of the external causes. The public opinion had an 
indirect effect on policy makers, and indeed was more often shaped by the elites ra-
ther than the vice versa. It is observed that this particular conjuncture motivated the 
Democrats to respond by introducing Keynesian policies, in form of tax breaks for 
companies and individuals, to recover from the economic recession, particularly to 
stem the decline in the growth rate, rising inflation, and waning real income level 
(Burns, 1997). 
 
 
2.2.2.3.2. Environmental Change as a Factor of Party Ideology/Policy Change  
 
In a research over 25 parties, Harmel and Janda examine factors contributing to the 
formation of particular party ideologies, from extremist to centrist, portrayed on a 
left-right spectrum. The policy preferences employed to identify parties as left or 
right parties include the approach of the parties towards (1) public ownership of the 
means of production, (2) the government’s role in economic planning, (3) redistribu-
tion of the wealth and (4) provision of welfare services. Accordingly, parties strongly 
favoring these policies are labeled left wing parties, while those strongly opposing 
them are labeled right-wing parties. The parties whose positions are not for strongly 
defending or strongly opposing such policies are labeled neutral. The scores each 
party is given in these variables is used to measure party extremism as well as ideo-
logical consistency and ideological distance from the mean of other parties (Harmel 
and Janda, 1982: 27-30).    
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Conceptualizing parties according to their ideologies this way, Harmel and Janda 
contend that a number of factors are closely associated with party extremism no mat-
ter whether they are rightist or leftist. First, they find that the nature of the electoral 
system and the number of political parties is highly correlated with distance of party 
ideologies from the center of the ideological spectrum. Accordingly, ideological ex-
tremism is greatly influenced by whether elections are held according to “majority 
principle,” where only the winner of elections can enter the parliament, or according 
to the principle of “proportional representation,” where parties can enter in the par-
liament proportional to the votes they have in elections (correlation rate with party 
extremism: 0.50). The parties will have greater tendency to stray from extremism in 
electoral systems operating according to majority principle compared to the other 
one. That is because in proportional electoral systems, even though extremist parties 
may get a very small proportion of votes, they can at least find place in the parlia-
ment to benefit from the opportunities provided by being in the parliament as well as 
from the possibility of joining in a coalition government. After successive failures of 
not being able to enter the parliament and the government in majority electoral sys-
tems, parties will be discouraged from extremism for matters of survival (Harmel and 
Janda, 1982: 31, 34; Hermens, 1938: 25). It will also matter a great deal for the pro-
spects of party extremism whether it is a two-party or multi-party system that rules in 
a particular country (correlation rate: -0.33). In two-party political systems where the 
elections are held according to the majority rule, parties are motivated to shift their 
policies and goals to the center of ideological spectrum so that they can address the 
widest number of voters (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 31, 34).   
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Secondly, the possibility of rule by a coalition government is explored to be highly 
associated with ideological extremism because such a likelihood provides extremist 
parties with a structural space of survival, as they can be incorporated in a coalition 
(the rate of correlation: 0.50). However, in political systems where governments are 
traditionally formed by a single party, extremist ideological parties with limited elec-
toral support have few chances of survival, and thus they are compelled to mitigate 
their ideological stance (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 31-32, 34). 
 
Thirdly, the degree of regime opposition is found to be negatively correlated with 
emergence and survival of ideological parties (-0.12). Contrary to what could be ex-
pected that governments will be driven to defend more ideological policies with the 
purpose of warding off an authoritarian backlash, it appears that if political regimes 
proscribe membership to extremist ideologies, parties will be deterred from ideologi-
cal extremism under fears of party closure, bans from political bans or other type of 
punishments that may be brought by the defenders of the regime (Harmel and Janda, 
1982: 32, 34; Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 374).   
 
Fourthly, a negative correlation is measured between affluence and party extremism 
(correlation -0.20). Societies enjoying high levels of GDP per capita accompanied by 
relatively equal income distribution are more likely to have centrist parties. But in 
societies where there is a large gap in income distribution, there is a high propensity 
for party ideological extremism (correlation is 0.32). When people are deprived of 
economic, social and political opportunities, especially extremist parties on the left of 
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the ideological spectrum will have a strong appeal (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 32-34; 
Milnor, 1969: 104-105). 
 
 
 
2.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.3.1. The Dependent Variable  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to offer a theoretical and empirical analysis to the 
party change witnessed in the course of Turkish religious right. As the type of party 
change can take various forms as it is cited above which may include changes in po-
litical tactics, organizational structure, issue orientation, organizational identity, goal 
orientation and organizational death, an attempt to incorporate all the changes that 
took place in these domains will exhaust a dissertation work (Janda, 1980). Thus the 
work in hand will focus on the change in the issue and goal orientation of the move-
ment particularly vis-à-vis the degree of importance assigned to religion in its suc-
cessive parties. It is the argument of this dissertation that the Turkish religious right 
has been subject to a remarkable change in its goal and issue orientation from a high-
ly conservative movement that had the goals of dressing up the state and society with 
an Islamic character to a moderate rightist one trying to introduce rights and free-
doms for the pious in line with liberal democratic, secular and global ideals. An at-
tempt will be made in the last two chapters to exposit this particular change with an 
 24 
 
examination of the earlier and later members of Turkish religious right in two policy 
areas, i.e., (1) foreign policy and (2) religion and secularism. In trying to do this, a 
rich and in-depth set of research materials will be used that involve the analysis and 
examination of party programs; goals; projects; policies; publications, speeches, and 
declarations released by party leaders, other members and party centers; bill of in-
dictments for party closure; defence documents of the litigated parties as well as 
some other works produced by experts of Turkish religious right to shed light over 
the course of events and processes.  
 
 
2.3.2. Identifying The Turkish Religious Right in Its Issue and Goal Orientation 
 
In attempting to explore the change in the issue and goal orientation of Turkish reli-
gious right, we will rely on a hypothesis that among the party types classified accord-
ing to their goals – vote-maximizing, office maximizing, policy/ideology advocating 
and intra-party democratizing – the Turkish religious right has born characteristics 
closest to the policy/ideology advocating parties. While this behavior was the most 
powerful in National View parties with their manifestations to introduce an Islamic 
society and state, it has been inherited by the Justice and Development Party too to a 
lesser extent exhibited in its ambitious campaign to introduce some rights, freedoms 
and opportunities for the religious conservative segments of the society. The ele-
ments of policy/ideology advocating behaviors in JDP include the waging of legal 
and political struggle for the (1) liberation of wearing headscarf in schools and uni-
versities, (2) removal of the legal barriers in front of the graduates of Imam-Hatip 
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schools for entering the universities and various public posts, (3) introduction of 
some religious norms and principles in some areas that does not violate the secularist 
principle, (4) promotion of the proliferation of schools that teach religious courses in 
addition to modern sciences, and (5) development of relations with Muslim countries 
of the Middle Eastern on cultural and historical bases (Kuru, 2009: 181-198; Hale, 
2005: 299-300). 
 
But it needs to be added that the list of causes canalizing the Turkish religious right 
to amend its profile has also generated pressures for the renovation of its party type 
too to some extent. To put it more clearly, while on the one hand mitigating its ideo-
logical character, the movement has also acquired some remarkable vote-seeking, 
office seeking and intraparty democracy maximizing concerns. The vote-seeking 
concern of the movement is often observed in JDP’s attempt to reach to a wider elec-
torate by pulling the party to the center of right. This is expected to increase the 
chances of the party for a single party government which will make it more comfort-
able in job and will also enhance its legitimacy with a greater electoral support from 
the public. The party also pays attention to its relations with other right parties for a 
potential coalition in case of a lower voter turnout as it is seen in its cooperation with 
Nationalist Action Party for various policies from time to time.   
 
The party displays some intraparty democracy maximizing behaviors too insofar as 
there had emerged, particularly during the second half of the 1990s, a group of party 
members who were uncomfortable with the centralization of the power in the hands 
of Necmettin Erbakan with very little space for intraparty opposition, competition 
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and confrontation. Thus some party members including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ab-
dullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and Abdullatif Şener were voicing the necessity for some 
structural changes in favor of a more democratic tradition within the party even be-
fore the establishment of Justice and Development Party.  
 
 
2.3.3. Independent Variables 
 
An important part of this dissertation will be devoted to the exploration and examina-
tion of the independent variables of this particular change. The literature on Turkish 
religious right incorporates a list of factors argued to be instrumental in this process 
which include (1) leadership change from Necmettin Erbakan to Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, (2) the emergence of a new coalition preceding this leadership change, and 
(3) the rigid secularism of the state elites, globalization, Europeanization, resulting 
democratic socialization, a strengthening moderate middle class among the environ-
mental changes.  
 
The change of the leadership in Turkish religious right after the emergence of some 
oppositional factions against the traditional coalition led by Necmettin Erbakan was a 
remarkable development in the history of the movement to the extent that it is fol-
lowed with a period of extensive restructuring and reformation. The process took a 
period of time with the spread of some opposing views against traditional party poli-
cies, strategies and ways in the beginning which went on with the application of 
some pressures on and the marginalization of the uncomfortable party members. This 
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was then followed by the emergence of a faction in the party led by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and Abdullatif Şener who had the purpose of 
capturing the party leadership and displacing the traditional party coalition to intro-
duce extensive changes in various domains of the party but only to fail under a heavy 
campaign waged by the traditional party coalition administered by Necmettin Erba-
kan from outside with calls for obedience, unity and resistance. A more radical step 
was taken after this when the new coalition decided to split from the party for the 
introduction and implementation of their goals in the formation of a new party, the 
Justice and Development Party.  
 
The events that transpire with leadership and dominant coalition change in Turkish 
religious right attest to many of the findings propounded in the theoretical literature 
of party change. The literature on the change of Turkish religious right points out that 
the willingness, dynamism, and readiness of the new party coalition and the leader-
ship for change; their goal to put their mark on the list of achievements of the move-
ment; the sympathy that the electorate demonstrated against them; their capture and 
control of the power mechanisms in the party and the government; their positive ap-
proach to change for matters of survival and success; their material difference from 
the traditional party leadership and coalition in their vision and mission have been 
closely associated with the set of changes that the movement has undergone (Heper 
and Toktaş, 2003; Öniş, 2006: 125). It will not be wrong to say that the change in 
leadership and dominant coalition would lead to a set of other changes in the move-
ment from an organizational point of view too (Gilmore, 1988).  
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Due to the limitations of the scope of a dissertation, the impact of leadership and 
dominant coalition change will not be examined in this work. The work in hand will 
be devoted to the impact of a number of environmental changes and stimuli on the 
issue orientation of Turkish religious right. These environmental changes and stimuli 
include (1) the rigid secularism of the state elites, and (2) globalization and Europe-
anization. While the rigid secularism of the state elites will be analyzed within the 
theoretical framework of regime tolerance and party extremism offered by Harmel 
and Janda (1982), the rest of the variables will be scrutinized with a view to the im-
pact of equalization of income distribution and affluence on party ideological change 
with some additional theoretical extrapolations. There are some other reasons in lim-
iting the set of independent variables to these two variables only apart from the ne-
cessity to narrow down the scope of a dissertation work: Firstly, it is assumed in this 
dissertation that the state elites have been the most important variable producing the 
proposed change in the ideological course of the Turkish religious right. An analysis 
to historical, philosophical, administrative and functional aspects of the state elites is 
deemed to be going to explain a large part of our main thesis. Globalization and Eu-
ropeanization, secondly, provides us with a rich and comprehensive set of tools that 
help us explore the set of changes taking place in economic, social, cultural and po-
litical domains – those changes that are not covered by the state elites’ activism.       
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2.3.3.1. State Elites     
 
As included above, Harmel and Janda measure a -0.12 correlation between regime 
opposition and party ideological extremism in the pool of 25 party cases, a type of 
relationship which can be opened as the more the degree of regime opposition the 
less is the likelihood of party extremism and a degree of correlation (0.12) which can 
be interpreted as notable. Sigelman and Yough measure regime opposition with re-
gard to the presence or absence of following five indicators in a given country which 
include freedom of group opposition, interest aggregation by associational groups, 
press freedom, role of the police and number of government sanctions against per-
ceived threats (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 365). Our examination will be based on 
an argument that in Turkey regime opposition to real or alleged anti-secularist poli-
cies and activities of the religious right has had a much greater impact and has acted 
more toward the moderation of the ideological tone of the religious right. This is be-
cause, firstly, there has been a very strong class of state elites in Turkey with a strong 
secularist tradition, framed on the model of rigid French secularism, which prohibits 
the entrance of religion in public sphere (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 233-235; Çınar and 
Duran, 2008: 20-22; Öniş, 2001: 291-292; Narlı, 1999; Toprak, 2005: 170). Thus in 
this dissertation work rigid secularism of the state elites will be employed as our 
proxy variable for regime opposition. And, secondly, the politics of the religious 
right differ substantially in Islamic countries like Turkey compared to the Christian 
Democracies, in the sense that Islamic politics may substitute for secularist politics 
so far as Islam has an overall legal and political framework that can be used to con-
stitute the legal infrastructure of a political system. It also has various historical and 
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contemporary examples including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria and Egypt (Hale, 
2005: 299-300). Therefore, regime opposition is regarded to be effected much more 
heavily in democratic countries with a substantial Muslim population like Turkey 
than it is observed in other countries and thus it remains as a more imperative inde-
pendent variable for moderation of Islamist movements.    
 
Chapters Three and Four will be devoted to the exploration of the style and charac-
teristics of the defenders of regime in Turkey with a view to their historical and phil-
osophical formation as well as the mechanisms they exploit to maintain their pres-
ence in politics, the justifications offered to this end and specific occasions of state 
elites in action in contemporary Turkish political life.   
 
 
2.3.2.2. Globalization and Europeanization  
 
Harmel and Janda incorporate two factors into the list of independent variables that 
affect party ideological extremism which match very well with a set of developments 
that have taken place in the socioeconomic life in Turkey, i.e., affluence and sectoral 
inequality. They maintain that societies which are characterized with low levels of 
GNP per capita, unequal income distribution and a sharply divided class system 
could give birth to political parties with extreme ideological tendencies. They meas-
ure a correlation of -0.20 between affluence and party extremism, and another corre-
lation of 0.32 between sectoral inequality and party extremism. Accordingly, when 
people are deprived of economic, social and political opportunities and rewards, ex-
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tremist parties will have stronger appeal (Harmel and Janda, 1982: 32-34). An at-
tempt will be made here in this work to expand the scope and scale of Harmel and 
Janda’s socioeconomic variables in a way to include the abovementioned two varia-
bles too to make us equip with a richer set of analytical tools. More clearly, the vari-
ables of affluence and sectoral inequality will be rediscovered in two more compre-
hensive and inclusive proxy variables, i.e., globalization and Europeanization to ena-
ble us to incorporate some social, political and intellectual factors too which will be 
summarized here below.      
 
Globalization and Europeanization are argued to be a potent set of variables exerting 
tremendous impacts on the socioeconomic and political life of countries that it comes 
to contact with. Globalization could be considered as a short summarizing name for 
unification, growth, expansion and stabilization of economies; spread of some uni-
versal political norms and principles like democracy, human rights and rule of law as 
well as multilateralism, cooperation and partnership in the sphere of international 
relations; and diffusion of collective, authoritarian and closed systems in favor of 
individualist, liberal and open societies (Scholte, 1997; Dodge and Higgott, 2002; 
McGrew, 2000; Halliday, 2002). Many of what comes with globalization are indeed 
considered as the main elements of centrist, moderate and mild party ideologies 
which is exactly the opposite of extreme ideological formations.  
 
Europeanization, secondly, is distinguished as a regulated and safer form of globali-
zation that shows impact particularly on the European continent. The values and 
principles that it promotes are almost no different than globalization which may in-
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clude in more specific terms spread and settlement of free market economies, democ-
racy, rule of law, human rights, multilateralism, collectivism as well as individual, 
group and gender rights and freedoms. Europeanization differs from globalization 
with its more formalized, diplomatic, legal and strict structure with its specialized 
organs, decision-making processes and problem-solving mechanisms (Risse et. al., 
2001).   
 
To begin with, it is very commonly argued in the literature of Turkish political Islam 
that the rapid economic growth that the country has witnessed since 1990s as a prod-
uct of economic globalization patronized by Turgut Özal has been a source of sub-
stantial socioeconomic and political transformation. It is particularly regarded as be-
ing instrumental in the emergence of an Islamic bourgeoisie who produced wealth 
through manufacturing and marketing of goods and who were thus able to benefit 
from the rewards and the opportunities presented by the system. This economically 
and politically powerful middle class of entrepreneurs are pointed as an agent of 
peace, stability and moderateness among religious right wing cadres to constitute a 
barrier against extreme ideological formations. They tended to share an idea that a 
state of political and economic instability that could emerge as a result of some radi-
cal political movements would cost them enormous economic losses (Öniş, 2001: 
289-291; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 113-120).  
 
Globalization is deemed to be linked with the growth of a class of influential Islamic 
intellectuals too who have come to appreciate and promote the elements of globaliza-
tion originating from the west with a conviction that westernization in political, eco-
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nomic and social terms does not always contravene Islam and that it is indeed most 
often in the interests of the Muslims to adapt to the global condition. Among the 
leading members of this class, we can count Fethullah Gülen, Ali Bulaç, Hayrettin 
Karaman, İsmet Özel, leading members of the Iskenderpaşa religious community 
among many others (Aras and Çaha, 2000; Dağı, 2004). This class of intellectuals 
constitutes a body of actors who communicate with and convey their opinions to the 
political leaders of Turkish religious right as well as the general conservative elec-
torate to serve as an ultimate office of teaching, consultation, deliberation, confirma-
tion, reformation and transformation.   
 
Globalization is also regarded to be related with a process of political socialization 
on the part of the members of Turkish religious right. Many scholars of Turkish poli-
tics argue that the Turkish religious right has shown a genuine ideological transfor-
mation which brought them closer to understand and appreciate the virtues of global 
political, economic and social values. An increasing support for EU membership, 
democracy, human rights and rule of law draws attention on the part of Turkish reli-
gious right with many material steps taken (Öniş, 2006a; Kösebalaban, 2004).    
 
As to the Europeanization, it is argued to be effective in the process of ideological 
transformation with the adaptive pressures that it brought by the accession talks 
communicated in EU summits and acquis communautaire. The Turkish political 
elites have been in favor of introducing and implementing many of the reforms for a 
number of reasons. Europeanization is, first, considered as an important road for 
Turkey’s economic and industrial development with the funds, resources and oppor-
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tunities provided to member and candidate countries. Secondly, it is expected to help 
the settlement of European standards in the domain of civil-military relations to 
mean that it will minimize the powers of the military to intervene in the political pro-
cesses. Europeanization is expected to bring greater rights and freedoms for the con-
servative electorate to remove the legal barriers in front of headscarf, Imam-Hatip 
schools and religious education. Finally, the members of the Turkish religious right 
seem to have experienced a learning process that brought them to welcome European 
values and institutions (Özbudun, 2007; Tocci, 2005).   
 
The theoretical design of the dissertation could be displayed in terse in figure 1 
below   
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework  
  
 
  
 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
2.4. Contribution of the Work  
 
The work in hand is expected to contribute to the studies of Turkish religious right in 
a number of ways. Firstly, it differs from the majority of the research and analysis in 
the area with its original theoretical analysis. There are very few perspectives to the 
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transformation of Turkish religious right developed with a view from the theories of 
party change. Thus it has been one of the purposes of this work to locate our empiri-
cal findings in the broader literature of comparative politics. Secondly, it offers a 
detailed analysis of the nature of the party change concerning issues about foreign 
policy, and religion and secularism by tracing them in party programs, goals, poli-
cies, speeches and declarations by party leaders and other leading party members, 
minutes of party closure court cases, and apologies presented by parties. Thirdly, it 
aims to scrutinize the nature and origins of the secularist state elites’ conception of 
secularism and religion by conducting a detailed analysis of how it has come to be 
and how it is actuated starting with the late Ottoman period and continuing with mili-
tary and judiciary interventions, memorandums, party closure cases, and apologies. 
And finally, it brings a theoretical view to the studies of globalization and European-
ization vis-à-vis their impact on various party characteristics in a more comprehen-
sive, deeper and clearer way by exploring their significance and implications in the 
domains of economy, politics, culture and society and linking them with our empiri-
cal findings and analysis.      
 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to explore and conceptualize the set of tools that will be em-
ployed in explaining the course of policy/ideological transformation that Turkish 
religious right has experienced with focus on the type and specifics of factors that are 
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associated with such political processes. Our first task has thus been to review the 
literature on theories of party change by paying special attention to the causes that 
produce party change which include leadership change, dominant coalition change 
and environmental change as well as the type of changes that they produce. While 
doing this, a greater part of the literature review is assigned to the role of environ-
mental changes on party change with an intention to employ it in framing our theo-
retical design. Based on this preliminary work, a theoretical background of the dis-
sertation is formed to involve, in brief, the identification of the dependent variable – 
the policy/ideological change of Turkish religious right – and the independent varia-
bles that are deemed to be the most instrumental factors among others in the emer-
gence of this proposed change – the rigid secularism of the state elites, globalization 
and Europeanization.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
TURKISH STATE ELITES AND THEIR SECULARISM 
 
 
 
In this chapter, Turkish state elites will be taken under scrutiny regarding their view 
and policies towards the role of religion in public life, with a historical and philo-
sophical perspective. An in-depth analysis will be offered of the type of secularism 
adopted by the state elites, who envisage not only the separation of religion and state 
but also the exclusion of religion from the public sphere and its relegation to private 
life. It will be observed that the roots of contemporary Turkish secularism go back to 
the Ottoman reform period during which a gradually growing campaign of westerni-
zation was put into action leading to the introduction of comprehensive reform pack-
ages in military, administrative, political, legal and educational domains. Gaining 
speed in the 19 century, the reformists had introduced a set of reforms that aimed to 
minimize the role of religion in public life, a process carrying on until the end of the 
First World War with a degree of increasing penetration to sociopolitical and eco-
nomic life. The end of the First World War and the establishment of the Republic 
brought greater changes, including a very rigid secularist campaign against religious 
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institutions and life. Religion was totally excluded from the public life and elements 
of religion were prohibited from public visibility.   
 
The introduction of multiparty politics raised hopes to mitigate this rigid secularism, 
though by then a class of state elites had already established itself, consisting of the 
military, the judiciary and the Republican Peoples Party and other civil bureaucra-
cies, a class that regulated its members’ political conformity and sought to check 
civil society with secularist policies. During the multiparty period, the state elites 
were involved in politics through direct or indirect intervention in political life in 
cases of anti-secularist upsurge. The period after the 1990s was exemplified with 
more moderate interventions to politics, possibly as a result of globalization, but it 
was also a scene of great tension, with the ascendance of the religious right in Turk-
ish political life and the rise of calls for greater representation of religious right polit-
ical ideals.     
 
 
3.1 The Ottoman Legacy  
 
 
3.1.1. The Classical Period 
 
According to Stanford Shaw, religious motivations were one of the leading reasons 
behind the emergence of the Ottoman Empire alongside some economic concerns. 
The Ottomans were aided with a powerful set of ideological and pragmatic goals in 
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their expeditions to the west. While serving to the purpose of spreading Islam and 
expanding its borders with Jihad or through communication with the Christian com-
munities in the western borders in the first place, the Ottomans were also observing 
great interests in collecting booties in wars against the Byzantine Empire (Shaw, 
1982: 33). Some others, similar in pointing out to the importance of religion in Ot-
toman state formation, argue that state and religion were two major sources of the 
government’s power. Religion and state were often used in unison as din-u devleti 
Osmani when an official order was released by the authorities (Mardin, 1981: 194; 
Mardin, 1983: 139; Davison, 2002: 223-224).The founders of the Ottoman Empire 
including Ertuğrul Gazi, Osman Bey and Orhan Bey were all decorated with titles of 
Gâzi (veteran of holy war), iftiharul mujahidîn (the pride of mujahedeen), şereful 
guzzât (the honor of veterans), al-muazzamul mujâhid (great mujahed), sultânul guz-
zât (the Sultan of the Veterans)  to demonstrate their involvement in Islamic matters 
in their most significant examples as the head of the state (Dursun, 1989: 110-111).  
 
In addition to the religious character of the state and the rulers, the Ottoman ruling 
elite were accompanied by many notables of religious origin in their military cam-
paigns, governmental and religious matters. The leader of the Âhi order in Ankara 
Sheikh Edebali, who is claimed to be the father-in-law of Osman Bey, his son Şeyh 
Mahmut, Âhi Şemsettin and many other religious dignitaries and dervishes had taken 
part in gazas and conquests (holy wars) and they were assigned various administra-
tive, political and legal posts in the statecraft. The sheiks and other members of the 
religious society were often gifted villages and towns by the Ottoman Beys to con-
tribute to Islamic life and practice in the country. The religious elites enjoyed a poli-
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cy of protection, proximity and tolerance assumed by the Ottoman Rulers. Some of 
them were appointed as muftis as a supreme office of fatwa against whom the rulers 
and the subjects were equally dependent on religious issues. Their views pertaining 
to religious aspects of the matters were highly respected (Gündüz, 1989: 14-20; Kö-
prülü, 1959: 89-93; Ocak, 1999: 241-243). The impact of the Âhis and other reli-
gious orders was felt in their powers to select the Beys too in consultation with vi-
ziers and provincial governors (Beylerbeyi). Orhan Bey and Murat II were selected 
as Beys after the decision of the Âhis, for instance. The seizure of Ankara from the 
control of the Âhis was an important event which shows how powerful the Âhis had 
grown during the foundation of the Ottoman State (Uzunçarşılı, 1984: 496). 
 
 
3.1.1.1. Religion in Ottoman Educational Life: Medreses  
 
During the foundation of the state, the administrative cadres of the Ottomans were 
occupied by the hodjas, bureaucrats of earlier Seljuks and Ilhanids, members of vari-
ous sufi orders, Islamic knights as well as dervishes who were educated in medreses 
of Iran, Egypt and Crimea. One of the first policies adopted by the Ottoman rulers 
after the conquests was the establishment of medreses with an aim to contribute to 
religions, social, cultural, scientific awareness of the general public but also to edu-
cate the special work force to be employed in administrative posts. The first Ottoman 
medrese was established in Iznik in 1331 to proliferate in numbers in a short time. 
After a successful education in medreses, the graduates were able to be judge, mufti 
and teachers (Akgündüz, 1997: 247-300; Baltacı, 1976: 56-58). The leading mem-
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bers of the Ottoman Imperial Court including the grand vizier, some other viziers, 
judge of the army (kadıaskers), court calligrapher (nişancı) as well as the 
Şeyhulislam were all graduates of medreses who were able to come to these offices 
with a mechanism of appointment and promotion. Until the capture of Istanbul by 
Mehmet II., the religious bureaucracy enjoyed a great impact on the government af-
ter which they were challenged by the slave bureaucracy in public offices. For in-
stance, the Çandarlı Family of ulema origin occupying the office of Grand Vizier 
since the foundation was eliminated and the office was transferred to the slave bu-
reaucracy by Mehmet II. soon after the capture of Istanbul (Dursun, 1989: 122-123).   
 
The number and qualifications of medreses proliferated in the Ottoman Empire by 
time in response to necessities and initiatives of the ruling elite. While in the begin-
ning they gave education at a basic level, during the time of the Conqueror and af-
terwards medreses were established specializing in areas of traditions of the Prophet 
(Hadis), Koranic Exegesis and Jurisprudence which were named as Sahnı Seman, 
Darul Hadis, Süleymaniye, Müsille-i Süleymaniye among others. The educational 
curriculum in medreses included religious areas of knowledge as enumerated above 
and such secular sciences as mathematics, geometry, astronomy, medicine, logic and 
literature (Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 20-23; Baltacı, 1976: 16-37; İnalcik, 2003: 174-179).  
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3.1.1.2. Religion in Ottoman Law 
 
The legal system in the Ottoman Empire was based on Şeriat in essence. The Otto-
man Sultan was required to obey the Islamic law much as the rest of the people. It 
was one of the duties of the Sultan to apply and protect the Şeriat. Yet there had de-
veloped a domain of law called as customary law (örfi hukuk) over time inherited 
from earlier Arab and Turkish Muslim states. The customary law was not a rival le-
gal system to Islamic law. It had emerged to fill in the gaps of the Islamic law, to 
regulate those areas which are not covered by the Islamic law, and to give prompt 
response to the necessities of the time. As the head of the state, the Ottoman Sultan 
was endowed with the authority to introduce laws about the political order and or-
ganization in service to public good and in the context of following good traditions. 
The customary law originating from the Sultan was incorporated in legal documents 
issued by the Sultan which include Kanunnames, Adaletnames and fermans (İnalcık, 
2000: 27-36; Aydın, 1994: 375-391). 
 
 
3.1.1.3. Religious Bureaucracy in Central Government and Their Duties 
 
The Ottoman state structure incorporated a plenty of incumbents from the ulema with 
sizable power sources and authority in their hands. During the foundation of the 
state, the judge of Bursa (Bursa kadısı) was the leading member of the religious bu-
reaucracy. He was the highest legal authority in the country with his areas of respon-
sibilities covering the administration of the judges and teachers, and the resolution of 
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religious and legal disputes between the residents of Bursa and between the members 
of the army. Due to the increasing burden on the judge of Bursa with the expansion 
of the state, another legal office called as the Kadıasker (judge of the army) was in-
stituted by Murat I. in 1363 and the judge of Bursa Çandarlı Halil Hayrettin Paşa was 
brought to its head (İpşirli, 1994: 267-269).  
 
Kadıasker was responsible for administering the educational and legal organizations, 
seeing to legal needs and disputes of the army and the ruling elite in time of war and 
peace. Kadıasker was a founding member of the Divan-ı Hümayun (The Imperial 
Court) and was granted the authority to issue judgments on behalf of the Sultan by 
Mehmet II in his Kanunname as one of three offices entitled to do it. The duties of 
Kadiasker in Divan-ı Humayun included delivering opinions in the area of Islamic 
law when needed, undertaking various responsibilities in statecraft, and seeing to the 
lawsuits falling in his domain of authority. Kadiasker was the representative of the 
ulema in Divan- Humayun and he was coming after the grand vizier in protocol (Uz-
unçarşılı, 1988: 151-157; Uzunçarşılı, v. 2, 1995: 589).  
 
Another leading member of the ulema playing an important role in Ottoman state 
structure was the Şeyhulislam. The office of Şeyhulislam was established during the 
reign of Murat II. in 1425 as an office of fatwa and Molla Şemseddin Fenari was 
appointed as first Şeyhulislam. The office remained as a supreme religious authority 
until 1922. While it was a modest institution in the beginning, Şeyhulislam was nom-
inated as the head of the ulema class and was promoted over the Kadiasker in reli-
gious hierarchy during the reign of Mehmet II. and it acquired a remarkable signifi-
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cance and respect during the tenor of Zenbilli Ali Efendi, Ibn Kemal and Ebussuud 
Efendi in the 16th century. Şeyhulislam was responsible for the appointment and 
promotion of the judges, muftis and medrese teachers. But more importantly, 
Şeyhulislam was a supreme office of fatwa. The domain of issues covered by the 
fatwas included by time the declaration of war and peace, taxation, deposition and 
killing of the Sultan or those issues of lesser political importance like prayers, inter-
actions (muamelat), innovations like coffee and tobacco to make the Şeyhulislam an 
important political actor with his powers of approval and control (Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 
173-214; İpşirli, 1991: 269-271; Uzunçarşılı, v.3, 1995: 449-450). The ruling elite 
and the slave bureaucracy were put in a hard position when they were not granted 
fatwas for various policies. For instance, the call of the II. Bayezid for fatwa from the 
Şeyhulislam Mevlana Zeynel Arabi to organize an expedition to Memluks for their 
sanctuary to Cem Sultan was rejected and the expedition was cancelled. The names 
of Sultans deposed and killed with the fatwa of the Şeyhulislam, on the other side, 
include Sultan Ibrahim in 1648, Mustafa IV. during the time of Mahmut II., Abdul-
Aziz in 1876, Murat V. and Abdulhamid II. (Dursun, 1989: 243-247). 
 
 
3.1.1.4. Religious Bureaucracy in Ottoman Kaza and Sanjak Administration: Judges 
(Kadıs and Mevleviyets)  
 
Starting with the foundation of the state, the Ottomans were appointing a judge to the 
conquered lands with the purpose of distributing justice. The conquest was consid-
ered as completed with the appointment of judges and subaşıs (military governor). 
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The judge of the Kazas was the highest legal, political and municipal authority in 
Kaza administration. He was appointed directly by the central authority and was not 
subject to the sanjak or provincial administrations. His main duty was solving disa-
greements among the public according to the laws of the Şeriat and the traditions, but 
he was also the head of administrative, financial, military and municipal matters in 
Kazas. The judge of the sanjaks, mevleviyet, was the highest legal authority in his 
unit, but was supposed to work in cooperation with Sanjak Beyi and Beylerbeyi in 
political and municipal matters. Thus it can be said that the members of the religious 
bureaucracy were granted extensive powers and authority in Ottoman peripheral 
government observing the application of Islamic law and order in their domain of 
government (Akdağ, 1974: 400-406; İpşirli, 1994: 263-267). 
 
 
3.1.2. The Period of Stagnation: Innovations and Reforms 
 
The Ottoman Empire was introduced to a process of innovations and reforms in its 
domestic structures taking speed with the late 17
th
 century due to a course of stagna-
tion shadowed out with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at Vienna in 1683. The 
defeat and the accompanying stagnation was closely associated with the shift of the 
balance of power between the Ottomans and the West against the Ottomans in mili-
tary, economic and technological domains. With the help of technological and scien-
tific advancements achieved, Europe had discovered the New World and had found 
new routes to the East to grow huge gold reserves in its treasure. European states had 
also improved their military and naval powers substantially. With the shift of superi-
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ority in military and economic domains to the West, the Ottomans were not able to 
deal with their traditional enemies and were introduced to a process of decline. The 
defeat in wars against Austria and Russia was also another source of economic dete-
rioration as the wars were an important revenue gate of the Ottomans. The process 
was further exacerbated with the capitulations (trade concessions) granted to some 
European states which led to the destruction of Ottoman economic and industrial 
development in progressively greater scales (Berkes, 1998: 23-25; Karpat, 1959: 3-8; 
Zürcher, 2007: 15-19; Ahmad, 2002: 34-43).  
 
 
3.1.2.1. The Tulip Era and Secularizing Trends  
 
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1714-1717 War against Austria and the signing 
of the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 remain a critical date in the history of Ottoman 
secularization. The defeat was interpreted by the Ottomans that it would not be pos-
sible any more to defeat the European powers with traditional military means and 
technology and that the Ottomans had to turn to Europe for inspiration and innova-
tions. Furthermore, the perception of growing threat from Russia and Austria was 
forcing the Ottomans to look for allies in the west French being the most notable 
candidate as it was also in trouble with the same countries. With the Treaty of Passa-
rowitz, the Ottomans were thus introduced to a process of close links with and obser-
vation of Europe that was intended to improve the military capabilities in the first 
place but also leading to a rise of interest in French civilization and culture (Karagöz, 
1995: 173-182; Ergil, 1987: 8). This particular period in Ottoman History, lasting 
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until the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730, is named as the Tulip Era to have underly-
ing effects in the process of innovations and reforms adopted in following years with 
substantial secularizing tendencies.  
 
Envoys were sent to various European countries, Mehmet Çelebi being one of them, 
for observations on European civilization and education, and to give reports on as-
pects of it that could be adopted by the Ottomans (Lewis, 2003: 45-46). Mehmet 
Çelebi had noted during his observations in France the effective usage of technology 
and science in military domain. He delivered a report to the incumbents for the re-
moval of traditional military system in favor of the adoption of more effective tech-
nology and methods, and invitation of foreign officers and technicians to do this job 
(Berkes, 1998: 33-36). The invitation of foreign officer corps and attempts to build 
European style military structures had some implications for secularist politics be-
cause the transfer of the elements of material culture involved the importation of var-
ious non-material cultures too attached to them in various ways. The employment of 
non-Muslim officer corps in the army was opposed by the ulema, first of all, as it 
was deemed against the religion to give Muslims under their authority. Secondly, 
there were issues and practices prescribed by religion in the education and applica-
tion of even very rigid areas of knowledge like mathematics, geometry, medicine and 
geography.  
 
But the Tulip Era was important in the process of Ottoman secularization mostly 
because of a spirit of worldliness that it generated. It was a period of time character-
ized with decline in moral and religious concerns and a rise of interest in the material 
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world exemplified with the cherishing of the elements of Western civilization, cul-
ture, literature, architecture and arts. The traditional rich segments of the Ottoman 
society liked spending money for mosque constructions and various religious en-
dowments in the past, but the Tulip era saw the construction of palaces, manors, 
pools, parks, gardens and fountains. It saw the emergence and proliferation of operas, 
taverns, parties and coffee houses (Berkes, 1998: 26-30). 
 
Ibrahim Müteferrika appears as the most leading reformist intellectual of the Tulip 
Era. He was the person opening the first official Ottoman printing permitted to be 
used for publication of non-religious items. Ibrahim was concerned with innovation 
and awakening in Islam. He defended the importance of introducing new methods 
and ideas from the west. In the book that he wrote on the causes of Ottoman stagna-
tion titled Usûlül Hikem fî Nizâmıl Umem, he argued that the Ottomans were falling 
behind Europe because of their inability to follow them in technological develop-
ments but also because of the failure to devise wise political methods, laws, proce-
dures and principles to establish viable political regimes unlike west. Ibrahim made a 
distinction between three types of government including monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy, and went on with the virtues of democratic government with its promo-
tion of popular representation and parliamentarianism. According to Ibrahim, the 
good governance that came with democratic movements in Europe was closely asso-
ciated with their advance in front of the Ottomans. The Muslims were in a state of 
ignorance. While adopting the latest military technology and methods, in the first 
place, the Muslims had to employ modern technological and political means to gain 
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wealth and establish unity among the Muslims with viable political and administra-
tive methods (Altuntek, 1993: 196-197). 
 
A class of conservatives was in the rise in the same period who were opposed to a 
total campaign of Westernization. Christianity was still an enemy of Islam for them. 
It was wrong to rely on the Christian states in partnership and alliance. Cultural and 
social westernization would also mean a denial of traditional Islamic heritage which 
was never acceptable. The betrayal of France in 1807 was a proof of this fact. French 
was indeed motivated to expand over the Ottoman lands. They argued that if the 
harmony of traditional institutions was broken, it might not have been possible to 
unite them again (Dursun, 1998: 251-257). 
 
 
3.1.3. The Period of Decline 
 
The Period of Ottoman decline starting with the defeat of the Ottoman Army in Ot-
toman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
caused a greater tide of innovations and reforms in the Ottoman Empire compared to 
the previous of Tulip Era. The War was mobilized with a discourse of Jihad, but the 
defeat meant that it would not be possible to deal with Russia with religious zeal and 
traditional military methods. It would not be enough for the Ottomans to adopt new 
military techniques and methods, but there was also a need to change their traditional 
social and cultures structures too. The failure was indeed related with some cultural 
and traditional traits of the Turkish people which were not adaptive to new methods 
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and technologies, and thus a radical transformation was needed in body politic 
(Shaw, 1971: 167). 
 
There were conservative oppositions to this thinking, however, stemming from an 
alliance of the ulema and the military. The conservatives stressed the importance of 
religious differences between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Their methods were 
unacceptable some times as seen in the denial of the European experts of the authori-
ty of the God on earth. They believed that wars can be won with military means only. 
Based on the history of wars between members of two religions, the conservatives 
never relied on the partnership and cooperation with Christian states. For them, the 
reformers were more like traitors. Modern methods and ideas of the West was a new 
stratagem to enslave the Muslims. The dispute turned violent at times, and conserva-
tives organized in various assaults against the reformer bureaucrats and the Padişahs; 
they ruled fatwas, agitated the army and preached for the repudiation of certain re-
forms and the punishment of those who introduced them (Zürcher, 2007: 24; Ahmad, 
2002: 34-43; Ahmad, 2007: 25-26).     
 
Yet Selim III.  was a strong supporter of the reformistsreformists’ cadres. He agreed 
with the idea of a comprehensive reform program that would cover all aspects of the 
life. A reform package called New Order (Nizamı Cedid) was launched to carry out 
desired reforms. Most remarkable reforms related with secular politics was the open-
ing of the Military Engineering School (Mühendishâne-i Berri Humâyun) in 1795 by 
the side of the Naval Engineering School (Mühendishâne-i Bahri Humâyun) estab-
lished by Mustafa III. in 1776. These schools were intended to replace the Janissary 
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army which was the most threatening member of the conservatives. The curricula of 
the schools did not include the traditional Islamic areas of knowledge covered in me-
dreses except the Arabic language but were rather decorated with modern sciences 
and areas of knowledge. Many of the teachers working in these schools were French 
officers and specialists. In addition to these, many other cartographers, astronomers, 
geographers, and even poets and painters were invited and recruited from France to 
raise the qualifications of Ottoman Army to the European standards. Many of the 
students who graduated from these schools would be the intellectual fathers of Otto-
man modernization. There was a sizable increase in the number of foreigners in the 
Ottoman Empire in this period. An impact of these officer corps on Ottoman secular 
tendencies was their introduction and enjoyment of some western manners and ways 
of life (Lewis, 2002: 57-60; Berkes, 1985: 111-112).   
 
There was a remarkable debate against religion during the period of New Order. 
Some reformists sought the causes of Ottoman decline in religious fanaticism and 
superstitions. Selim III. was in agreement with them and he was motivated to crash 
the ulema and the Janissarys as well as the authority of the Şeyhulislam for a more 
successful reform process. However, the ulema, Janissaries, ayans and derebeys unit-
ed against him to dethrone and kill. According to them, Selim was not a defender of 
Islam any more. He was more like a Frenchman (Berkes, 1998: 82-85; Ergil, 1987: 
12).  
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3.1.3.1. Mahmut II. 
 
The forerunner of the Tanzimat period II Mahmut was an intimate devotee of west-
ern civilization. For him, the recovery of the Ottoman Empire required a comprehen-
sive reform process covering military, political, administrative, legal and social do-
mains. To do this, he knew that he had to break the powers of the Janissaries and the 
ulema as they had aborted many reform attempts by previous Padişahs and states-
men.  
 
The Janissary army was abolished successfully in 1826 and a list of reforms in its 
aftermath. He maintained the tradition of inviting foreign officer corps to train and 
improve the army. A growing practice in the military domain, which was learnt from 
the Governor of Egypt Mehmet Ali, was the sending of military students to various 
countries of Europe for education. Two more military schools were opened by 
Mahmut II. for the modernization of the army in European style in addition to previ-
ously established military and naval engineering schools, i.e., Imperial Music School 
(Mızıkayı Humayun Mektebi) in 1831 and School of Military Sciences (Mektebi 
Ulumi Harbiye) in 1834. The first school was established to replace Mehterhaneyi 
Humayun to educate drummers and trumpeters for the army led by an Italian instruc-
tor, Donizetti Paşa. The second was opened as an example of French School of Mili-
tary Sciences with the medium of education being French and the curriculum being 
imported from its French model (Lewis, 2002: 80-84; Metin, 2010).     
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In the realm of civilian education, a School of Medicine (Mektebi Tıbbîye Şâhâne) 
was established in 1827. Dârul Ulûmu Hikemiye-i Osmanîye ve Mektebi Tibbiye 
Şâhâne (Ottoman Imperial School of Physical and Medical Sciences) was established 
in 1838 as an improved form of the medical school. All the Ottomans were able to go 
to these schools. Mektebi Maârifi Adliye and Mektebi Ulûmi Edebiye were estab-
lished to educate government translators and to translate scientific books from Euro-
pean languages (Berkes, 1985: 111-112; Göktaş, 2009: 19-21; Metin, 2010). These 
schools were built as secular schools attached to the Ministry of Education outside of 
the jurisdiction of Şeyhulislam. Many of the intellectuals, reformists and leading 
statesmen of the 19
th
 century were graduates of these schools (military and civilian) 
to be the vanguards of social, political, intellectual and educational modernization of 
the Ottoman Empire. They were the barracks of the emerging secular bureaucracy. 
While some of these schools gave education in French language, some others re-
quired the knowledge of French language from the students and they had Muslim and 
non-Muslim teachers. (Karagöz, 193-194; Shaw, 1983: 78; Mardin, 1983: 139-143; 
Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 232-233;).  
 
An important development in secularist politics during the reign of Mahmut II. was 
the introduction of a central bureaucratic system and transfer of the powers and au-
thority of the ulema to various ministries and directorates. The ulema was highly 
independent in terms of its revenues, employees and establishments in the past. They 
held courts and issued rulings from their own residences. But Mahmut II. opened an 
office and department of Chief Mufti and made them directly accountable to the pal-
ace. The Chief Mufti was an office holder appointed by the government. With the 
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establishment of the Ministry of Justice afterwards, the powers of the ulema was fur-
ther minimized as the appointment of teachers and judges, and administration of 
schools and colleges were transferred to the Ministry of Justice any more. Another 
important development in terms of the weakening of the ulema was the establishment 
of Directorate of Foundations. Religious Foundations (Evkaf) constituted a serious 
revenue gate for the conservative ulema. To break one of the economic power bases 
of the ulema, II. Mahmut established the Directorate of Foundations. The directorate 
took the foundations under a central authority by which the revenues were collected 
from one hand and distributed directly for religious purposes in constructing 
mosques, paying the salaries of religious staff and in other religious activities (Lewis, 
2002: 92-94; Berkes, 1998: 98-99). 
 
 
3.1.3.2. Tanzimat Period 
 
Tanzimat period was the real beginning of Ottoman modernization. The reforms that 
it brought were far more extensive than previous reform attempts penetrating to al-
most all domains of Ottoman life. It was an important milestone in Ottoman seculari-
zation with various reforms introduced in political, administrative, legal, social and 
educational realms. The period started with the declaration of the Gülhane Hatt-ı 
Hümayun in 1839 soon after the death of Mahmut II. and continued until the declara-
tion of first Ottoman Constitution in 1876.   
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One of the most significant achievements of the Tanzimat reforms was the introduc-
tion of a concept of Ottoman citizenship. This was important as the traditional Otto-
man society was a Muslim dominant society with rights and privileges over the non-
Muslim subjects of the state. This was the part of a thinking called Ottomanism to 
prevent nationalistic secessions from the Empire particularly in the Balkans. This 
issue was handled more seriously with the Reform Edict in 1856. As a part of this 
concept, the non-Muslim members of the society were allowed to benefit from many 
rights and privileges granted to the Muslims. The notion of justice and equality was 
taken to the center of legal, political and administrative processes (Karpat, 1959: 10-
11).  
 
 
3.1.3.2.1. Secular Reforms in Legal Domain 
 
In the legal domain, an important development was the introduction of a Penal Code 
in 1840 with parts of its articles and methods borrowed from the French Penal Code. 
Another Penal Code was prepared in 1858 with more borrowings from western 
sources. A Commercial Code was adopted in 1850 based on French Commercial 
Code by which first time the concepts of interest and bill of exchange were intro-
duced to the Ottoman legal system. Statutory Courts (Nizamiye Mahkemeleri) were 
established in 1840 operating according to secular principles to see to criminal and 
commercial cases. As a deviation from the traditional Islamic legal system, Statutory 
Courts embodied Muslim and non-Muslim judges at the same time and the witness-
ing of the non-Muslims were accepted in the courts from then. A Land Law was in-
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troduced in 1858 according to which ownership and inheritance was regulated ac-
cording to secular principles of equality of man and woman. A process of the codifi-
cation of the Şeriat was in order sometimes in itself and sometimes in unity with sec-
ular European laws. A Civil Code was prepared by Ahmet Cevdet Paşa according to 
Hanefi school of Jurisprudence completed in 1876, but aspects of family and person-
al law were excluded from the codification as a deviation from classical Islamic law. 
Codification of Islamic law was important insofar as it opened the gate of ijtihad as a 
chance to introduce some changes in Islamic law (Ortaylı, 1986: 165-167; Ergil, 
1987: 24-27). 
 
 
3.1.3.2.2. Secular Reforms in Education 
 
There were remarkable secular reforms in the educational realm also. At the primary 
school level, priority was given to the opening and proliferation of Rüşdiyes to edu-
cate students for government offices, military and medical schools. The traditional 
sıbyan mekteps and medreses run by the ulema were not able to raise students for 
newly established bureaucratic cadres and high schools, and instead of reforming the 
traditional religious schools which would agitate the conservatives, a decision was 
made to establish new schools under the authority of Ministry of Education. The cur-
riculum of Rüşdiye’s were filled with modern sciences including mathematics, geog-
raphy, history, French language, painting in addition to a limited number of courses 
on Arabic, Iranian and religion. Rüşdiyes did not have the heavy load of religious 
courses taught in medreses and sıbyan mekteps. In 1845, idadis were established as 
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the secondary school division of the Rüşdiyes to serve to the same purpose. Another 
important development was the opening of Darulmuallimin in 1848 and Darulmual-
limat in 1970 (Male and Female Teacher Schools) with the purpose of meeting 
teacher needs of Rüşdiyes and Idadis based on secular thinking and modern educa-
tional curriculum (Berkes, 1998: 175-192; Ortaylı, 2005: 183-185; Metin, 2010).   
 
In addition to Rüşdiyes and Idadis, the Tanzimat period saw the opening of Sultanis, 
first one being the Galatasaray Sultanisi established in 1868 with an intention to give 
high quality of education for government offices and military schools. Galatasaray 
Sultanisi was characterized as a very highly secular school giving education in 
French language. Many of the teachers were French and many of its students were 
non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. The school was under the authority of French 
Ministry of Education. Appointments were made by the French ministry. Its curricu-
lum included education of modern and ancient European languages, modern social 
and natural sciences, and law (Lewis, 2002: 122; Davison, 1990: 173; Ortaylı, 2005: 
184; Berkes, 1985: 116-117).   
 
At the level of higher education, a number of developments draw attention. Mektebi 
Mulkiye (School of Government) was established in 1859 to educate students for 
non-military government offices. The graduates of Mulkiyes would work in adminis-
trative, legal and municipal jobs. The students in this school were taught economy, 
law, international relations, statistics etc. with addition of some other courses after-
wards. Mektebi Hukuk (School of Law) was opened in 1860 to meet the personnel 
 59 
 
needs of Statutory Courts like judges and the others, the offices formerly occupied by 
the graduates of higher medreses (Davison, 1990: 171).       
 
Şinasi appeared as a leading intellectual of the Tanzimat period who advocated and 
supported the necessity of westernization reforms in the Ottoman Empire. He is 
known as the father of the movement of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. In 
his writings, he elaborated on ideas of citizenship rights, freedom of expression, pub-
lic opinion, liberal ideas, national consciousness, constitution and liberty. He intro-
duced many literary works and forms from European literature including theatre, 
poetry and stories. He translated many books and literary pieces from European lan-
guages (Berkes, 1998: 197-198; Mardin, 2006: 296-306).   
 
 
3.1.3.3. The Period of Constitutionalism 
 
The period of Ottoman Constitutionalism starting with the declaration of the Otto-
man Constitution and the opening of the parliament had many implications for secu-
lar politics. While Article 11 of the Constitution indicated that “the religion of the 
state is Islam,” the removal of the Muslim and non-Muslim differentiation, institu-
tionalization of the concept of Ottoman citizenship, and introduction of various rights 
and liberties were important steps towards secularization. The articles of the Consti-
tution from 8 to 26 pertaining to common rights of the subjects incorporated provi-
sions about freedoms and rights of the citizens including citizenship rights, personal 
freedom, personal safety, freedom of belief, freedom of press, right to petition, right 
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to be civil servant, inviolability of private property, prohibition of torture among 
many others (Shaw and Shaw, 2004: 222; Ortaylı, 1986: 167-168).   
 
 
3.1.3.3.1. Influence of the Young Ottomans  
 
It is argued that behind the declaration of the first Ottoman constitution, there was 
the influence of intellectual currencies of thought propagated by the Young Ottomans 
(Genç Osmanlılar). Young Ottomans were intelligent much as they were intellectual. 
They were aware of the potential of a conservative backlash against reform attempts 
and thus they followed a road from within Islamic doctrines for the introduction of 
reforms. They often argued that Islam was not irreconcilable with reform and many 
of the European political institutions and principles were embodied within the text of 
Islam. What needed was a careful interpretation (Davison, 1963: 219-233).     
 
Namık Kemal was a leading member of the Young Ottomans. For him, the cause of 
the Ottoman failure was political and economic and the recovery was through educa-
tion and constitutionalism. He argued that Islam and liberal constitutionalism were 
not in contradiction. While there were significant differences between classical Is-
lamic political doctrines and contemporary political ideas, Islam was open to renova-
tion and change depending on the circumstances. The west had been superior to the 
Ottoman Empire due to the promotion of the ideas of liberty and progress. The Ot-
tomans thus also had to adopt contemporary political and legal developments in the 
west by establishing a republican regime, a parliamentary government assigning the 
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sovereignty to the people, and taking the public will and consent as the source of 
political action (Davison, 1963: 223-231; Berkes, 1998: 209-213; Karpat, 1959: 12-
13).      
 
According to Namık Kemal, the Tanzimat reforms had many erroneous applications. 
The idea of cultural westernization was not right in case of the Ottoman Empire for it 
did not have anything to do with Ottoman progress and recovery. The Ottomans had 
to keep their loyalty to traditional Islamic values. They were the foundations of the 
Ottoman society and attempts to remove them would be an attempt to our existence. 
Reforms had to be worked from within Islam (Berkes, 1998: 216-217).     
 
The fate of the first Ottoman Constitution and the parliament did not last long, how-
ever, due to the outbreak of the War with Russia in 1877. They were suspended in-
definitely. The period was followed with a regime of oppression. The intellectual 
champers were occupied by the Young Turks this time who defended the restoration 
of the Constitution and the Parliament. Contrary to the Young Ottomans, the Young 
Turks displayed a positivist outlook in their approach to religion and politics (Bellah, 
1958: 2). They were reactive to the authoritarian and dictatorial Hamidian regime. 
They were closer to the secular constitutionalism of the Tanzimat reformers in out-
look. 
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3.1.3.3.2. Secularist Policies during Second Constitutionalism 
 
After the declaration of Second Ottoman Constitutionalism in 1908, it is observed 
that the Şeyhülislam was trying to enhance his powers and authority over various 
political, administrative, educational and other institutions. He had a seat in the cabi-
net and he was the head of Şeriat Courts as well as the Ministry of Foundations. 
Turkists and the Westernists were against an office of Şeyhülislam with extensive 
powers. They had an opportunity to curb the powers of Şeyhülislam during the First 
World War when the Union and Progress Party had taken the government under its 
total control. He was first removed from the cabinet in 1916 and his jurisdiction over 
Şeriat Courts was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. A secular court of appeals 
was established above the religious courts, and the duty of the appointment of judges 
was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. The administration of the foundations was 
transferred to the Ministry of Foundations. And finally his traditional authority over 
the medreses was transferred to the Ministry of Education (Berkes, 1998: 416-418; 
Ergil, 1987: 45-47). 
 
In legal and administrative domains, the Law of Family Rights was adopted in 1817 
in which the secular and religious concerns were united. In the new Family Law, the 
women were allowed to start a divorce case. In case of an attempt to polygamy by 
the husband, the wife would be able to apply to the court for divorce. Various public, 
educational, and participatory rights were granted to women in sociopolitical life. In 
1916 and 1917, western calendar was adopted to in place of the Hijri calendar with 
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an excuse of removing the problems encountered in temporal and fiscal matters 
(Shaw and Shaw, 2004: 365-367).   
 
 
3.2 Republican Period  
 
After the end of the Independence War, which was supported by the religious and 
bureaucratic elites at the same time, Atatürk and his close friends, who were educat-
ed in the societies of late Ottoman bureaucratic elites, started a campaign of modern-
ization and westernization much deeper and more comprehensive than its examples 
during the Ottoman Empire, most commonly  named  as the Kemalist Revolutions 
that negated the classical status of the religious elite as equal in power to the secular-
ist elite. The goal of the Kemalist Revolution was summarized by Atatürk as elevat-
ing the Turkish nation to the level of contemporary civilizations. The idea of con-
temporary civilization held by Atatürk and his associates had a very broad character, 
aiming to transform the Turkish nation in all political, economic, social and cultural 
spheres (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 233-235; Davison, 2002: 219, 237-238; Zürcher, 
2007: 172-173). The roots of this thinking in the west date back to the Enlightenment 
era and the idea of liberating man from the scholastic medieval thinking nurtured by 
religious institutions of the time.  
 
Having their origins in their admiration of western modernization, Kemalist state 
elites construed religion as an obstacle to Turkey’s journey to contemporary civiliza-
tion. Religion was a source of fanaticism, ignorance and hatred against progress and 
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reason. In a modern society there could have been no place for religion (Davison, 
2002: 237-238, 248-253, 263, 265; Mahçupyan, 1998: 54; Öniş, 2006b: 104, 106; 
Heper, 1981: 249-251; Erdoğan, 2005; Lewis, 2002: 267-271; Tamimi, 2000: 9-12). 
Serif Mardin describes religion as a very central part of the traditional Turkish socie-
ty with its function to mystify certain rituals and practices, obscuring Turkey’s goals 
for modernization and development like a wolf trap (Mardin, 1983: 154-157).   
 
Consequently, secularism was presented as a very strong characteristic of the Turkish 
Republic. The type of secularism adopted by the state elites was a very assertive one 
which was deemed to be the only way to break the institutional hold of Islam over 
the state and the society (Kuru, 2009: 173-176). Contrary to the role of religion in the 
majority of the Christian world, Islam had penetrated all aspects of sociopolitical life 
in Muslim Turkish society, and accordingly, a much more radical theme of secular-
ism was supposed to be introduced to countervail its power. In turn, a secular nation-
alism and rationalism was introduced as the new official identity to replace the tradi-
tional religious identity and to fill the resultant moral vacuum. This new identity was 
indoctrinated to the people in newly established social centers like People’s Houses 
(Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 233-235; Bellah, 1958: 3; Mahçupyan, 1998: 65). However, 
it is very commonly argued that Kemalism was not able to present an alternative mo-
rality addressing people’s reason and conscience, and thus its cultural modernization 
theme was doomed to fail.  
 
Religion was pushed to the margins of the private life of citizens and religious insti-
tutions were taken under the control of public authority. Caliphate was abolished and 
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the office of sheikh ‘l-Islam was replaced by the Presidency of Religious Affairs and 
Directorate of Foundations (Davison, 2002: 220). Reforms were introduced to erase 
the signs of religion in public life (Heper, 1981: 249-251; Zürcher, 2007: 172-173; 
Toprak, 2005: 170). A radical example of these reforms was the prohibition of the 
fez, turban and other religious attire and introduction of hat law (Davison, 2002: 237-
238; Lewis, 2002: 267-271, 402-404). Even further, these reforms were sometimes 
introduced with a discourse of “breaking the idols.” The Islamic dress style was an 
idol, the Islamic calendar was an idol, Islamic law was an idol and the Arabic alpha-
bet was another idol, all of which had to be replaced with their versions from the 
“civilized” Western world (Ahmad, 2002: 99-101). Reforms were deemed necessary 
to destroy the power of religious ideas, traditions and arrangements in front of devel-
opment and progress. Turkish secularism is thus most commonly interpreted as an 
example of modernization against Islam (Davison, 2002: 214; Esposito, 1998: 98).  
 
Table 1 below presents a list of leading reforms adopted by Atatürk and his followers 
during the early Republican period, in line with this tradition of approach to the state 
of affairs between religion and politics. It could be very easily observed here that 
these secularist reforms and policies are part of a social and cultural project as well 
as having political motivations that aim to introduce new forms of life to break the 
institutional bond of religion on Turkish social, cultural and political life.   
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Table 1: Secularist Reforms and Policies during the Republican Era  
-Abolition of the Caliphate, the office of Sheikh ‘l-Islam, and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, 1924 
 
-Establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Reisliği) 
and the Directorate-General of Foundations (Evkaf Müdürlüğü), 1924 
 
-Introduction of the Law of Unity of Education (Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu), 
closure of centers for Religious Brotherhoods and Orders, those places known 
as lodges, hermitages and medresehs (tekke, zaviye ve medreseler), 1924 
 
-Closure of the Progressive Republican Party due to accusations that it became 
a center of anti-secularist opposition, 1925  
 
-Introduction of the dress reform and Hat Law prohibiting religious attire such 
as fez and male turban, 1925   
 
-Adoption of the Gregorian calendar and abolition of the lunar calendar, 1925 
 
-Adoption of Swiss Civil Code, 1926  
 
-Replacement of Arabic Alphabet with the Latin Alphabet, 1928 
 
-Removal of the constitutional article pertaining to Islam as the official religion 
of the state, 1929 
 
-Removal of religious courses from the school curricula, from 1933-1940s    
 
-Adoption of penal, commercial and procedural laws imported from various 
European countries 
 
-Adoption of Western metric system of measurement,  
 
-Closure of the Free Republican Party on the grounds that it became a center 
for anti-secularist opposition, 1930   
 
-Introduction of the surname law, 1934 
 
-Change of the official week holiday from Friday to Sunday, 1935 
 
-Change of the language of Prayer Calls from Arabic into Turkish, 1932-1950  
 
-Prohibition of going for Pilgrimage, 1934-1947 
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This holistic secularism was implemented by a class of state elites. During the early 
republican period, Atatürk, İsmet İnonü, and his other close associates were the main 
actors of the state elites, applying their influence through the office of the presidency, 
the office of the prime minister, the government, parliament and the Republican Peo-
ple’s Party. With the rise of the Democrat Party after the introduction of multiparty 
politics and its electoral victory, the role of the government and the parliament in the 
state elites was interrupted. The settlement of the military as the leading actor of the 
state elites, which was not as active then as it is now, corresponded to the time after 
the 1960 military coup, when the Turkish Armed Forces were identified in the 1961 
Constitution as the guardian of the Turkish state against internal and external threats 
– a duty incorporated in the internal service code of the Turkish Armed Forces too. 
Today, the members of the state elites include the military judiciary, the Republican 
People’s Party, some media centers, some business, trade and industrial unions, secu-
larist intellectuals, and some professional groups (Heper, 1985: 48-149; Toprak, 
2005: 170).  
 
This particular class of state elites has adopted an idea of the state above society, 
with their responsibility being to enlighten, educate and guide the people; to discover 
and implement policies for the public’s good and interests. It is therefore a class 
characterized with elitism, responsible politics and strong leadership. The public 
good and interest deliberated by the state elites has been executed in a comprehen-
sive westernization and modernization program with a positivist outlook to be guided 
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by science and reason (Heper, 1985: 48-66; Özbudun, 1994: 192-200; Mahçupyan, 
1998).  
 
 
3.3 The Multiparty Political Era   
 
The introduction of multiparty politics brought a set of changes in the rigid secularist 
line of the state elites, led by the Republican Peoples Party of the time. The RPP was 
troubled by electoral concerns. They were fearful that the party’s militant secularist 
policies over the previous twenty years had attracted a great deal of resentment from 
the people, and that this would cause them a disastrous electoral experience. To this 
end, the RPP demonstrated an inclination to bring in some liberties for religious 
practice. Some of them that could be cited here are opening the tombs and shrines to 
the public, removing the legal barrier against going on Pilgrimage, permitting the 
recruitment of religious preachers in the army, introducing elective religion lessons 
in schools, opening Imam-Hatip Courses in various cities to meet the need for reli-
gious services, establishing the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University, voting af-
firmative for the return to Arabic prayer calls in an initiative proposed by the DP 
deputies, and endorsement of the anti-communist fatwa of the Directorate of Reli-
gious Affairs (Ahmad, 1994: 440-442; Zürcher, 2007: 233; Bozan, 2007: 13-14).    
 
Despite these attempts, the RPP lost the elections to Adnan Menderes’s Democrat 
Party in 1950. But the concerns of the state elites about republican and secularist 
reforms continued, as the nature of the threat changed. The new liberties introduced 
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were never meant to abandon the Kemalist reforms. The RPP had lost control of the 
government. The liberal rightist DP was provided with an important mechanism to 
address the calls of the public for religious rights, freedoms and reforms – only to 
draw the opposition of the RPP deputies. Accordingly, the DP tried to exploit the 
religious feelings of the people for electoral purposes, and the RPP had to protect 
their reforms. The DP had passed the amendment of Article 524 of the Penal Code, 
relating to the reading of prayer call in Turkish: the Imams would be free to recite 
prayer calls in Arabic or Turkish upon their choice. The ban on Koran recitations via 
radio was removed; formerly elective religious courses were made mandatory; per-
mission was given for production and marketing of religious publications; and there 
was a striking rise in the number of mosques and preacher schools. The Imam-Hatip 
Courses were turned into Imam-Hatip Schools. In 1959, Higher Islamic Institutes 
were established for the graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools to continue their education 
and training (Ahmad, 1994: 440-442; Zürcher, 2007: 233; Landau, 1978: 248-254; 
Bozan, 2007: 14-15). DP’s controversial policies were accompanied by speeches by 
Adnan Menderes promising the removal of the dress reform and return to the Arabic 
alphabet. The Imams’ verbal attacks on the RPP in speeches were an equally im-
portant concern to the RPP.  
 
The DP presented itself as a centrist party opposed to religious radicalism. And this 
was true to a great extent, which could be ascertained from their various campaigns 
against centers of religious radicalism, and plenty of other examples: the DP gov-
ernment had closed various Islamic journals, such as Büyük Doğu, Sebilurreşat and 
İslamiyet; the leading religious nationalist ideologue Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was 
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brought to court and; a DP party member from Samsun, Hasan Fehmi Ustaoğlu, was 
dismissed from the party for demurring to Atatürk. Said Nursi was brought to court, 
charged with secretly undermining the republican and secularist foundations of the 
state. Millet Partisi (Nation Party) was closed on grounds of violating secularist re-
forms. And similarly, Türkiye Milliyetçiler Derneği (Turkish Nationalists Founda-
tion) was closed for being an anti-communist organization (Ahmad, 1994: 444-447; 
Landau, 1978: 263-267; Kırçak, 2001a: 59, 63-67). In many of these cases, the DP 
was supported by the RPP too, to become a parallel group of state elites declaring its 
determination to protect republican values. The RPP was too committed to sacrifice 
Kemalist reforms for religious freedoms.  
 
Another important issue of the time concerning religious radicalism was the presence 
of a Sufi order called Tijanis. Tijanis were known for their attacks to Atatürk busts 
and statutes and their calls for return to Arabic prayer calls. In a typical response to 
such opposition, the RPP and DP countered Tijanis by closing the order and sentenc-
ing its leader to ten years’ imprisonment. In 1951, the DP passed the Atatürk law in 
the parliament to prohibit and establish punishments for defaming Atatürk (Zürcher, 
2007: 233; Landau, 1978: 262-263; Kırçak, 2001b: 53-54). Though the DP drew the 
attention of the secularist forces, its religious agenda was very limited. and often it 
reflected electoral concerns. The DP’s religious reforms were introduced within the 
framework of freedom of belief and conscience; for this reason, the DP had passed a 
law in the parliament in 1953 to protect the freedom of conscience. 
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The DP was critical of the militant secularism of the state elites as well as their elitist 
formation. Accordingly, it was not right to consider the nation as a collection of peo-
ple inclined to backwardness and bigotry who could be kept under control with 
weapons and bayonets. The idea that religion hinders progress and has to be mini-
mized or even deleted in a modern society was not acceptable. The RPP had to re-
spect freedom of belief and conscience or risk losing power (Ahmad, 1994: 446; Zü-
rcher, 2007: 234). 
 
The 27 May regime established after the 1960 military intervention introduced some 
other changes in the nature of the state elites’ secularism. The government was dis-
solved and a military junta was established to rule for the next 18 months. Contrary 
to what was expected, the National Unity Committee did not attempt to reintroduce 
the militant secularism of the early republican period. They rather observed some 
functional benefits in the use of religion for some public purposes. Religion would be 
employed in producing peace and stability in the country. For this reason, the NUC 
endeavored to give a national and also a progressive nature to religious institutions. 
Religion would have stayed pure and it would not have been subject to political ex-
ploitation if it had been taken under state control. The idea of reading the Quran and 
the prayer calls in Turkish was totally abandoned. Contrary to earlier members of the 
state elites, religion was not deemed as a source of backwardness, bigotry and unrea-
son by the junta leaders. It was counterproductive to be inimical to religion and reli-
gious services. It was argued that domestic tension was not produced by elements of 
Islamic culture, but likely originating from foreign influence. Wearing Çarşaf, for 
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instance, was a tradition imported from the Christians (Ahmad, 1994: 450-453; Lan-
dau, 1978: 257-259; Kırçak, 1993: 100-101).  
 
The NUC had adopted the religious reforms the DP implemented in 1950s, and even 
added to them. The curricula of the Imam-Hatip schools and High Islamic Institutes 
were supplemented with addition of modern sciences so that they could produce bet-
ter teachers. This paradigmatic change did not mean that the NUC opposed Kemalist 
reforms. The NUC believed that Turkification of religion would be demanded by the 
people themselves as they grew more aware of their culture and history (Ahmad, 
1994: 452-453).  
 
After the return to democracy, the parties were again showing inclinations to employ 
religion in their political campaigns. Both the RPP and the newly established Justice 
Party (JP), led by Süleyman Demirel, argued that they had brought many religious 
freedoms and that they would do more for the pious if they were elected, while also 
accusing one another of antireligious inclinations. Demirel and his deputies were 
often accused of being Freemasons, and the RPP of being a communist party. Free-
masons were servants to Israel and Judaism, and therefore they were enemies of Is-
lam. The RPP, on the other hand, was trying to destroy religion and morality in the 
country under the façade of secularism. RPP was also accused of planning to close 
the mosques and religious schools. The JP won the elections in 1965. The broad pol-
icy goals of the JP included many religious reforms. The number of Imam-Hatip 
schools and Koran courses was rising. The JP was leading a campaign to open an 
Imam-Hatip school in every city, and clearing the way for their students to enter uni-
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versities, a goal that they had achieved in 1976. Religion was employed as an im-
portant tool for combating radical leftist ideology. Religion was also deemed to help 
ameliorate social problems related to rapid economic development (Ahmad, 1994: 
454-459; Bozan, 2007: 16-17; Kırçak, 2001b: 60-61). 
 
In 1970, a new actor emerged in Islamic politics that would dominate the political 
venue for the next 30 years. Necmettin Erbakan established the National Order Party 
(NOP) by splitting from the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel. The NOP entered 
Turkish political life with an ambitious religious conservative agenda that included 
the goal of instituting an Islamic society, a society with all its facets in agreement 
with Islam. The party promised to introduce radical reforms when they entered the 
government: cinemas, theatres, and bailey schools would be closed, and football 
would be prohibited. Such policy promises put a lot of material in the hand of public 
prosecutors to bring the party into the courtroom for closure. And so was it done af-
ter the military memorandum of 1971 (Ahmad, 1994, 460-461; Landau, 1978: 274-
275).   
 
The change of leadership in the RPP from İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit had added 
some new ideological views to the RPP program. The party had assumed a center left 
social democratic policy line. Ecevit was proposing to introduce land reform in the 
entire country. He was accusing Erbakan of being a capitalist for his opposition to 
land reform. Despite their differences, Ecevit and Erbakan formed a coalition gov-
ernment between 1974 and 1977. As the vice-premier, Erbakan held a number of 
important ministries. The state elites were alarmed by the rise of his power. Bureau-
 74 
 
cracy and educational institutions were being occupied by Erbakan’s cadres. The 
secondary school level of the Imam-Hatip schools was reopened, and plenty of new 
Imam-Hatip schools were opened with the initiative of the NSP branch of the gov-
ernment. In his election campaigns, Erbakan promised a mosque and a Koran course 
in every village, an Imam-Hatip school in every county, a High Islamic Institute in 
every city; Ayasofya would be opened to prayer. Erbakan was distressing the state 
elites with his religious campaign (Ahmad, 1994: 462-464: Bozan, 2007: 16-17).  
 
Towards the 1980s, quelling a state of armed interdenominational conflict was at the 
top of the agenda of secularist politics. In various cities of the country, there had ap-
peared a Sunni-Alawite clash. The Alawites were being accused of apostasy and 
communism, and they were thus targeted by the Sunnis. The Alawites were most 
often supportive of RPP and they were indeed its most loyal voters. What followed 
were massacres of Alawites, martial law, and eventually the military intervened to 
prevent their slaughter (Ahmad, 1994: 466-567).   
 
During the same period, the Iranian revolution took place. It had a great impact on 
religious political groups in the country, and the state elites feared that the revolution 
would spread to Turkey and other neighboring countries. It was claimed that Iran 
was providing propaganda and money to the revolutionaries in Turkey. In 1979, the 
National Salvation Party organized a meeting in Konya, called the Jerusalem Meet-
ing. The meeting soon turned into a radical religious demonstration, with the partici-
pants, wearing fez and other religious attire, chanting various slogans for the intro-
duction of Şeriat law. All of these events brought religious radicalism to the top of 
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the agenda as an anti-secularist threat that, the government decided, had to be coun-
tered with serious measures (Ahmad, 1994: 467-468).  
 
 
3.4 The Gates of State Elites to Politics 
 
The ways individual members of the state elites exercise power in politics differ from 
one another in contemporary Turkey, though often they act in accordance with their 
interpretation of their role in society, and their duties to it. The most powerful mem-
ber of the state elites is the military, the author of three coups d’état, carried out in 
1960, 1971 and 1980. The involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces in the political 
process is legitimized by some constitutional provisions and internal service codes 
that charge the army with the duties to protect the country against internal and exter-
nal threats and guard the secular constitutional system. The Internal Service Code of 
the Turkish Armed Forces describes the duty of the Turkish army as the protection of 
the country and the Republic of Turkey as it is identified by the Constitution (Article 
35). And similarly, Internal Service Regulation of the Turkish Armed Forces rule 
that Turkish Armed Forces defends  the country against internal and external threats 
by force if necessary (Article 85). These provisions have constituted the legal 
framework for the military interventions of the last century, as well as the Armed 
Forces’ safe exit from political engagement without legal prosecution (Özbudun, 
1999: 110; Heper and Güney, Summer 2000: 620-621; İba, 1998: 147-148).  
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The military is thus granted the right to take unilateral action without consent of the 
political elites in case they perceive the need to defend against a threat, to reserve 
peace and security, and to enjoy extensive tutelary powers. The National Security 
Council, established by the 1961 Constitution and still active today after certain 
reformations, is the administrative organ that assembles military and civilian bureau-
crats to deliberate national security issues and to deliver the recommendations of the 
Armed Forces to civilian authorities. The members of the National Security Council 
(NSC) include the president, prime minister, chief of general staff, deputies of the 
prime minister, attorney general, minister of defense, minister of interior, minister of 
foreign affairs, commanders of the Turkish ground, air and naval forces, and the 
commander of the gendarmerie forces. The NSC serves as a leading platform for 
military bureaucrats to apply their tutelary powers in the country by communicating 
their views to the political elites on a regular basis. Article 118 of the Constitution 
stipulates that the NSC deliver its views to the Council of Ministers “on taking deci-
sions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, determina-
tion and implementation of the national security policy of the State.” The involve-
ment of the NSC in politics is enhanced with a very broad definition of national secu-
rity in Article 2 of the Law of National Security Council. Article 2 defines national 
security as the protection of the constitutional order, national existence and integrity; 
promotion of the interest of the country in the international field in all social, politi-
cal, cultural and economic domains; and preservation of interests originating from 
international treaties vis-à-vis internal and external threats (Özbudun, 1999: 108; 
Cizre, January 1997: 157-158; Hale, 1996: 272-273; Heper, 2002: 55-66; Cizre and 
Çınar, 2003: 320-322).  
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In addition to the NSC, the military delivers its messages to the authorities and the 
general public through press releases, speeches, and most recently through official 
websites. A recent example of military involvement in Turkish politics vis-à-vis Is-
lam were actuated after a NSC meeting held on February 28 1997, and ensuing 
communication between the military and the government to take necessary actions to 
combat religious radicalism; another is a memorandum issued through the website of 
the Office of Chief of General Staff on 27 April 2007 against the candidacy of Ab-
dullah Gül for presidential elections with a declaration that the military may inter-
vene into the process if the first round of the presidential elections are not cancelled.  
 
The judiciary, secondly, can get involved in aspects of party politics through the 
Constitutional Court and the public prosecutor of the Supreme Court, by monitoring 
whether the parties are observing their legal obligations. In the case of the religious 
right, the Judiciary is particularly attentive to inspect specific party policies and pro-
grams to check whether they abide the principle of secularism. In cases where the 
relevant organs of the judiciary observe that a party is violating this particular princi-
ple, they can initiate a court case for the punishment of the party. The court case 
starts with the Public Prosecutor’s presentation of a file to the parliament for the 
prosecution of the party. If the application passes the votes of the parliament with a 
2/3 majority of votes, the file is brought to the Constitutional Court. The Constitu-
tional Court can decide to punish the party with a majority of two-third of the votes. 
Legal provisions involving the prosecution of a party for violating the principle of 
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secularism are located in articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and Law of Political 
Parties. The article 68 paragraph 4 of the constitution stipulates that: 
… The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall 
not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity 
with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule 
of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular 
republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship 
or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime…  
 
Article 69 continues that it is the Constitutional Court which determines whether a 
party is violating article 68, paragraph 4 of the Constitution after the filing of a suit 
by the Chief of Public Prosecutor of the Republic. The Constitutional Court shall 
decide the dissolution of a party if it determines that the party is a center of activities 
against 68:4, if party organs execute such activities intensively and in determination. 
If the violation is not executed intensively and in determination, the Court can decide 
to deprive the party of state aid wholly or partly. Party members who have caused the 
closure of the party “cannot be founders, members, directors or supervisors in any 
other party for a period of five years.” And finally, “political parties that accept fi-
nancial assistance from foreign states, international institutions and persons and cor-
porate bodies shall be dissolved permanently.” 
 
Article 101 of the Law of the Political Parties, another source of judicial action 
against political parties, similarly rules that the legal power to dissolve a party is held 
by the Constitutional Court in cases of the violation of article 68 of the Constitution 
by a party seeking power, perpetrating and provoking such actions or accepting ma-
terial assistance from foreign sources. The degree of punishment, ranging from party 
closure to budgetary cuts, will depend on the intensity and magnitude of violations. 
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Before opening a lawsuit against a party for this matter, the Public Prosecutor corre-
sponds with the party to allow explanations for the violations stated; if the party does 
not or cannot provide them, the Public Prosecutor applies to the Constitutional Court.   
 
In addition to its role in party closure cases, the Constitutional Court embodies the 
leading actor of the state elites with regard to determining the limits of secularism to 
be observed by political elites and other actors. Article 24, paragraph 5 of the Consti-
tution stipulates that:  
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or 
things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of 
personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, 
social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets. 
 
This provision of the Constitution is important in the sense that political elites or any 
other entity cannot refer to religion as a source of social and economic action, nor 
legal and political action. More clearly, the Constitution decrees a concept of secular-
ism that prohibits religion from social, economic, political and legal action, to repre-
sent one of the most comprehensive conceptions of secularism in the world. 
 
The media, thirdly, serves the cause of the state elites in a variety of ways. The most 
important function of the media vis-à-vis secularist politics is its service as a set of 
publicity, publication and broadcasting institutions through which the leading mem-
bers of the state elites – the military and the judiciary – deliver their messages and 
opinions to the public and to Islamist politicians. It is also employed as a platform of 
debate and deliberation for the professional and intellectual members of the state 
elites to share their deliberative processes with the public. An equally important 
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function of the media, which was very commonly used during the February 28 Pro-
cess, is its service as a body of surveillance over religious politics, allowing the state 
to discover and decipher anti-secular activities of various religious actors.  
 
The business and industrial community, fourthly, can join in the strongly secularist 
coalition as an economic interest group. As a part of the private economic sector 
holding a sizable part of the economy in their hands, the opinions they express and 
particular economic policies they adopt can bear a great deal of importance for the 
economic base of the country. They constitute an economic support base for the gen-
erality of state elites.   
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, an analysis is offered to the emergence, characteristics and mecha-
nisms of secularism assumed by Turkish state elites starting with an examination of 
the nature the relationship between religion and politics in Ottoman Empire. Classi-
fied as an Islamic state in its origins, the Ottoman state was introduced to a process 
of westernization and secularization due to a state of weakening against the west ex-
emplified in military defeats, economic retreat and administrative problems. The 
state was met with an increasingly greater tone of reform agenda first aiming to ren-
ovate the army but then springing to political, intellectual and social domains also 
with the thinking that development and progress bear a comprehensive character. 
When it was reached to the end of the First World War and the establishment of the 
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Republic, a great deal of progress was recorded in terms of the secularization of the 
state in model of western states.  
 
After the end of the Independence War, a gradually intensifying secularist campaign 
was run by Atatürk and his close associates, as the earlier representatives of the state 
elites, on behalf of transforming the political profile of the country to a contemporary 
one. Bearing a kind of thinking viewing the religion as characteristically inhibitive 
and backward concerning progress, taking its origins from the enlightenment ideas of 
rationalism, materialism, positivism, and thus reactionism to religion in a modern 
society, a very comprehensive set of revolutions were initiated to disestablish the 
institutional hold of religion on Turkish political, social, educational and daily life.   
 
While witnessing a degree of moderation with the introduction of multiparty politics 
and ensuing political developments taking place until today, this secularist vision is 
maintained by a group of state elites including the military, judiciary, business and 
industrial community and the media among others who enjoy a set of legal and polit-
ical provisions to exert their impact in Turkish political life on issues of religions 
politics when needed.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
28 FEBRUARY PROCESS: SECULARIST REACTION AND ITS RECEPTION 
BY THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
 
 
 
This chapter is assigned to the examination of the secularist opposition expressed 
with the 28 February Process with regards to the tide of change that it generated in 
issue and goal orientation of the Turkish religious right. In trying to do this, we will 
first examine the rising threat of religious fundamentalism, and then the secularist 
reaction displayed against it and then the way that the reaction is met by the religious 
right to lead itself into a state of ideological reformation towards a more moderate, 
centrist and conciliatory political line. The rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
was evidenced with the calls of various Welfare Party deputies for the transformation 
of the political, legal and social character of the state and the society towards an Is-
lamic one as a development becoming public since 1990s. Some of those develop-
ments were made subject to the accusations posed against WP in its closure case. The 
developments were met with a heavy reaction by the state elites involving the issu-
ance of 28 February 1997 NSC Meeting resolutions delivered to Prime Minister 
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Necmettin Erbakan urging him to take serious actions against radical religious 
movements and actions, first; and then the opening of a closure case against the WP, 
and then the Virtue Party, ending up with its closure and introduction of various pun-
ishments to its organization and some members. The result of these secularist reac-
tions was the transition of the religious right to a period of ideological moderation 
exemplified in the elimination of the radicals in and outside of the party, encourage-
ment of a group of reformists in the party, declaration of loyalty to and respect for 
the secularist principle and other sensitivities of the state elites, and search for alter-
native political programs in contemporary universal values and principles.      
 
 
4.1. The Road to 28 February 1997 NSC Meeting: Background 
 
The Welfare Party enjoyed a dramatic increase in its electoral share in local and par-
liamentary elections since its establishment in 1984. The table below shows its elec-
toral share in general and municipal elections until its closure in 1998. Steadily 
growing since the first election it joined in 1984, the Party was the winning party of 
1995 general elections with 21.37 percent of the votes. The party had come to the 
office with a very ambitious political and social campaign. There were radical voices 
rising in the Party as well as from the grassroots for the introduction of Islamic law 
and statehood.  
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Table 2:                            Welfare Party Electoral History 
 1984 1986 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 
General  
Elections 
 4.76 
percent 
7.16 
percent 
 16.90 
percent, 
a  
 21.37 
percent  
Municipal  
Elections 
4.44 
percent  
  9.8 
percent 
 19.14 
percent  
 
a: In general elections held in 1991, WP was united with Nationalists Workers Party 
(Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi) and Reformist Democratic Party (Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi). 
 
Although the number of incidents and activities that could be considered as radical 
did not amount to more than ten maybe, their content was judged as radical enough 
to represent a threat to the secular foundations of the republic according to the Con-
stitutional Court. A look at the list of accusations incorporated in the Bill of Indict-
ment prepared by the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassations Vural Savaş can 
give a better idea here:   
 
On March 23 1983, during the meeting of the leaders of political parties in the na-
tional assembly about constitutional amendments, the Welfare Party leader Nec-
mettin Erbakan was quoted to defend the introduction of Islamic law within the con-
text of a multiple system of law that would replace the Turkish law system. And on 
January 13 1991, Necmettin Erbakan presents the following speech in Sivas:   
If you don’t serve the Welfare Party, your prayers will not be accepted. One 
cannot be Muslim without serving to the Welfare… This party is an army of 
Islamic Jihad… If you are a Muslim, you have to be a soldier of this army… 
Alms must be given to headquarter of the army of Jihad, to party centers in 
the counties… (Vural, May 21 1997) 
 
At another occasion, Welfare Party Representative Şevki Yılmaz was claimed to 
propagate, in a speech before his election as a representative from Rize on March 27 
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1994, that Koranic Order, Islamic state and Islamic law had to be established in the 
country and that the Muslims had to wage jihad for this purpose and work in service 
to Welfare Party which was devoted to this project. And on 8 of May 1997, WP rep-
resentative from Şanlıurfa Ibrahim Halil Çelik was quoted to say in the lobby of the 
parliament that  
There will be bloodshed if you try to close the Imam-Hatip schools during the 
WP Government. Turkey becomes worse than Algeria. We want the blood-
shed indeed… I support Şeriat to the core. I am longing for the introduction 
of Şeriat (Vural, May 21 1997; Sabah, May 10 1997). 
 
While there was a growing reaction from various members of the state elites against 
these kinds of actions by WP deputies, no serious action was taken for some time to 
come. President Süleyman Demirel was urged by the army generals to take the issue 
of irtica (religious reactionism) into the agenda of the National Security Council, but 
he was reluctant to do so for he was fearful of the emergence of a crisis. But the or-
ganization of an iftar at the manor of the prime ministry on January 11 1996, which 
was joined by leaders of a group of religious orders and communities, put an end to 
the state of inertia from the part of the state elites. The organization was taking place 
when there was a growing contempt about Ajzmendis due to their protests against 
secularism and Atatürk (Poyraz, 2007: 321, 397; Sabah, 11 January 1997). On Janu-
ary 18 1996, President Süleyman Demirel was invited to the office of chief of gen-
eral staff for the first of a list of briefings he was given about the threat of irtica and 
to discuss the actions to be taken. The first serious action taken in this process was 
the removal of 13 lieutenants and sergeants from the army during the Supreme Mili-
tary Council Meeting held on 1 August 1996 due to their allegations with irtica ac-
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tivities. The Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Güven Erkaya was expressing 
accumulated concerns of the army about irtica as follows:  
A state of chaos emerges if the laws are not applied in this country. It under-
mines the foundations of the state of law. You may not like certain provisions 
of the constitution. But you have to obey them as long as the constitution is in 
force… Article 24 of the Constitution states that one cannot defend a şeriat 
state. It is our natural right to expect the representatives to move according to 
their oaths. The representatives of a party are advocating the şeriat regime 
outright. I find it extremely dangerous for the representatives of a party in 
government to do so in terms of secular republic. (Ergin, 1997) 
 
On another occasion, Erbakan was accused of ignoring certain national security is-
sues with his visit to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi with the purpose of improving 
ties with the Muslim world. The meeting had gathered a considerable reaction from 
the state elites when Qaddafi was claimed to nominate himself as the head of the 
Council of Islamic Command and that Erbakan was a member of the council. Equal-
ly important in provoking reactions was Qaddafi’s insults to Turkey about the PKK 
issue. Qaddafi was advising Turkey not to persecute the Kurds, let them have their 
state and stop the war against people fighting for their independence (Binay, 1996; 
Oral, 4 May 1997).  
 
 
4.2. Sincan Events and Secularist Reaction   
 
The tension rising this way, the famous Sincan events prompted the leading actor of 
the state elites, the military, to intervene in the political process on 28 February 1997. 
It was a special night organized by the Mayor of Sincan District Bekir Yıldız in An-
kara on 2 February 1997 like one of those known as Jerusalem Night to protest Isra-
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el. The program, which was joined by the Ambassador of Iran, turned to a call for 
şeriat regime and symbolic attacks to the pillars of secularism in Turkey. Events 
were brought to the attention of the public by a heavy secularist media campaign 
with calls for reactions and protests all around the country. The army had displayed 
its reaction by sending 20 tanks and 15 armored vehicles to the district on February 5 
in a parade. On February 23, General Güven Erkaya was indicating that “Radical 
religious currencies constitute a great danger for Turkey’s future. İrtica has turned to 
be a more dangerous threat than PKK” (Milliyet, 12 July 1997).     
 
Waiting until the monthly National Security Council Meeting, the generals presented 
a list of resolutions on February 28 1997 to be signed and adopted by Prime Minister 
Erbakan against the danger of irtija. In the meeting, political Islam was stated to be 
the most serious danger to national security, secularist constitutionalism and democ-
racy. The list included 18 resolutions parts of which included (1) the closure of unof-
ficial Koran courses, (2) a freeze on the appointment of members of the Welfare Par-
ty for civil service, (3) monitoring and inspection of bank accounts belonging to reli-
gious communities and orders, and (4) once again prohibiting the wearing of head-
scarves in public offices.  
 
Erbakan was urged by the military to take action against militant religious organiza-
tions and it was stated that the military would undertake the duty itself in case of his 
failure. In the meantime, some deputies from the other partner of the Government, 
the True Path Party, started to present their resignation and transfer to other parties. 
 88 
 
The government lost its majority in the parliament which ended up with the resigna-
tion of the Prime Minister and the fall of the government on June 18 1997.  
 
The leading secularist business association, TÜSİAD, was criticizing that religious 
radicalism could generate economic instability in the country by harming economic 
production and foreign trade. And in a united declaration publicized by TÜRK İŞ, 
DİSK, TİSK, TESK, and TOBB, it was indicated that:  
Turkey is facing one of the most serious dangers in its republican history. 
Turkey is being driven into a civil war. Democracy is ruptured, irtica has 
turned to an undisputable danger and contemporary secular republic estab-
lished by Atatürk is under threat. There is an urgent need for the establish-
ment of a new government loyal to Atatürkist principles and revolutions de-
fending the democratic republic (Sabah, 22 May 1997).  
 
 
 
 
4.2.1. The Reception of the Reaction by the WP 
 
According to a majority of the specialists on Turkish politics, the February 28 Pro-
cess starting with the reaction of the armed forces against rising threat of anti-
secularist opposition has been the most important development producing the wit-
nessed change in the goal and issue orientation of Turkish religious right. The 
movement was introduced to a process of de-Islamizing its discourse, eschewing 
incidents of political tensions and assuming a consensual and moderate posture. The 
clue of this tendency was given right in the beginning with Necmettin Erbakan’s re-
sponses to the critique of the generals during the National Security Council Meeting 
on 28 February 1997. Erbakan was trying to assure the generals by saying that “we 
are respectful for secular democracy” (Milliyet, 3 March 1997). And he was going 
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on: “I expect your understanding. It will put me under pressure if you indicate all of 
what you say one by one. We have taken the necessary message from this meeting” 
(Değer, 2 March 1997). And after the meeting, Erbakan was reporting: “We have 
made the decisions together. We are in agreement with Turkish armed forces. We are 
in consensus” (Sabah, 3 March 1997); and that “There is no disagreement and dis-
cordance on top of the state mechanism, there is a complete accord. The meeting is 
held in mutual love and sympathy” (Milliyet, 3 March 1997). What was understood 
from the immediate developments was that the WP was not likely to assume a radical 
oppositional attitude against the views of the army generals and that a process of 
change would follow towards the adoption of a more moderate party political line.     
 
The tone of this immediate response by Erbakan was saved in the aftermath of the 
meeting. During the party group meeting held in the parliament a week after, Erba-
kan was saying that “Turkey is a democratic country. There is not a regime problem 
in Turkey. All those artificially-produced problems are left behind. We will establish 
the Great Turkey all together.” He was going on by expressing the opposition of the 
WP against “radical groups” and the necessity to educate them for their adaptation to 
social peace and consensus (Milliyet, 5 March 1997). His points were repeated with 
his speech after a talk with the leader of Motherland Party Mesut Yılmaz when he 
said “Turkey is a democratic and secular state. Turkey is a state of law. We all want 
the implementation of these things in earnest… Neither democracy nor secularism 
could be given up” (Milliyet, 6 March 1997).      
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Soon after, a campaign of suppression and liquidation was launched in the party 
against the radicals. As a beginning, Şevki Yılmaz and Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan were 
invited to the Office of Prime Minister by Erbakan to caution them not to rise up the 
tension and refrain from provocative actions (Milliyet, 7 March 1997). In opposition 
to a speech by İbrahim Halil Çelik which said that if Imam-Hatip Schools were 
closed, Turkey would turn to Algeria and Iran and that there would be bloodshed and 
mischief, Erbakan was responding:  
We don’t let any insults against our army. Army has a special place in WP’s 
belief… Everybody must know that Turkey will not be an Algeria or Iran. 
Turkey is a democratic country. Democracy is settled here. Law is settled 
here. Turkey is a secular country. WP is the guarantor of secularism (Sabah, 
14 May 1997). 
 
Erbakan was supported by the moderates in the party. One of the intellectual found-
ers of Just Order program, Süleyman Akdemir, was saying that   
WP is occupied by some people like Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and Şevki 
Yılmaz who think that Islam is about male-turban (sarık) and frock (cübbe). 
Either the WP will be a center party or the radicals will capture the party…  
Turkey needs packages of negotiation, secularism, human rights and justice… 
(Kul, 26 March 1997)  
 
It was stated that Erbakan was similarly disturbed from debates by party leaders 
known for their radical speeches on issues of male-turban, frock, headscarf and 
Imam-Hatip schools. Erbakan was opposed to any party member raising the tension 
with or without knowledge (Milliyet, 16 April 1997). An interrogation order was 
issued by Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan against Şevki Yılmaz due to some 
speeches he made on some TV channels. And at another time, Erbakan was express-
ing his personal apologies to Municipal Governor of Gaziantep Celal Doğan for 
some verbal attacks directed by Şevki Yılmaz (Sabah, 31 May 1997).     
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A more material step was taken with the signing of the NSC document by Erbakan 
and transition to the implementation phase of the resolutions. As a beginning, author-
ity over Koran courses was transferred to Ministry of Education with a very careful 
oversight mechanism. A process was started for the closure of dervish lodges for 
those of them which were discovered to be open still. And a headscarf ban was put 
into action starting to its application in the hospitals first (Milliyet, 13 March 1997).    
 
WP’s conciliatory and moderate behavior was opposed by some radical Islamist 
groups. In a paper distributed by “Muslim Students of DTCF” in Ankara University 
Faculty of Languages, History and Geography, WP was accused of ‘flattery’ and 
‘surrender without being able show any resolution against the regime.’ It was said in 
the paper that  
Is it not so dramatic and doesn’t it tell us a lot the striking similarity between 
(1) the complex of inferiority that the secular-Kemalist gang suffers against 
the west and (2) the submissive fatigue that the WP suffers against the domi-
nant powers and its mission of becoming a regime validator? (Milliyet, 1 May 
1997)    
 
The emergence of this conciliatory and centrist tendency was reflected in WP’s for-
eign policy view also. Global Forum of Spiritual and Parliamentary Leaders to be 
held in Konya on 6-9 October 1997 for a discussion of Islam in 21
st
 century found 
exceptional support from the moderates in the Party led by Erbakan. WP was 
claimed to be searching for establishing a global mission for itself as an example of a 
striking break from the internationalism of the National View movement known for 
its suspicions and reservations about the West, Christianity and Israel. A joint work 
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was prepared by State Ministers Fehim Adak, Abdullah Gül and Minister of Culture 
Ismail Kahraman for the Forum. The purpose of the Forum was to bring religious 
and political leaders closer for the resolution of ongoing humanitarian crises. It was 
expected that Turkey’s historical heritage of originating from being a crossroad of 
interreligious relations and communication would facilitate the Forum goals with 
which the WP was extremely pleased. Organization stood as a critique of Samuel 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis which claimed that conflicts and wars in the 
future would be shaped according to the differences in culture and civilization over 
the countries. A special interest was exhibited to the Forum by Erbakan who met the 
conference organizers in his office to deliver his support for the goals of the Forum 
(Kul, 21 April 1997).      
 
 
4.2.2. The WP Closure Case and Defense  
 
Despite the cooperative and conciliatory policy adopted by the WP in response to the 
reaction of the armed forces, events were followed by the second leading actor of the 
state elites, the Judiciary, to lead Welfare Party into a judicial process. A Bill of In-
dictment was submitted to the Constitutional Court by the Public Prosecutor of the 
Court of Cassations Vural Savaş with a demand for the closure of the Party with 
claims that the WP had violated the secularist principle. The first accusation directed 
to the Party was about its introduction of a parliamentary bill for the abolition of 
headscarf ban. According to the Public Prosecutor, the attempt of the Party was a 
violation of secularism and the WP was insisting on passing this bill for electoral 
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purposes despite their knowledge. The second type of accusations involved provoca-
tive speeches by the party leader Necmettin Erbakan, and some parliamentarians and 
mayors including the Mayor of Rize Şevki Yılmaz, Ankara Representative Hasan 
Hüseyin Ceylan, Ankara Representative and Vice-President of the Welfare Party 
Ahmet Tekdal, the Mayor of Kayseri Şükrü Karatepe, Şanlıurfa Representative 
İbrahim Halil Çelik, and the Mayor of Sincan District. The speeches recorded on 
different occasions involved calls for abolition of secularism, introduction of Şeriat 
regime, and preparation for armed resistance to carry out these goals. The third type 
of accusations was about the reluctance of leading members of the incumbent Wel-
fare Party to take actions against these anti-secularist campaigns. And finally, the 
Welfare Party was accused of opening new Faculties of Islamic Theology and Imam-
Hatip schools without any need. These educational institutions were accordingly in-
troduced in the beginning to meet the necessity of religious personnel, but they were 
turned into alternative educational institutions against secular schools in opposition 
to their founding principle (Vural, May 21 1997).          
 
The WP defense presented to the Constitutional Court against the accusations di-
rected in the bill of indictment remained a critical document for the prospects of par-
ty change that would be followed in the aftermath of the court case. The whole de-
fence was devoted to prove the argument that WP was one of the most loyal actors of 
Turkish political life to secularism and other principles of the Constitution. Though 
the Constitutional Court was not persuaded with the arguments presented, the de-
fense was an expression of a serious commitment for WP’s loyalty to secularism to 
be pursued then and in the future for a simple reason that a failure to do so would 
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lead to a process of persecution reaching to as far as party closure and imprisonment 
of the leadership cadre.  
 
A solemn statement was given in the defense which said that “WP is the real defend-
er and guarantee of the secularist principle of the constitution.” Examples were given 
to this from the party program and various speeches and policies by party members. 
The Article 4 of the party program was indicating that  
Our Party believes in freedom of thought and conscience; it considers all the 
pressures against freedom of thought and conscience as a violation of secular-
ism… Secularism is not enmity against religion. It is rather introduced and 
put into action as a principle to defend freedom of religion and conscience 
against all types of violations (Article 4 of the WP Program).  
 
Accordingly, this principle was reiterated with repetition in all the speeches made by 
WP deputies in the assembly and outside. Here were some examples: 
To act against secularism means acting according to scholastic thinking. It is 
a behavior of acting in a dogmatic and scholastic style for an ignorant person 
to apply pressure by saying that our religion orders this way and you will all 
abide by it by making impositions in an ignorant way. We don’t want such a 
style in the country (WP Defense). 
 
Secularism means acting with knowledge and reason (WP Defense).      
 
About the set of accusations on Imam-Hatip schools, headscarf issue, speeches by 
party members, the argument presented by the WP was that either there was a very 
serious misinterpretation and misunderstanding by the public prosecutor, or the evi-
dence that he provided was not substantive (See Appendix 1 for the defense of the 
WP against specific accusations). But even then, a number of initiatives were taken 
in the party for the suppression and removal of some party deputies considered to be 
impairing the party with their radical tendencies. After a number of warnings issued, 
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Şevki Yılmaz and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan were removed from the party on 20 June 
1997 before the finalization of the decision of the Constitutional Court.  
 
Despite all the attempts and apologies of the WP, the Public Prosecutor of the Court 
of Cassations Savaş Vural was found justified in all the accusations directed in the 
Bill of Indictment. The process finalized with the closure of the Welfare Party on 16 
January 1998 with the decision of the Constitutional Court that the Party had turned 
to a center for anti-secularist movements. The decision went on with the abolition of 
the deputyship (milletvekilliği) of the WP representatives Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket 
Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and İbrahim Halil 
Çelik. Same representatives were prohibited from being founders, members, execu-
tives and auditors of another party too. And finally, properties of the Party were to be 
transferred to the Treasure (Constitutional Court Decisions, January 16 and February 
22 1998). 
 
The impact of the military reaction and closure case on the change of poli-
cy/programmatic orientation of the party could be stated in a number of points. First 
of all, it was understood that a political campaign which included calls for Islamic 
law and statehood would certainly lead to party closure and political persecutions, 
and thus the parties established in the future had to avoid such policies in order not to 
experience similar problems. Commitments made for loyalty to democracy, secular-
ism, rule of law etc. in response to the reactions of the state elites since the rise of the 
tension would thus constitute the backbone of the parties that the movement would 
establish in the future. Furthermore, it was understood that the party had to search for 
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alternative political programs in order to survive in competitive Turkish political 
system which is often argued to be found in the adoption of a set of political values 
and principles brought by globalization and Europeanization.  
 
Secondly, the political ban brought to party leader Necmettin Erbakan was important 
in terms of the prospects of party change that would follow in its aftermath. As it is 
cited in Chapter Two, party leadership change is sometimes considered as the most 
decisive development leading to party change in various domains due to the differ-
ences in views, capabilities, tactics and traits among the leaders but also because 
leadership change is often observed as a new entry point for political parties. The fact 
that Erbakan was ousted from political life by the state elites stands as a good exam-
ple of how influential the state elites were with their powers to manipulate other fac-
tors also. While the influence of this leadership change in policy line of the move-
ment was observed in as early as the leadership of Recai Kutan, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s inauguration to JDP leadership brought greater changes in the profile and 
program of the movement as it will be explained below.  
 
Finally, the overarching influence of the state elites on the change in goal and issue 
orientation of the WP was manifested with the introduction of various political bans 
to radical figures of the party too like Sevki Yilmaz and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan who 
were some of very few persons leading to the radicalization of the party with their 
speeches and actions. Their removal from the party and a tacit warning ruled against 
potential extremist tendencies meant the weakening of what could be called as the 
 97 
 
radical coalition by cutting their influence in the formation and shaping of party poli-
cy and goals.   
 
 
4.3.The Virtue Party  
 
As a precaution against a potential closure of the Welfare Party, a new party was 
established on December 17 1997 with the name Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) by 
İsmail Alptekin. With the closure of the WP on 16 January 1998, all the non-banned 
representatives of the WP moved to Virtue Party and Recai Kutan was brought to the 
leadership on 14 May 1998. One of the most important priorities of the VP since its 
establishment was to prove its difference from the WP particularly in those issues 
that could bring it into conflict with the state elites on issues related with secularism. 
The causes that led to the closure of WP were noted and a very serious commitment 
was made not to repeat them.  
 
In his speech during the First Party Congress held on 14 May 2000, Kutan was ex-
plaining that no belief, opinion or conviction would dominate in the country during 
the VP government and he was saying “We consider this as a natural result of Re-
public with its principles of democracy, secularism and rule of law” (NTV-MSNBC, 
14 May 2000). And he was similarly saying in one of his speeches he made before: 
Everybody will be free in their beliefs. No pressure will be applied on any-
body even though they may not be believers. State will be equidistant to all 
religions. The source of the laws issued in the parliament will be science and 
reason. We are against the idea that here is the orders of a religion and that 
the laws will conform to it (Sabah, 2 November 1999).  
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Kutan was expressing his willingness for the introduction of American secularism in 
Turkey in an interview conducted by David Rockefeller. He was saying that “For us, 
secularism is the one adopted by the USA… The VP is aiming to integrate secular-
ism, democracy, religious and moral values all” (Sabah, 23 October 1999). 
 
The policy of restraint from real or controversial anti-secularist party behaviors, 
which had started to shape quickly with 28 February NSC Meeting, was taking a 
more material shape with the closure of the WP and prime of the Virtue Party. A 
solemn declaration was released by party leader Recai Kutan to indicate that the VP 
was not a continuation of the WP. Kutan was expressing his party’s resolution to 
preserve domestic peace and stability when he said “We will not be party to any con-
flict during our electoral campaign.” He was going on by saying that as VP they 
would always be in favor of reconciliation and peace (Hürriyet, 11 February 1999). 
In 2001, when he was evaluating the NSC decisions on combating irtica, Kutan was 
saying that “İrtica is one of the most important problems in the country.” He was 
going on by saying that whoever tried to suspend democracy and freedoms by trying 
to turn them to what they were in history was an irticacı (Sabah, 12 April 2001).  
 
A sign of the goal of the VP to emphasize its dissociation from WP politics was the 
attempt of Recai Kutan to terminate Erbakan’s influence in the party as well as the 
just order discourse he propagated. Kutan was expressing his distaste with Erbakan’s 
directives about nomination of Merve Kavakçı as candidate and then his encourage-
ment to Kavakçı to give her loyalty oath in the assembly with headscarf. Kutan was 
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rebelling by saying “That is too much. If they decide something, they must ask us as 
well,” and he was going on: “It (Kavakçı’s attempt) was a very unnecessary behavior. 
It was very indecent” (Sabah, 4 May 1999). While opposing Erbakan’s attempts to 
rule the party from outside, Kutan was declaring the end of the traditional just order 
discourse too developed and promoted by Erbakan as the party program of National 
View parties. Kutan was saying that “We don’t use the concept of just order. There is 
no such thing… It was an academic debate… We will move away from the just order 
slogan any more” (Çekirge, 11 July 1998). 
 
The VP demonstrated a great concern not to draw secularist opposition on headscarf 
issue too, which was one of the areas that WP was accused of violating secularism. 
To this end, Kutan was saying that they would not keep the issue of headscarf in the 
agenda even though they believed that it was the right thing to do (Hürriyet, 9 Febru-
ary 1999). He was trying to persuade Kavakçı not to come to the Assembly with her 
headscarf in fear of the emergence of a new conflict with the state elites (Sabah, 1 
May 1999). While Kutan was trying to avoid problems with the state elites, there 
were some other party members like Nazlı Ilıcak who were known for their various 
activities that could be considered as a clear break from traditional policy founda-
tions of the movement. Nazlı Ilıcak was organizing a reception in her manor in honor 
of Recai Kutan during which the guests were presented wine. In a report by the re-
porter of Daily Telegraph, the wine was pouring like water in the reception. Ilıcak 
was stating that the VP did not have any goals to introduce a Şeriat regime and that 
that’s why she was in that party (Sabah, 6 June 1998). In a similar incident, VP par-
liamentary candidates were visiting pavilions to ask for the votes of the hostesses 
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waiting for their customers. The candidates were saying “Vote for us. We know your 
problems as well as those of your workplace. We will help you when we come to the 
government” (İçgen, 12 April 1999). 
 
The WP attempt to prove harmony with and loyalty to concerns of the Turkish 
Armed Forces took a more solid shape during the VP. Kutan was stating that they 
didn’t have any problems with the army and that they were able to understand the 
sensitivities of the army on issues of secularism (Çetin, 11 February 1999). To keep 
the channels of communication with the army at a pace, while preparing the updated 
program of the VP, Kutan was sending a letter to the chief of general staff to take his 
opinion about those issues that he could be concerned. Kutan was saying that “The 
VP is the most loyal party to the laws and the constitution” (Ertürk, 28 March 1999). 
This process was supported by the overall VP electorate too. In a nationwide survey 
conducted by VP, the people were asked the most reliable institution in Turkey and 
interestingly for 47 percent of the people who said that they would vote for VP in 
next elections army was the most reliable institution in Turkey (Ertürk, 25 August 
1998).    
 
Kutan was promising that the mistakes committed by the WP during electoral cam-
paigns would not be repeated by the VP. For this reason, party members who would 
join in the campaigns for 18 April 1999 elections as speakers and managers were 
given education and seminars on secularism and democracy. In this process, Kutan’s 
speech booklets were taken as the base and the main subjects that the speakers were 
to emphasize with insistence were summarized as democracy, secularism, human 
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rights, freedoms, rule of law, economy and foreign policy (Hürriyet, 8 February 
1999).  
 
A remarkable development was the approaching of some WP deputies to Israel and 
the Jews. During a visit to USA, an assembly of VP deputies including Recai Kutan, 
Abdullah Gül, Ali Coşkun and Temel Karamollaoğlu were meeting with members of 
Jewish lobby in the USA with representatives from the American Israeli Public Af-
fairs Committee, American Jewish Committee, Presidents of Conference of Ameri-
can Jewish Organizations etc. (Sabah, 2 November 1999). And in a similar incident, 
VP leader Recai Kutan was hitting the glasses with Israeli Minister of foreign affairs 
Simon Peres. The approach of various party members towards Israel was an im-
portant deviation from traditional National View goal of anti-Israeli sentiment.        
 
The process of moderation and cooperation initiated by 28 February military reaction 
and the closure of the WP was not found enough by the judiciary, however. The VP 
was brought to the courtyard by the Public Prosecutor with an accusation that the 
party was a continuation of the WP and that it violated secularism with some provoc-
ative actions and speeches by its members on the headscarf issue. The Public Prose-
cutor was found justified by the Constitutional Court not for the first but for the se-
cond accusations and a decision was ruled for the closure of the VP and introduction 
of political bans to a list of party members (Constitutional Court Decision, 22 June 
2001). The ouster of what could be called as the group of radicals in the party includ-
ing Merve Kavakçı, Bekir Sobacı and Ramazan Yenidede served as a structural ad-
justment from outside for the approximation of the party towards greater degree of 
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moderateness and cooperation with the state elites. The lesson drawn from the clo-
sure case was that the movement had to be more careful about the sensitivities of the 
state elites on issues of secularism and that whatever they do on behalf of conserva-
tive politics they had to observe legal and constitutional limits and that they had to 
work in cooperation and coordination with the legal and military members of the 
state elites.  
 
 
4.4. The Justice and Development Party  
 
With the establishment of the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish religious 
right was introduced to a deeper and more comprehensive process of change. Under 
the impact of a number of variables, the ideological line of the JDP was converging 
towards the center right. Some leading party members like Abdullah Gül were even 
motivated to move the party somewhere between the right and the left (Hürriyet, 12 
July 2001). The impact of state elites in this process of moderation was manifested in 
a number of ways including the intimidation of party members from sponsoring radi-
cal policies in fear of political persecution through military and legal processes, and 
an ensuing process of political socialization, first; and second, in the removal of 
Necmettin Erbakan from the leadership of the movement with all the charismatic and 
authoritative status he enjoyed to be replaced gradually by an emerging coalition of 
reformists calling for new ways and programs in the movement.  
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4.4.1. Secularist Backlash as an Instrument of Moderation  
 
The secularist backlash directed against Turkish religious right starting with the mili-
tary memorandum and following party closure cases against the WP and then the VP 
remain as the most influential factor motivating the founders of the Justice and De-
velopment Party to reconsider the goal formation and issue orientation of the move-
ment towards a more moderate one with very limited appeal for ideological concerns. 
The JDP deputies came to acknowledge more firmly that they had to stay away from 
clashes with the state elites in order not to experience the same troubles as the WP, 
VP and their deputies. The signs of this line of thinking could be read in as early as 
the emergence of the split in the movement between the traditionalists and the re-
formists which was itself the result of secularist intervention into politics.  
 
After the ruling of the Constitutional Court decision for the closure of the VP, Abdul-
lah Gül was delivering his opinion to the journalists by saying that:  
Our party is closed down; past mistakes must not be repeated. We want a 
healthy formation anymore. What needs to be done at this stage is to make a 
critique of the past mistakes and then to move towards unity with negotiation, 
without making any impositions (Yılmaz, 25 June 2001).  
 
For the new party that the reformists were intended to establish, Gül was saying that 
the party would not be an “ideological” and “marginal” party. He was going on:  
We will not be a religionist (dinci) party nor the party of the religious people 
(dindarlar) only… We believe that there cannot be any democracy without 
secularism and no secularism without democracy… We don’t regard us as the 
continuity of the VP. We will keep away from populism, exaggeration and we 
will be realist… We will not return to the mistakes of the past. Our priority 
will be the economy (Hürriyet, 12 July 2001).  
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In response to questions of “what is new with you,” Gül was saying that they were all 
in the process of change including Erdoğan. He was going on: “We have all experi-
enced important things in last five years. Erdoğan and us, we are all making genuine 
self-criticisms. This self-accounting covers our past mistakes also” (Hürriyet, 12 July 
2001).  
 
A material step was taken in favor of the implementation of this policy orientation 
during the closure case process of the VP in the domain of foreign policy. Against 
the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Chechnya, a voting session was held in the Par-
liamentary Assembly of Council of Europe for the suspension of Russia’s voting 
rights in the Assembly in order to pressure it to stop the campaign of aggression in 
Chechnya and move into a process of dialogue with elected Chechen representatives. 
As an example of a very dramatic break from the foreign policy approach of the Na-
tional View movement, Abdullah Gül was using a negative vote in the session. Rus-
sia was saving the sanction with a very small margin of negative votes (Hürriyet, 31 
January 2000).  
 
While he was talking in the past like “my reference is Islam” and “democracy is not 
a purpose, it is an instrument,” the leading reformists in VP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
was now saying that he would not treat seriously those who pronounced “Şeriat 
State” (Hürriyet, 8 February 2000). Similarly, in a speech that he made in his exit 
from prison in 2000 before the establishment of the JDP, Erdoğan was stating “We 
gave up making religious politics decorated with religious motifs and stories; we 
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shall not do any such politics; we will show how the religious people make politics” 
(Hürriyet, 16 May 2000).  
 
There were some other reformists like VP Istanbul representative Mukadder 
Başeğmez who argued that 28 February Process had indeed been better. For him, 
although the secularist reaction was cast in a very undemocratic way, it had been 
helpful for the turn of the religious right towards recognizing the importance of glob-
al and universal political values. He was arguing that there was an urgent need for 
the transformation of certain Islamic doctrines in favor of more contemporary norms 
particularly on issues of gender rights and equality. The woman had to share an equal 
space with man in the mosque and the politics, and the tradition of thinking the 
woman as a sex object abhorred and driven to a dark corner of the house had to be 
abandoned (Türenç, 12 February 2000). 
 
 
4.4.2. The Impact of Erbakan’s Removal from Politics  
 
Organizationally, WP and VP shared many features in common with traditional Is-
lamic political organizations with certain structures and procedures that it incorpo-
rated like absolute leadership, unconditional obedience to the leader, top-down deci-
sion making and appointment processes, stringent disciplinary norms towards which 
the members were expected to show strict loyalty and obedience (See, for example, 
Sabah, 15 May 1999). Erbakan was located on top of this structure and there was not 
much of an objection to his office until the advance of 28 February Process (See for 
 106 
 
example Sabah, 23 March 1998). As an example to this tradition, in a meeting joined 
by the wives of party members, Erbakan’s wife Nermin Erbakan was talking to the 
ladies that “This (paper) is white. But it must be accepted as black if we say that it is 
black… Obedience is essential. Do obey and don’t let the tradition spoiled” (Hürri-
yet, 3 May 2000). It can be said almost with precision that without the external 
stimuli issued by the state elites leading to Erbakan’s prohibition from politics, Erba-
kan would keep ruling in the party preserving his privileges and powers something 
which he was enjoying even during the leadership of Kutan by giving instructions 
through informal channels of communication. 
 
Erbakan’s prohibition from political activism thus meant a very serious organization-
al crisis in the movement. The prestigious charismatic leader was ousted and his ex-
ceptional authority as the office of ultimate decision-maker was suspended. The ab-
sence of a leader like Erbakan in Virtue Party was one of the most important reasons 
for the emergence of oppositional voices in the party who were united around a party 
coalition called as ‘reformists.’ The reformists were distinguished with their objec-
tion to traditional political methods applied in the party as well as the ineffectiveness 
of the solutions offered towards the challenges (Hürriyet, 19 September 2000). In 
line with this, Abdullatif Şener was identifying Abdullah Gül’s candidacy for party 
leadership in VP as a search for renovation and he was going on: “This (Abdullah 
Gül’s candidacy) is a development that addresses to the political vacuum generated 
in the country originating from ersatz political understandings” (Hürriyet, 9 March 
2000). For Erdoğan, Turkey was in search of three things: The first was a change of 
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mindset. Second was structural change and the third was civilization, contemporary 
civilization (Donat, 29 February 1999).    
 
According to the innovationists, Erbakan and his close associates were unable to deal 
with domestic and global crises that the party was facing and when this was united 
with the authoritarian party structure, the party was inevitably driven to failure and 
loss. The movement was in urgent need to renovate itself in almost all the domains, 
not only in style of politics but also in the process of policy making too. The organi-
zational structure of the movement had to be changed in favor of a more democratic 
one that would enable close communication and contact among upper and lower 
echelons of the party as a major instrument to develop viable policies through voic-
ing, discussion and deliberation of issues and concerns (Milliyet, 22 February 1998; 
Sabah, 23 March 1998; Sabah, 16 May 1998; Hürriyet, 13 May 2000; Hürriyet, 6 
October 2000). The movement was supposed to mitigate its ideological formation 
from a religious conservative to a moderate one to address to the interests of the gen-
erality of the electorate. When he was asked about the concept of 'Muslim left' that 
he uttered about the political program of the new party, Abdullah Gül was saying 
that: 
I speak very clear. We want to be a party of all Turkey. There is need for a 
party that will work for the interests of all the citizens. We want to establish a 
party that will not be in service of the pious only, but those who are not pious 
too. We want to be in service of all the citizens. We want to establish a party 
that will serve to entire Turkey in a way comprising all the citizens (Hürriyet, 
12 July 2001).  
 
Abdullah Gül was stating that he was not an office of safekeeping nor he was work-
ing on a base of permission. He would undertake authority and responsibility and he 
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was saying: “We will grasp entire Turkey with a new style and concept of govern-
ance” (Hürriyet, 9 March 2000). Abdullah Gül was stating that “There cannot be any 
democracy with sidestepping. Demands of the grassroots must be taken into account. 
For a party in progress rather than in retreat, there is a need for a democratic, trans-
parent and bold posture” (Hürriyet, 1 May 2000).  
 
Criticisms about the lack of intraparty democratic tradition were paramount during 
the leadership of Recai Kutan in Virtue Party. The reformists were opposed to what 
they called as Kutan’s safekeeping leadership (emanetçi liderlik), government of the 
party from Erbakan’s house, tradition of submission (biat) and permission (icazet), 
prohibitions ruled to party members by Erbakan, hand-kissing as a sign of obedience 
etc. as the sources of the failure to develop effective solutions, viable political pro-
grams and prompt response towards challenges and troubles faced (Zaman, 24 March 
1998; Hürriyet, 9 March 2000; Sabah, 23 March 1998; Sabah, 15 May 1998; Sabah, 
16 May 1998; Sabah, 3 April 1999; Hürriyet, 16 May 2000; Hürriyet, 10 August 
2000). Erdoğan was criticizing Kutan by saying that “You are not able to make ini-
tiatives. Because initiative is in the hands of others. This is the reason of all the prob-
lems that the party experiences” (Hürriyet, 9 August 2000). 
 
The party that the reformists were intended to establish would cast its difference 
from the traditionalists with the great importance given to intraparty democracy. A 
leading reformists Abdullatif Şener was announcing the decision of the reformists to 
establish a new party in order to change the concept of politics alien to the people 
and to transport public demands into political representation. Şener was pointing out 
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that democratization was not limited with voting in the elections only on the part of 
the people, but it also had to incorporate the citizens into the processes of decision 
making. The program of the new party would thus ensure all the essentials of intra-
party democracy (Hürriyet, 19 July 2001).  
 
 
4.5.Analyzing the Change in Foreign Policy  
 
The influence of secularist reaction on the transformation of Turkish religious right 
in its approach to issues of Islamic statehood, Islamic law, headscarf, Islamic norms 
and applications in public life etc. is examined in above sections with reference to 
responses given to the reactions issued by the state elites. An analysis of the impact 
of state elites on the change of foreign policy approach and policies of the movement 
will be in order in this section. Although the secularist reaction expressed with the 28 
February Process did not involve much of an opposition to the foreign policy orienta-
tion of the WP and VP, there were a number of foreign policy concerns at play inhib-
iting the members of the religious right from attempts to implement their traditional 
foreign policy goals to appear as a moderating structural framework, a process fur-
ther strengthened with the tide of moderation and centralism adopted by the JDP in 
response to secularist backlash.    
 
The origins of this change could be found in the inauguration of WP to the govern-
ment in coalition with True Path Party. While the movement was supporting a for-
eign policy goal targeting to minimize relations with the west and leading to a pro-
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cess of cooperation and integration with the Muslim world (Erbakan, 1975a; Erba-
kan, 1991; Erbakan, 1993b), it was realized in government office that the party was 
not recognized a very free space of action due to a foreign policy framework already 
established. To put it more clearly, Turkey’s membership to and close ties with 
NATO, UN and European countries were incorporated as major tenants of Turkish 
foreign policy and the chances were too little for WP to divert from this route in or-
der to put its earlier goals into action. As a part of its NATO membership, Turkey 
was supposed to preserve its warm relations with the USA and other NATO mem-
bers. The goal to become a part of contemporary civilization had to be advanced with 
greater cooperation with the west and its global political economic institutions like 
USA, UN and EU.  
 
More to this, there were some other developments initiated by Turkish armed forces 
that the WP had to settle with such as the military agreements and protocols signed 
with Israel for purposes of modernization and cooperation. Due to the current state of 
affairs, the WP was not possible to sustain a low level of diplomacy with Israel as it 
was often propagated by Erbakan in his books and campaigns (Erbakan, 1975a). 
Turkey was motivated to keep its relations with Israel at a high level because of its 
membership to the western security framework, some US-related interests necessitat-
ing close relations with Israel as well as certain domestic political economic con-
cerns. For some specialists, the process of cooperation and solidarity was also a 
product of sympathy nurtured by members of Turkish Armed Forces towards Israel 
for “in many ways the Israelis were just like them: modern; westward-looking; hav-
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ing a shared Arab other; fellow victims of terror” in addition to the goal of promoting 
a set of interests related with alliance with the USA (Robins: 2007, 299).      
 
When we turn to the chances of WP goals to establish deeper and firmer ties with the 
Muslim world, it was observed that the WP was substantially disabled with a number 
of military-related foreign policy concerns. To start with, it was not possible to estab-
lish close links with Syria due to the residence provided to Abdullah Öcalan and also 
because of Syrian claims on Hatay. There was problems with the Iranian neighbor-
hood too for Iran was accused of permitting PKK camps in its Turkish border and 
supporting radical Islamic movements in Turkey (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 139-143; 
Robins, 2007: 295). Erbakan’s tent meeting with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi 
was also ending up with failure and reactions from the state elites as well as other 
domestic actors as Qaddafi was advising Turkey to let PKK establish a Kurdish state 
in South East Turkey and also because he was announcing Erbakan as a member of 
the Council of Islamic Command established to introduce Islamic regimes in the 
Middle East (Binay, 1996; Oral, 4 May 1997).  
 
The expectation from religious right to respect Turkey’s traditional foreign policy 
concerns in its neighborhood was casting itself in more rigid terms with the 28 Feb-
ruary Process during which the successive party closure cases, political bans and 
imprisonments were compelling the founders of the JDP to adopt a relatively moder-
ate and centrist party line. It was understood with Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s declarations that the newly-established party would not be a “marginal” 
and “ideological” party and that they would give up religious politics, the movement 
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would reframe a substantially new political discourse in foreign policy domain also 
without much significance assigned to religious concerns (Hürriyet, 12 July 2001; 
Hürriyet, 16 May 2000). The idea of minimization of relations with the west and 
integration with the Muslim world promoted by WP and, to a lesser extent, by VP 
was being reformed in favor of an idea advocating the development and deepening of 
the relations with the west in economic, political and social areas, on the one side, 
and introduction of a pragmatist perspective to relations with Muslim countries, on 
the other. Turkey’s historical and cultural ties with the Muslim world would be re-
spected, but Turkey would endeavor to promote reform in the Middle East for a more 
democratic and egalitarian with respect for human rights and rule of law (Dağı, 2006: 
92-93). 
 
This general framework was developed into a more sophisticated form with the new 
foreign policy understanding promoted by Ahmet Davutoğlu who was assigned vari-
ous posts in the foreign policy team of the JDP to be appointed as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in May 2009. The general principles of JDP foreign policy goals and 
preferences which found a space of implementation since JDP’s introduction to the 
government in 2002 could be briefly stated as resolving all problems with neighbors, 
acting in multilateralism, transforming Turkey into a center country, promoting glob-
al values and principles in the Middle East with a rhytmic and dynamic diplomatic 
campaign (Davutoğlu, 2009a: 501; Davutoğlu, 2004).    
 
A noteworthy example of the desertion of the idea of Islamic internationalism and 
unity, with a distaste of and distancing from the non-Muslim west, as a part of its 
 113 
 
centrist and moderate policy line, was the participation of the JDP to an international 
coalition titled as Alliance of Civilizations aiming to eradicate potential conflicts 
among members of different religions, nations and cultures to be brought to its co-
presidency together with Spain in 2005. In line with this, the JDP was organizing the 
International Islamophobia Conference in 2007 in Istanbul as an attempt to improve 
dialogue among religions and cultures (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 2006: 109; Davutoğlu, 
2009b: 164).    
 
 
4.6.Secularist Opposition during the JDP Period 
 
Despite the substantial scale of change in the political line of the religious right, the 
secularist reaction went on during the JDP period too particularly on issues of head-
scarf, Imam-Hatip schools, Koran courses and some related matters. In 2003, the 
JDP started a campaign to pay tuition fees for economically disadvantaged students 
for their education in private schools. Hüseyin Çelik distributed a paper for this mat-
ter, but the campaign was harshly objected to by a counter-campaign from the state 
elites, with the claim that the target of the initiative was to provide funds to private 
schools belonging to the Gülen group. The bill prepared by the JDP in the parliament 
was vetoed by President Necdet Sezer for the reason that more than 20 percent of the 
funds the bill disburses would go to schools whose education programs contradict 
secularism (Kuru, 2009: 182). 
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In February 2006, the Council of State ruled that it is unacceptable for a school prin-
cipal to wear a headscarf even in the street. This ruling was condemned by the gener-
ality of the public and surprisingly, the judges who made this decision were targeted 
by an assassin who succeeded in killing one of them. The attention of the state elites 
immediately turned to the JDP as the cause of this violence, but the police uncovered 
that the assassination was related to a “deep secret” state organization known as 
Ergenekon.         
 
Another important event was the opposition of the secularists to the nomination of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül as candidate in the presidential election. 
The secularists were united in protests in major cities, calling for a more modern 
president—referring to the headscarf worn by Abdullah Gül’s wife and his previous 
membership in the National View, aspects anathema to secularism. The office of the 
presidency was considered as one of the last fortresses of the secularist state. It was 
given broad executive, legislative, judiciary and appointive powers by the 1982 Con-
stitution, with an aim to serve as an office of tutelage and control mechanism against 
irresponsible policies of the parties. It was forecast to be occupied by secularist state 
elites, mostly from the military, and it was never thought that the Islamists would one 
day grow so powerful as to claim a right to occupy this position. Despite protests, 
Abdullah Gül won the electoral process in the parliament. But the process drew op-
position from the secularist camp, who were fearful that the Islamists would use this 
office to Islamize the judiciary and universities. Thus the RPP appealed to the Con-
stitutional Court with a claim that the election of the president required the participa-
tion of 2/3 of the parliament. Özbudun and Gençkaya argue that the opposition of the 
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RPP was groundless because the 1982 constitution does not require the participation 
of a particular number of representatives to any round of the elections and that the 
presidential candidate could fail only if he cannot receive the necessary ratio of votes 
determined for each round. Thus the application of the RPP to the Constitutional 
Court for the cancellation of the first round of elections was not compliant with the 
1982 Constitution (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 97-98; Özbudun, 2007: 48-50). 
When Abdullah Gül failed to secure the participation of 367 representatives in the 
first round, the RPP duly applied to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of 
the electoral process. Subsequently, the military issued a memorandum through the 
website of the office of the Chief of General Staff, which said that the military would 
directly intervene unless the presidential elections were cancelled. The tension rose 
with the declaration of Abdullah Gül that he would not withdraw his candidacy. 
However, the Constitutional Court cancelled the first round of elections, and thus the 
presidential elections (Constitutional Court Decision, 2007/54).  
 
This was followed by the JDP searching early parliamentary elections, and introduc-
ing a constitutional amendment for the election of the president with the direct vote 
of the people through referendum. The amendment was opposed by Necdet Sezer 
and vetoed. Sezer’s veto was supported by a campaign by the RPP. When the par-
liament returned the bill to the President again, Sezer and the RPP appealed to the 
Constitutional Court to reject the amendment, but failed to persuade the court. Elec-
tions took place in July 2007 with a clear victory for the JDP, which gained 47 per-
cent of the votes. Although the JDP was still short of a two-thirds parliamentary ma-
jority, they were now supported by the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), and later on 
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the Democratic Society Party, the Democratic Leftist Party, the JP and some inde-
pendents, providing Abdullah Gül with a sufficient number of votes to elect the pres-
ident. The new parliament thus elected Abdullah Gül as the new president of Turkey. 
The parliament also ratified the amendment for the election of the next president via 
referendum in October 2007 (Özbudun, 2007: 50-51; Kuru, 2009).  
 
A more important political clash took place after the introduction of a constitutional 
amendment, with a united action by the Nationalist Action Party and the JDP, for the 
repeal of the headscarf ban at universities. The argument of the two parties was that 
the headscarf ban violated the equality principle. All citizens of the country were 
able to benefit from the public services on equal basis and the right to higher educa-
tion was not to be denied for reasons not explicitly defined by the law. Articles 10 
and 42 of the Constitution were thus to be amended to allow the use of headscarf at 
universities (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 107). The initiative was opposed by the 
leading actors of the state elites: the Judiciary, the RPP, the Democratic Leftist Party, 
the Council of Higher Education, the secularist Media, and some intellectuals. The 
Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, issued a warning 
to the NAP and the JDP to state that a closure case would be started against them 
unless they quit the initiative. Despite this warning, the amendment indirectly lifting 
the headscarf ban passed from the parliament with over 400 affirmative votes of JDP 
and NAP representatives (Milliyet, 10 February 2008). The newly appointed Presi-
dent of the Council of Higher Education issued an order about freedom of dress on 
university campuses. But the issue was not settled, as some universities rejected to 
apply the decision.  
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The RPP and the DLP appealed to the Constitutional Court subsequently for the can-
cellation of the amendment. The court agreed with their appeal and annulled the 
amendment in the interpretation that the amendment would place pressure on those 
students who do not wear headscarf, and also that the court had a right to apply and 
observe the headscarf ban because the parliament acted irresponsibly and passed the 
amendment in violation of the secularist principle of the Constitution (Constitutional 
Court Decision, 2008/116; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 107-108).  
 
The headscarf initiative led to the most serious clash between the JDP and the state 
elites since the breakaway of the party from the National View Movement. After this 
most recent headscarf controversy, the Public Prosecutor of Supreme Court, Ab-
durrahman Yalçınkaya, filed a closure case against the party, with a call for political 
bans to more than seventy party members, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç and also President Abdullah Gül. According to the Public 
Prosecutor, the party had turned into a center of anti-secularism, with its party lead-
ers, ministers, representatives, municipal governors and party organization delivering 
speeches and participating in activities that violated the principle of secularism.  
 
The list of accusations included the following: First, the party was trying to prepare 
the ground for the transformation of the basic principles of the Republic by removing 
the headscarf ban and by filling the bureaucratic cadres with Islamist party members. 
Secondly, the party was exploiting religious symbols for political purposes by play-
ing on the headscarf, restricting the sale of alcohol and discriminating against the 
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restaurants selling alcohol, and applying a social censorship based on religious prin-
ciples (Milliyet, 14 January 2008). Thirdly, the party was exacerbating the divide 
between the religious and the non-religious. Fourthly, the party was secretly trying to 
reshape and reorient the secular legal structure of the country through a kind of grad-
ualism. The accusations were again tied to the remarks of party leaders on the head-
scarf issue. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was noted to say that it was the ulema who should 
decide on the issue of wearing or not wearing headscarf, rather than the judiciary 
(Hürriyet, 16 November 2005). Other party members were noted to say that the reli-
gious should be free to wear the headscarf in schools and universities, as well as the 
public offices; and similarly, to tell a woman to remove her headscarf was a very 
huge social blunder that had to be abandoned. And finally, according to the Public 
Prosecutor, the JDP was conspiring to bring an Islamic Şeriat regime. It had not 
abandoned anything from the program of the earlier religious right parties and the 
party was trying to hide its real intentions (AKP İddianamesi).  
 
The closure case was condemned by many political actors in the country from the 
right and the left at the same time. The JDP had gained 47 percent of the votes in the 
general elections and it was forming the government. It would raise suspicions about 
the validity of the political system if such a popular party was brought to the court-
room for closure. The party had risen to power through elections, and it could be 
removed from power through elections only. The fact that the party had a sizable 
electoral support also meant that its policies and goals reflected the public will. Thus, 
the initiative of the Public Prosecutor was an attack against democracy (Haberturk, 
16 March 2008; Samanyoluhaber, 14 March 2008; Zaman, 14 March 2008; Haber7, 
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14 March 2008; HaberAktuel, 15 March 2008). The pressures of the state elites were 
also generating a great deal of economic instability in the country. According to 
Ergun Özbudun, the closure case was damaging Turkey’s image and democratic rec-
ords. Nowhere in the world were political parties threatened with closure for such 
simple reasons. The Constitutional Court had to reject the accusations of the Public 
Prosecutor and the case was not to be kept in the public agenda (Samanyoluhaber, 14 
March 2008; and also Abramowitz, 5 April 2008). But despite all domestic and in-
ternational reactions, the Constitutional Court found the party guilty of violating the 
secularist principle of the country. The closure demand was rejected with six “yes” 
and five “no” votes. But a financial sanction was ruled in form of the cut of 50 per-
cent of the funds that the party received from the Treasury with ten “yes” and one 
“no” votes.       
 
 
4.7.Conclusion 
 
To recap the main points of the chapter, the secularist reaction expressed with the 
military memorandum ruled on 28 February 1997 and ensuing party closures and 
political bans brought to various members of the religious right has played a critical 
role in driving the religious right into a process of ideological transformation towards 
a more moderate and centrist political line. It is observed that the religious right did 
not prefer to assume a radical attitude towards the secularist reaction, but rather tried 
to accommodate the pressures of the state elites by punishing the radicals in the 
movement, declaring commitment to secular and republican principles, and trying to 
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reformulate the goal and issue orientation of the movement in line with contempo-
rary political norms and standards. In some cases, the reaction was even found justi-
fied by some religious right cadres.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION ON THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF TURKISH RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
 
 
 
This chapter is assigned to the analysis of the transformative powers of globalization 
and Europeanization on Turkish religious right. Globalization and Europeanization 
will be examined in two different sections by first citing the theoretical insights and 
approaches that have been offered to them in the wider literature of comparative and 
international politics, and then by examining their corresponding impacts on the 
transformation of Turkish religious right in its issue and goal orientation after the end 
of each section. The main argument of the chapter is that the Turkish religious right, 
represented by the Welfare Party of 1990s and its successors, the Virtue Party, the 
Felicity Party, and the Justice and Development Party, has been impinged by forces 
of globalization and Europeanization to generate a strong propensity to adopt a more 
moderate political line. The content of the party program, goals, policies and political 
campaigns of the Turkish religious right draw attention with one thing that a greater 
emphasis and role is put on a set of universal, global and contemporary values, prin-
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ciples and institutions that include democracy, human rights, rule of law, secularism 
as well as free market economy in the sphere of economy and that the idea of found-
ing an Islamic society and state is totally abandoned. A very keen interest has devel-
oped to introduce rights and liberties for conservative people through the mecha-
nisms provided by globalization and Europeanization.   
 
 
5.1 Defining Globalization  
 
While defining globalization, it will be useful to locate its usage in different domains 
such as the economy, politics and sociology, to have a wider view. This will facilitate 
our attempt to figure out the role of globalization in the ideological change of the 
Turkish religious right by enabling us with a rich set of analytical tools. Globaliza-
tion is described and studied with different perspectives in different areas of 
knowledge. In economy, it is defined as the unification of international economies 
through the removal of barriers to international trade such as tariffs, quotes, and ex-
port fees, and also through increasing the volume of production and international 
trade (Scholte, 1997: 430-432; Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 17). In politics, globaliza-
tion could be defined as the process of a gradually strengthening multilateralism 
among the states, originating from issues and concerns that require the cooperation 
and solidarity of countries over the borders. Those issues and concerns can be related 
with trade, investment, democracy, human rights, drugs, health, security, terrorism 
etc. on which the countries are rendered better-off if they move collectively and in 
cooperation (McGrew, 2000: 131-139; Halliday, 2002: 37-38; Murden, 2002: 156-
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157). In social and cultural terms, globalization can be described as the transfor-
mation of societies from collective, authoritarian and closed systems to individualist, 
liberal and open societies, and also as the spread of western social and cultural mate-
rials represented in, for example, fast food, Hollywood, styles of clothing, architec-
ture and diverse social and cultural forms. If we combine all of these, globalization 
can briefly be described as liberalization, internationalization and universalization 
(Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 17).  
 
 
5.1.1 Economic Globalization 
 
Economic globalization refers to the process of increasingly greater integration and 
interdependence of domestic markets and production through cross-border mobility 
of goods, services, technology and capital (Thompson, 2000: 88-94; Sholte, 1997: 
430-432). Economic globalization is not a new phenomenon. There have been trade 
relations among countries all over the world since ancient times, but these relations 
have never been as intensive as today. During the 20
th
 century, economic globaliza-
tion has gained a tremendous momentum. Technological and scientific developments 
have facilitated production and mobility of economic objects throughout the world. 
Although there has not been a significant increase in the proportion of international 
trade in the GDP’s of the countries in this period, the volume of international trade 
has steadily grown huge (Thompson, 2000: 94-97).  
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After the Second World War, a set of international institutions and organizations are 
established which include General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to regulate and promote economic 
globalization. A major goal of these entities was to remove barriers to international 
trade such as tariffs, quotes, and fees, and to correct international and domestic mar-
ket failures. This process was accelerated with the end of the Cold War and collapse 
of the Soviet Communism as an important obstacle against economic liberalization 
was eliminated (Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 26-29; Sholte, 1997: 429-440; Fukuyama, 
1989). Leading non-state actors of the economic globalization include Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) with their branches in 
more than one country and their assets over the GDPs of many small states. Some 
well-known examples of MNCs and TNCs are IBM, General Electric, Honda, 
Mitsubishi, Nestle and Michelin (Thompson, 2000: 103-109).  
 
 
5.1.2 Political Globalization 
 
Political Globalization could be described as the process of a strengthening multilat-
eralism among countries that induce them to cooperate in bilateral, regional and in-
ternational entities to regulate the gains of modernization and development in the 
areas of the movement of goods, capital, knowledge, ideas, people; in combating 
trans-border problems and concerns like terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, drug traf-
ficking, organized crime, human trade, environmental disasters, poverty etc.; as well 
as for the spread and settlement of universal political norms and values like democ-
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racy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality and good governance (McGrew, 
2000: 131-139; Halliday, 2002: 37-38; Murden, 2002: 156-157).   
 
Actors of political globalization appear to be many. They include states, intergov-
ernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and sub-state actors with 
global, regional and domestic characteristics, examples of which could include the 
UN, EU, WTO, OECD, OPEC, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, various MNCs 
and TNCs as well as some major individual states like the USA, Britain, France, 
Germany. These actors could have differing goals and concerns that may be political, 
economic, social, environmental or of any other nature. Though widely unequal in 
their powers, access and influence, they come together on an issue basis in varying 
compositions to produce and implement global norms, rules and standards. This 
eventually leads us to an idea of global polity and governance where the actors have 
been successful in establishing a loose global community through which they can 
foster their common goods in a collective way (McGrew, 2000: 142-148; Lechner 
and Boli, 2008: 259-262).   
 
Francis Fukuyama is one of those who has written extensively on the aspects of po-
litical globalization related with the spread and supremacy of global political values. 
What he wrote on as the liberal idea was distinguished from its rivals with its embod-
iment of democracy, rule of law and market economies. Liberalism was based on 
rationalism, participation, secularism, individualism, equality and empathy among 
the people, and thus it was viewed as superior to rival ideologies. These institutions 
and principles were universals that all the countries needed to follow. Liberalism is 
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supported by western states and companies as it is regarded as the ideal form that 
contributes to global civilization. The scale of support was huge, ranging from acts of 
war, economic sanctions, to political and diplomatic pressure in case of declining to 
cooperate. And when the countries opted to cooperate, the policies were in the oppo-
site direction, including providing economic, political and military support. It was 
the main cause of the Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 
Cold War, for instance. They were all fought against totalitarianism and communism. 
The end of the Cold war was proof that dictatorships and bureaucracies were unable 
to compete with liberal societies in progress. Globalization then meant no more than 
expansion of the liberal world order (Fukuyama, 1989).  
 
 
5.1.3 Social and Cultural Globalization 
 
Social and cultural globalization could be defined as the emergence of common 
forms of social and cultural structures as a result of increasing contact, communica-
tion, immigration and exchange of social and cultural objects between countries. 
World cultures and societies are exposed to a great degree of contact and communi-
cation thanks to facilities and conditions provided by modernity that shorten the dis-
tances and bring people together some of which include modern means of transporta-
tion, media, TV, internet, phone, and other advancements in technology and science.      
 
We can try to make a distinction between social and cultural globalization here. So-
cial globalization could be defined as the spread of western social structures over the 
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world, the examples of which can be listed as the replacement of collective, authori-
tarian, and close social structures with individualist, pluralist, democratic and open 
ones (Halliday, 2002: 38). Cultural globalization, secondly, can be described as the 
homogenization of cultural values over the world through the exchange of local cul-
tural forms and the formation of cultures of synthesis. So in the case of cultural glob-
alization, it can be said that the societies are in a trend of adopting and enjoying cer-
tain elements of other cultures to produce an international hybrid culture. As a result, 
national dress styles, cuisines, festivals, organizations and all the cultural things that 
accompany them in the East have come to share many things in common with those 
of other countries in the West (Mackay, 2000: 48-49). 
 
According to UNESCO statistics, there is a substantial increase in the trade of cultur-
al assets and products over the world which has risen from $6,800 million in the 
1970s to $38,500 million in the 1980s (UNESCO, 1986: 10). The increase in trade of 
cultural commodities, as well as the instruments that propagate them, means that 
national cultures are weakening at the expense of an increasingly strengthening glob-
al culture (Karim, 2002: 37-40). Television occupies an important place as an in-
strument to represent and disseminate cultural exports. It is noted that from 1965 to 
1996, the number of TV receivers per thousand people has increased four folds over 
the world. And similarly, when we look at the number of TV channels in Europe, a 
sharp rise draws attention: from about 20 in 1984 to over 250 in 1996 (Mackay, 
2000: 49-54). The internet appears as another important instrument of cultural glob-
alization. It remains a huge source of information, communication, entertainment and 
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dialogue among different cultures. The usage of the internet is growing all over the 
world tremendously.  
 
New communications technologies allow instant, inexpensive and global communi-
cation over the world. The world is now like a global village where mobility is facili-
tated tremendously in time and space. This process aids democratic and participatory 
institutions too. Thanks to advanced means of communication, matters of politics and 
society are debated by a wider domestic and international public. Opinions are dis-
seminated over a huge social environment where they can be heard, deliberated and 
decided with access to broader knowledge. Communications revolution opens a gate 
to diversity, alternative thinking, opposition and liberty for a more democratic com-
munity (Mackay, 2000: 55-56).   
 
Social globalization is defined as the transformation of collective, authoritarian, 
closed and inegalitarian societies to individualist, libertarian, democratic, participant 
and open societies. This transformation could take place consciously or subcon-
sciously. The communications revolution examined above has lessened the barriers 
of time and space among societies substantially. The societies have been introduced 
to a process of dialogue, observation, deliberation, accommodation and adaptation as 
a result of which socio-cultural institutions have come to share commonalities across 
cultures.  
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5.2 Reactions to Globalization in the Islamic World 
 
Elements of globalization can encounter various reactions from a multiplicity of ac-
tors in a particular country. Depending on the policy and ideological goals of the 
actors, globalization can be met with reactions of absorption, accommodation, de-
nunciation or it might be imposed from inside or outside too in certain cases. Absorp-
tion takes place most often when global norms and principles share a great deal of 
similarity with domestic ones. That is especially the case with themes of scientific, 
industrial and economic development for which almost all the countries show great 
enthusiasm. Some other elements of globalization which might bear some cultural 
and political themes could be accommodated into domestic structures with an ac-
companying set of views. In these cases, countries might be sharing a similar set of 
principles and institutions with those of global ones and they can get united with one 
another in a functional way. These two types of reactions to globalization also bear a 
kind of philosophical approach that supports them against opposing political views. 
As far as the wider Islamic world is considered, for instance, it is often suggested that 
globalization is not contradictory with religious values and principles. It is an asset 
that promotes partnership, cooperation and peace among countries. It is a source of 
dialogue that contributes to economic, political and social progress for all its mem-
bers (Halliday, 2002: 45-55).  
 
They may even go further by arguing that Islam is itself a synthesis of the East and 
the West from the beginning. It was an updated version of Judaism and Christianity 
in religious terms. Contemporary science and technology was a product of exchange 
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of knowledge and technology over the countries. Islam was not against anything that 
originated from outside. Islam was in love of diversity and pluralism. Islam was a 
product of linguistic, cultural, political and economic integration with the other civi-
lizations.  
 
There have been cases where aspects of globalization are imposed. Some countries 
are subjected to varying degrees of sanctions and pressures by the international 
community to reform their social, political and economic institutions according to 
universal standards that may include introduction of democratic reforms, adoption of 
international human rights provisions, supremacy of the rule of law, freedom of 
thought and conscience, gender equality, respect for minority rights and so on. The 
extent of those pressures could include the starting of a war, international blockade, 
embargo, exclusion from the international community, downsizing of diplomatic 
relations and so on.  
 
At other times, globalization could be denounced by various groups of people for 
various reasons. It might be because it is thought to be an instrument of Western he-
gemony and domination over the East. For them, it is just a masque for the western 
imperialism of the previous century. At a lower level, globalization is sometimes 
interpreted as a grand project by the major power in the West by which they endeav-
or to spread and establish their political, economic, social and cultural institutions to 
the rest of the world. For those with this idea, globalization is a threat to state, nation 
and fatherland. In the Islamic world, for instance, the slogan of returning to tradition-
al Islamic ideals is heard very often. Solution for the illnesses of the time is the return 
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to faith, holy book and prayer. Islam has its unique political, economic and social 
institutions (Halliday, 2002: 48-53).  
 
 
5.3 Approaches to Globalization  
 
 
5.3.1 Conservatives  
 
Conservatives take classical Islam as the basis of their approach to globalization. 
They argue that Islam embodies all necessary forms of economic, political, social 
and cultural institutions by which modernity can be met. They are opposed to the 
idea that Islam is unable to conform to modern conditions or that it needs to be re-
formed in the face of new developments. Conservatives support the ideal of bringing 
about an Islamic state with a constitution compatible with Islam. Globalization is 
deemed to be closely tied with Western political, economic and ideological interests 
and that its cultural and social content is detrimental to the faith which is most often 
called as “Westoxification” rather than development and progress. Some particular 
contents of the West that they are opposed to include secularism, socialism and such 
things that directly aim to marginalize religion in public life as well as the ideas of 
equality, gender rights, and freedom of religion, which are deemed as in opposition 
to Islamic values and principles (Monshipouri, 2002: 99-101).   
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5.3.2 Modernists  
 
Modernists search for a compromise between Islam and modernity. While not reject-
ing the Islamic civilization, they argue that there can always be found a way to rec-
oncile Islam with the things brought by globalization. Islam could be reconstructed, 
reinvented and renewed depending on circumstances. The modernists agree with the 
aspects of political globalization such as democracy, human rights and rule of law by 
trying to search for their origins in earlier Islamic civilizations. So they argue that 
modernization can be Islamized and accommodated. However, it cannot be said that 
modernists concur with all aspects of globalization. They oppose the idea that politi-
cal modernization requires secularism and marginalization of the religion. And simi-
larly, they don’t agree that globalization requires westernization in cultural terms. 
For the modernists, moral and cultural forms of religion do not need to be brought 
into conflict with modernity. While they support the global struggle for democracy, 
human rights and rule of law, they oppose the employment of these mechanisms to 
establish hegemony and domination on the non-west as well as their usage as an in-
strument to marginalize religion (Monshipouri, 2002: 101-103). 
 
 
5.3.3 Liberals 
 
Liberals differ from the other two insofar as they believe in the validity of universal 
values, principles and institutions that include democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
market economy and good governance. They don’t search for ideal forms in tradi-
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tional religious and moral values, nor do they try to accommodate them with moder-
nity. Religion and morality is respected as a part of freedom of thought and con-
science, as well as because diversity and pluralism are valued in liberal systems. 
They believe that there is a universal civilization originating from the West. While it 
has some political and economic features that countries adopt to become a part of the 
international society, there are some others that settle by themselves through adapta-
tion, appreciation and synthesis. Even more, some argue that the tradition of Islam 
cannot compete with its contemporary rivals in many aspects of the life (Mon-
shipouri, 2002: 99-104).  
 
 
5.4 Globalization as a Moderating Power over Islamic Politics  
 
Turkish sociopolitical and economic life has undergone a rapid transformation par-
ticularly starting with the premiership of Turgut Özal in the 1980s. Turgut Özal was 
a leading champion of laissez-faire economies with his ambitious goals to restructure 
the Turkish economy. The changes introduced by Turkey’s post-coup prime minister 
in the sphere of economy included abandoning the decades-old import substitution 
strategy and adoption of an export-led economic growth strategy, privatization of 
huge public economic enterprises, introduction of free market regulations based on 
promotion of international trade and finance, flexible exchange and interest rates, and 
capital mobility (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2002). Political and social 
reforms came in early 1990s. Turkey was introduced to a period of remarkable eco-
nomic growth with its attraction of massive foreign investment as well as increasing 
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volume of international trade and domestic manufacturing sector. This process was 
facilitated with the participation of the Turkish immigrant population in Western 
Europe into the economic life with their capital, entrepreneurialism and newly-
acquired culture of consumerism (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 20-21; Kuru, 
2005: 259).   
 
In this period, the state monopoly on TV broadcast, radios, universities and schools 
was terminated and the path to a great communications and technological develop-
ment was opened. A drastic surge of private media incorporations, educational insti-
tutions, civil society and intellectual groups took place in Turkish sociopolitical life. 
There was a tremendous increase in the consumption of TV, radio, cinema and video 
products. The internet and cellular phones were added to the traditional channels of 
communication in 1990s. These developments have introduced Turkey into a greater 
state of integration and communication with the forces of globalization. The ele-
ments of political and social globalization, such as democracy, human rights, rule of 
law, freedom, equality, as well as the ideas of open, individualistic and private socie-
ty were brought to greater attention of the public to meet with various reactions and 
views by different segments of the society (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 19).  
 
The Islamists of 1970s and 1990s were against the institutions of globalization in the 
beginning, and sought to limit the content of relations with the west to issues of in-
dustrial and economic development. But starting with the midst of 1990s – when 
Welfare Party was in government in coalition with the True Path Party – they have 
acquired a positive inclination towards the means and opportunities provided by 
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globalization to facilitate their goal of establishing an Islamic society. The Islamists 
were exploiting all communication, transportation, education, broadcasting, publica-
tion channels introduced by globalization, and they were also beginning to appreciate 
parts of global political and social values such as freedom of conscience, public will 
and parliamentary politics. The Islamists have gradually turned in favor of globaliza-
tion by changing their policy orientations from anti-western, anti-Zionist, and pro-
Islamic to pro-western, pro-globalization and pro-EU. While finding again inclusion 
in Turkish political life, this adaptation would also provide them with protection 
from potential secularist reactions (Dağı, 2005: 31-32; Dağı, 2006: 93-96). 
 
 
5.4.1 Economic Globalization and Turkish Islamic Bourgeoisie  
 
One of the most important contributions of globalization to religious right politics in 
Turkey has been the emergence of a moderate middle class of industrialists and busi-
nessmen. A class of conservative entreprenuers,
1
 taking advantage of a liberalizing 
domestic economic structure facilitated by Özal’s free market reforms particularly, 
was able to produce economies of scale by showing activism and participation in 
various sectors of the economy. The influence of this particular class on Turkish reli-
gious right has been extensively studied in Turkish politics (Öniş, 2006a: 124-125, 
128; Karakaş, 2007: 20-22).     
 
                                                          
1
 Moderate in politics but conservative in economic, social and cultural life. 
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This conservative class of industrialists and businessmen has been united in an asso-
ciation named MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği – Association 
for Individual Industrialists and Businessmen) with motivations to promote their 
goals and interests. MÜSİAD has been accompanied by a number of other associa-
tions of its kind in forthcoming years. As an association of industrialists and busi-
nessmen with thousands of members, MÜSİAD’s concerns and interests were 
supposed to be taken into account by politicians and statesmen because of a list of 
issues related with them like employment, inflation, interest, economic development 
etc. which were also linked with a list of other social and political issues. MÜSİAD 
was a remarkable support base for the Welfare Party in the beginning by providing it 
with various assets of electoral and political support. MÜSİAD was known for its 
participation to WP’s political campaign in direct and indirect means and it was also 
active in organizing and sponsoring various TV and radio establishments, meetings, 
speeches, conferences, foundations, advertisements, and products with conservative 
purposes and themes. (Öniş, 2006a: 124-125, 128; Yavuz, 2005: 109, 111; Karakaş, 
2007: 20-22; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 115; Günalp, 2001: 439).   
 
As a result of the observed damages of periods of political and economic instability 
to economic interests of its members, MÜSİAD was prompted to deliver messages of 
moderacy and common sense to political groups. Concerning the secularist reaction 
expressed in 28 February Process, President of MÜSİAD Erol Yarar was expressing 
his contempt for WP’s radicalizing tendencies. He was condemning Erbakan’s 
attempts to rule the Virtue Party under the cover and was saying that  
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(VP)’s cooperation with people who led to WP-True Path’s collapse has 
drawn a lot of reaction. That was wrong. People want stability, transparency 
and seriousness. They don’t want conspiracy. They tell you not to be involved 
with Byzantine type conspiracies (Sabah, 23 April 1999).  
 
MÜSİAD was observing interests in the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and 
human rights, which would provide them with a hospitable environment for their 
economic activities as agents of peace and stability (Öniş, 2001: 289-291; Kösebala-
ban, 2004: 11-12; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 113).  
 
The change for globalism in the political discourse of MÜSİAD was also associated 
with the perception of the organization that defense of contemporary political and 
legal principles such as democracy, human rights and rule of law would enable them 
with capabilities to enjoy the social and cultural contents of their identity. Freedom 
of thought and conscience was an invaluable asset in this matter. This new policy 
line would also make it possible for them to criticize the state elites for their frequent 
intervention in parliamentary and governmental political processes and for their rigid 
sense of secularism. Particularly, the military was invited to follow its counterparts in 
the liberal world in terms of the ideal type of civil-military relations, which foresaw 
the minimization of the role of military to significant domestic and external security 
issues only. They had to move away from anything resembling dictatorship, towards 
participatory government promoting civil and human rights for the citizens. (Koyun-
cu-Lorasdağı, 2010: 116-120).   
 
Another important reason for this paradigmatic change in MÜSİAD was that the idea 
of minimizing economic relations with the west and uniting with the Muslim world 
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was economically fruitless that led to huge economic losses as a very lucrative group 
of markets was abandoned. There was a need to differentiate economic and political 
concerns as they were most often two different domains and conservative business-
men had to exploit this opportunity at a maximum capacity. And in fact, opening to 
the global markets was now more of a necessity for purposes of growth, competi-
tiveness and survival.  
 
 
5.4.2 Islamic Intellectuals  
 
The liberal reforms introduced starting with Özal period in 1980s have been instru-
mental in the proliferation of a group of Islamic intellectuals who were exposed to 
elements of political, social and cultural globalization originating from the west. 
Some of them had grown very influential with their supporters, large scale business 
enterprises, participation in civil society organizations and political parties. Their 
famous examples include Fethullah Gülen, Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel among many oth-
ers. Until the end of the 1990s, the views of these intellectuals displayed similarities 
to their contemporaries in the rest of the Islamic world such as Sayyid Qutb, Mav-
dudi, Ali Shariati etc. who were with the idea of establishing an Islamic state and 
society in their countries (Dağı, 2004).  
 
The February 28 1997 process has been a critical date to speed up the orientation of 
many Islamist intellectuals from the above mentioned trend to a globalist universalist 
one. They were now in greater support of the institutional settlement of western val-
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ues and principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights. The idea of establish-
ing an Islamic Sharia regime was abandoned in favor of the promotion of western 
social, political and economic values. This shift towards globalization would, on the 
one hand, protect the religious right against rigid secularist reactions and, on the oth-
er, would enable them with legal mechanisms to enjoy social and cultural aspects of 
their conservative identity (Öniş, 2006a: 125). It was a necessity to take on these 
universal values and principles for survival, but the Islamists have also understood 
the virtues of globalization, which protected their rights and freedoms as well as 
providing many other opportunities (Atasoy, 2009: 169-172; Dağı, 2004).  
 
Fethullah Gülen is presently one of the leading figures among the Turkish Islamist 
intellectuals to whom we can assign a special space here. He is distinguished with his 
views and activism on matters of religion, politics, society, economy etc. with his 
moderate, libertarian style who communicates them most often in an integrated way 
via a large industry of publications, conferences, TV channels and many other media 
instruments. He was critical of some WP policies and goals related with the estab-
lishment of some Islamic political ideals in Turkey even before the February 28 Pro-
cess. In an interview, he talks as follows:  
The difficulty arises when some Muslims and policy-makers consider and 
present Islam as a purely political, sociological, and economic ideology, ra-
ther than as a religion. 
... Religion in general and Islam in particular cannot be compared with de-
mocracy or any other political, social, or economic system. Religion focuses 
primarily on the immutable aspects of life and existence, whereas political, 
social, and economic systems or ideologies concern only certain social as-
pects of our worldly life. (Gülen, 2001)  
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Fethullah Gülen shows strong commitment to democracy and secularism with a con-
tention that democracy is the ideal form of government in modern world which also 
meets the expectations of the conservative religious segments of the society and that 
traditional Islamic political principles must not be incorporated into political pro-
grams and policies by any parties. He is a strong supporter of market economy and 
entrepreneurialism as a road to wealth creation, freedom and service to religion (Aras 
and Çaha, 2000; Atasoy, 2009: 170-172).  
 
 
5.4.3 Turkish Religious Right under Political Socialization 
 
It is very commonly argued by scholars of Turkish politics that Turkish religious 
right has been introduced to remarkable process of socialization in line with 
universal and global political values, norms and principles taking speed particularly 
in the second half of 1990s (Dağı, 2005: 28-32; Öniş, 2006a: 124). The decline in the 
oppositional stance against EU, USA, Israel and global political and economic 
institutions like UN, IMF and the World Bank in party policies and programs as well 
as increasing support for contemporary political and legal rules and institutions like 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, secularism were clear signs of this process 
(Kösebalaban, 2004: 13; Dağı, 2005: 28). The change was sometimes associated with 
problems of incompatibility between the classical Just Order and National View 
doctrines of the movement and elements of globalization. When the Party was 
brought to the government, it was understood that many of the ideals promoted and 
promised in election campaigns associated with Islamic politics were not applicable 
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or practicable. In some other cases, supporters of the movement were detecting 
various interests in the development and adoption of new goals in line with those 
things brought by globalization. And still in some other cases, they were realizing 
that global values, principles and programs were indeed much better and more 
preferable than those defended by the movement over the years. 
 
The approach of the movement towards globalization was more like conservative, 
with some modernist inclinations though, until the midst of 1990s characterized with 
a denunciation of integration and proximity with the west as well as of various 
western ideas, values and principles and processes. But with a process beginning 
with the introduction of the WP to the government, leading the movement to 
intimately meet with processes of globalization, a modernist liberal approach was in 
the formation in support of integration and cooperation with the west as well as of 
adoption and accommodation of western ways and norms.  
 
 
5.4.3.1. Traditional National View Approach to Globalization 
 
A rich number of books, speeches and programs produced by the National Salvation 
Party and Welfare Party cadres, particularly by traditional party leader Necmettin 
Erbakan, provide us with suffient resources to demonstrate the conservative approach 
of the movement towards globalization. The conservatism of the movement was 
most evident in its foreign policy orientation. To start with, the view of the 
movement towards relations with the USA was very much negative. It was argued 
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that the USA had evangelical and imperialistic motivations towards the Muslim 
world. Reminiscent of Samuel Huntington’s theory of clash of civilizations, it was 
believed that America was trying to weaken and subjugate Muslim countries, in one 
side, and assist a strengthening Christian hegemony and expansion in the Middle 
East in the other. Accordingly, the quietude of the USA during the Serbian genocide 
against the Bosnians, US support to Armenia in 1991 Azeri-Armenian War, again 
US support to PKK through Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq were 
material proofs of this thinking (Erbakan, 1993a: 71-77). 
 
Turkey’s membership to Customs Union and European Economic Community was 
opposed with greater vehemence with a belief that EEC was a Christian club 
established to promote Christian unity and cooperation with some ill motivations 
about the Muslim world. And they would not accept Turkey to the community as 
long as it stayed Muslim. A likely accession to the Community would weaken 
Turkey by also making it dependent on Europe in political and economic terms 
(Erbakan, 1991: 11-14; Erbakan, 1975a: 235-250, 254-264). As to Israel, the 
National View was with the idea that it was not possible to execute friendly relations 
with Israel for Israel was an invader nation massacring brother Palestinians with 
future goals to invade further in Islamic lands reaching to as far as Turkey (Erbakan, 
1975a: 250-254; Erbakan, 1991: 201). The ideals foreign policy orientation for 
National View was the minimization of relations with western states and 
international organizations and development and deepening of the ties with the 
Muslim world. While this was in the economic and political interests of the country, 
it was also a part of Turkey’s historical and cultural ties with the Muslim world to do 
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so. To this end, Turkey had to leave aside USA, UN, EEC, NATO, IMF and other 
western actors and work for the establishment of an Islamic UN, Customs Union, 
military alliance among the Muslim countries (Erbakan, 1975a: 165-270; Erbakan, 
1991: 35). 
 
Movement’s conservatism in domestic policy areas was not less than its 
conservatism in foreign policy. The objectives of the party were reaching to as far as 
introducing an Islamic regime with calls for jihad for this purpose. This was the main 
reason for the opening of a closure case against the WP. Apart from that, in 
economy, the movement defended an economic system based on classical Islamic 
teachings with motivations to remove interest from economic life, replace the 
interest-based banking system with investment and stock marketing, and fight against 
the illnesses of capitalist economies like extravagance, luxury, self-preservation and 
gratification. The party was not against private property and entrepreneurialism, 
however (Erbakan, 1975a: 149-157; Erbakan, 1975b: 66-81; Erbakan, 1991: 22-27). 
 
Religious education occupied a special place among National View goals: Number of 
lessons of religion and morality would be increased in public schools; number and 
quality of Imam Hatip schools, faculties of theology and Islamic graduate schools 
would be enhanced. Religious education would contribute to the belief and morality 
of the new generations by teaching them the importance of dignity, integrity, loyalty 
and respect for the elderly people at a time of growing concerns about them 
(Erbakan, 1975a: 90-97, Erbakan, 1976: 19-25; Erbakan, 1975b: 14-25). An idea of 
multiple law system was promoted by the WP with an intention to allow religious 
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people to benefit from judicial services according to Islamic law (Refah Partisi: 4, 
70-79). There were a list of other policies and goals adopted by the WP particularly 
involving the implementation of various Islamic norms and principles in public life 
like prohibition of alcohol sale in public restaurants, removal of some Atatürk busts, 
political campaigns for freedom of headscarf in schools and universities etc. 
revealing its conservative identity (Karakaş, 2007: 24-25).  
 
 
5.4.3.2. The WP from Government to Its Closure   
 
A substantially modernist approach was in the development with the introduction of 
the WP to the government. The party program taking its inspiration from classical 
religious teachings of the past was faced with realities of the modernity to notify the 
party with the necessity to reorganize itself in its goal and issue orientation (Tanıyıcı, 
2003: 471-472). In foreign policy, in Turkey’s economic relations, it was observed 
that an attempt to move the orientation of the economy from the west to the Muslim 
East would be counterproductive and regressive for it was in Turkey’s greater 
interests, as a necessity of economic globalization, to be engaged in greater 
integration and cooperation with the west. The party was aware of the potential 
contribution of west-dominant international trade, finance and investment to Turkish 
economy. The import of technological and industrial infrastructure was an equally 
important necessity. To this end, the WP was introducing a remarkable change in its 
view to EU, US and western global economic organizations like IMF and World 
Bank.  
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The turn of the movement towards the west was also manifest in the emergence of a 
favorable thinking about western political values and principles such as democracy, 
human rights and rule of law, a view particularly strong among young party cadres. 
A belief was growing in the party towards accepting these values and principles as 
part of a universal culture above religious considerations to which all countries had 
to pay respect. This remained as another factor motivating the WP to improve 
Turkey’s ties with the west as members of a world community sharing common 
values and principles. There were many other benefits of the partnership with the 
west apart from economic and political considerations such as improving Turkey’s 
military power and technology. Turkey’s NATO membership and strategic 
partnership with the USA was critical in this context which had to be preserved 
without any change.  
 
There was a noteworthy change in the view of the movement towards the members 
of religions other than Islam who were often suspected as nurturing ill motivations 
about the Muslim world and developing countries. The participation of the WP to 
Global Forum of Spiritual and Parliamentary Leaders held in Turkey on 6-9 October 
1997 was a good case in point. The Forum was organized as a challenge to Samuel 
Huntington’s idea of clash of civilizations with a belief that solutions could be 
brought to humanitarian crises taking place on the globe by bringing leaders of 
different religious and political communities together. In opposition to the tendency 
to see differences in civilizations as a source of conflict, the Forum stood as a 
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platform to call attention to the amenities of pluralism and multiculturalism 
originating from cultural differences (Kul, 21 April 1997).  
 
As a part of this paradigmatic change in the movement, the Minister of State 
Abdullah Gül was joining in an official visit to the USA in February 1997 during 
which he was reaffirming the multidimensionality of Turkish-American relations 
with a depth spreading to various domains and he was going on: “Our government 
would like to improve these relations” (Sabah, 20 February 1997; Çongar, 21 
February 1997). Gül was saying that Turkish-American relations were beyond simple 
relations between two countries. Delivering the intention of the WP-True Path 
government not to change the course of relations between two countries, Gül was 
saying that “US officials pronounce that they support democracy, pluralism, free and 
fair elections and open society. Turkey is also a country like that” to point out to the 
membership of two countries to common political traditions (Emiroğlu, 28 February 
1997; Süzal, 24 February 1997). Gül was expressing his admiration of American 
secularism and the longing of his party to replace the one at home with American 
secularism (Süzal, 28 February 1997). 
 
WP’s pro-US turn was so remarkable that the party was at times yielding to 
observing pressures from US authorities in various foreign and domestic political 
issues. During his US visit, Gül was warned against establishing close relations with 
Iran for its alleged support to terrorist organizations and abortion of Middle East 
peace process. In case of its failure to keep relations with Iran at a low, Turkey was 
threatened with an embargo.  (Sabah, 21 February 1997). Apart from that, American 
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officials were expressing their concerns about radical religious tendencies in Turkey 
and delivering their message that Turkey would be accepted to western community 
only if the secularist principle was respected. In a meeting between US Secretary of 
State Maedeleine Albright and deputies of EU Commission in February 1997, the 
deputies were reporting that the meeting was held “to emphasize the importance 
given by the USA and the EU to secular Turkey, to express the rising concerns 
against the problems, and to indicate how important for both sides to reinvigorate the 
ties and deepen the relations with Turkey.” Albright was pointing out to “the 
necessity to perceive how critical it is for secular Turkish Republic to be linked to the 
west with close ties… It is very important for secular Turkey to anchor to the west” 
(Sabah, 19 February 1997).  
 
In his visit to the USA, Gül was publicizing the strong willingness of his party for 
EU membership too. In response to concerns against Turkey’s motivations to diverge 
from the West, Gül was saying that “This concern is groundless. If there is such a 
concern, take us to the EU immediately” (Sabah, 20 February 1997). The desire of 
the party to enter EU could be better understood when we look at Gül’s warnings to 
warnings to veto NATO’s expansion attempts in case of a motivation by EU to close 
the gates to Turkey (Çongar, 21 February 1997). Gül was returning from the visit 
with promises given by US officials to support Turkey’s EU accession process. Gül’s 
attempts were supported by Erbakan too for he was also emphasizing the importance 
of establishing an atmosphere of understanding and communication with the USA. 
America was recognized as a global power, and Turkey had to execute its relations 
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with it on the base of perceived reciprocal interests (Özcan, 1998: 184-185; Dağı, 
1998: 101-102).    
 
The hint of pro-EU turn (Named as European Economic Community at that time) 
was given as early as its establishment in 1985 indeed. The party leader Ahmet 
Tekdal, occupying the seat due to Erbakan’s ban from politics, was saying that his 
party was in support of Turkey’s membership to EEC with observed interests in the 
contribution of the membership to Turkey’s economic development (Tekdal, 1985: 
8-10). The changed attitude of WP leader Erbakan towards Turkey’s EU membership 
was becoming public much before the establishment of the WP-True Path 
Government.  Erbakan was saying that:  
We are not against the Customs Union… What does the Customs Union 
mean? The Customs Union means Turkey’s attainment of competitiveness 
through the establishment of a healthy economy despite the removal of 
customs duties and liberation of everything… Who does not want it? 
(Milliyet, 30 December 1995).   
 
 
As the coalition partner of the WP-True Path Government, Erbakan was giving his 
support with his signing of the 54 Government Program to the continuation of 
accession talks with EU in line with the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963. A special 
importance was given in 54 Government Program to the implementation of necessary 
reforms and regulations for the functioning of Customs Union Agreement as well as 
the introduction of harmonization measures for EU accession.   
 
There was a remarkable change in the view of the WP towards Turkey’s relations 
with Israel also. The party was not allowed to put its conservative program into 
 149 
 
action in government for reasons. While the pressures of the Turkish Armed Forces 
were an important reason in this, there were also a number of other important 
concerns in the agenda. One of those concerns was US calls from Turkey for 
developing friendly relations with Israel. In case of its disregard, Turkey was being 
threatened with renunciation of US support to Turkey in diplomatic, military, 
economic and political arenas. Even more, Turkey was sometimes being advised by 
the US to turn to Israel for various military and technological items that it wanted to 
buy from the US (Zaman, 6 October 1996). Another concern expected from an 
improving Turkish-Israeli relations was the potential contribution of Israeli 
intelligence against PKK which had proved very useful indeed as it was seen in the 
capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (Robins, 2007: 299). A final motivation 
encouraging WP deputies to approach Israeli authorities was to use various American 
Jewish lobbies to solicit favorable US decisions and policies about Turkey (Zaman, 7 
June 1997).  
 
In addition to these realpolitik concerns, there were some idealist tendencies growing 
among WP cadres revealing itself in a belief in the likelihood of reaching peace in 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a striking deviation from the pessimist and malign 
Israeli image. The WP was hinting to play a mediator role in this process. In response 
to a question about WP’s view of Israel during his visit to USA, Abdullah Gül was 
saying that: “We want them to live in peace (with Palestine) and we want to play an 
important role in Middle East peace process” and he was going on by saying that WP 
was not an enemy of Israel (Sabah, 21 February 1997). 
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There were some other difficulties encountered in the pursuit of traditional National 
View program apart from those of above motivating the party to suspend it for 
periods to come. The attempt to introduce an upper limit and various taxes to interest 
applications in the economy with the declared war of the Minister of Finance 
Abdullatif Şener against interest were examples to it. Şener’s explanations in this 
direction, soon after the establishment of the 54 Government with True Path Party, 
was generating a state of instability in the economy by unexpectedly increasing the 
interest rates at a value of 13 points as well as leading to a rise in the value of foreign 
currency with warnings issued to foreign investors by specialists against a potential 
economic crisis in Turkey (Tamer, 24 November 2002).  
 
When the WP was closed, Bülent Arınç was explaining the plan of reformists to 
establish a new party located in the center and open to the world. The new party 
would feature democracy and human rights and it would not take the religion under 
its monopoly. Arınç was arguing that there were some mistakes in the timing and 
marshalling of certain foreign policy priorities during the WP period. He was saying 
For example, the Far East visit ranging from Iran to Malaysia: Was Iran 
supposed to be the first country? This was one of the issues that the US was 
very sensitive in the new world order. This was the case with Libya too 
(Cerrahoğlu, 22 February 1998).  
 
 
5.4.3.3. The Virtue Party  
 
Established on December 17 1997, as a precaution against a likely closure of the WP 
for many, the Virtue Party quickly gathered many of the non-banned WP 
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representatives in its organization. The modernist approach taking form during the 
WP-True Path Government acquired a more solid and sophisticated structure in VP’s 
policy perspective. When the state of chaos was recovered after the closure of the 
WP, a team of party members including Recai Kutan, Şevket Kazan, Abdullah Gül 
and Oğuzhan Asıltürk, appointed with instructions by Erbakan, were given to the 
formulation of the programmatic orientation of the party with observed differences 
from traditional National View line. It was stated in the outset that the VP would not 
follow the oft-promoted Just Order and National View ideas and that the party would 
give priority to democracy, human rights and rule of law as the major tenants of its 
goal and issue orientation (Radikal, 22 January 1998).  
 
The party program was introduced by Kutan with a slogan of “change.”  Kutan was 
saying in a speech that “We don’t use the concept of Just Order. There is no such 
thing. It was a debate in fact. It was an academic discussion” and he was going on “It 
was a brain gymnastic. Even Erbakan did not try to implement it when he was the 
prime minister” (Çekirge, 11 July 1998). For Kutan, what needed was the transfer of 
democracy, human rights and freedoms to Turkey, of those things that make the west 
superior (Sabah, 2 November 1999). The necessity of this process of adaptation was 
explained as follows by Gül as follows in a speech:  
It is inevitable to have such vivid political discussions in our country for we 
are introduced to a rapid process of change together with the world… With 
the passage of time and experience, the people are motivated to think more 
realist and healthy. It is without question that – as the leaders of societies – 
the political parties, politicians and thinkers cannot stay outside of this 
development… The relationship between politics and religion must be limited 
with measures taken for freedom of religion and religious education. It is 
observed that the parties which are established in the name of religion cannot 
be of any help to religion… (Gül, 9 February 2000)      
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In economy, it was indicated in VP program that the party was in support of liberal 
economic system with a goal to minimize the impact of the state in the economy. 
This was reiterated by Kutan during his visit to the US when he also had an interview 
with David Rockefeller. Kutan was saying that “My party supports economic 
liberalism” “Sabah, 23 October 1999) and that “We are not a party isolated from its 
environment. We are in favor of freedom of enterprise. But we are against a 
submissive economic policy too” (Sabah, 2 November 1999). The leading party 
member Bülent Arınç was in agreement with the change introduced. Arınç was 
saying that there was a need to reformulate the economic policy of the movement. 
The Just Order discourse sounded well in rhetoric but it was very difficult to put it 
into action in practice. Arınç was saying that “It is not possible to bring the interest to 
the zero line at once, for instance” (Radikal, 25 May 1998). The difficulty to remove 
interest from economy was recognized by Kutan also. Kutan was indicating that  
The economic system in hand is programmed according to an economy of 
interest. It is not possible to change it. Interest-based economy can remain, 
but there could be space for interest-free economic applications together with 
it. The present economic system can keep going, but I don’t invest my money 
in interest (Ertürk, 28 March 1999).   
 
In VP program it was indicated that a priority would be given to Turkey’s EU 
membership. The reason for the desertion of the idea of EU as a Christian club, 
imperialist and Jewish tool was given by Kutan as follows:  
Circumstances are changing in the world. Conditions of the day are not the 
same as those in the past. We have made an assessment according to the 
conditions of the day and we revised our old EU policy. We now say that 
Turkey must enter the EU… (Çekirge, 11 July 1998)   
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Concerning VP’s US policy, Arınç was saying that they would not do politics 
without taking the US into account. The colonial era had ended and a new world 
order had started. The VP was recognizing the virtues of western values (Radikal, 25 
May 1998). To this end, during his visit to the US, Kutan was meeting with US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and in a series 
of speeches and Forums he participated he was emphasizing the democratic identity 
of his party and was indicating that “We want the implementation of America 
secularism in Turkey.” During the visit, Kutan was also meeting with leading 
American Jewish lobbies including American Jewish Committee, Bna’i Brith, 
Presidents of Conference of American Jewish Organizations and American-Israeli 
Public Affairs Committee as a development in stark contrast to traditional party line 
(Sabah, 2 November 1999). There was a growing view among the leadership cadres 
of the party for the necessity and the possibility of bringing a solution to Israeli-
Palestinian conflict for which Turkey would be ready to play a mediating role. The 
VP was not an enemy of Israel as it was seen in its congratulation of 50 anniversary 
celebrations of the establishment of Israel (Radikal, 25 May 1998).   
 
VP did not totally abandon the traditional goal and issue orientation of the 
movement, however. Party preserved its conservatism in a number of issues. VP’s 
party program indicated that the international economic platform established by eight 
developing Muslim countries, D-8, would be given special importance with 
motivations to make it more functional and developed. In education, the party was 
offering a 5+3+3=11-year compulsory educational system instead of the then 8-year 
system by which the secondary school division of the Imam-Hatip schools would be 
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able to be reopened. Imam-Hatip schools and other vocational schools would be 
redesigned to improve their educational quality and latitude (VP Party Program).     
 
 
5.4.3.4. The Justice and Development Party  
 
Established after the closure of the VP, the JDP came up with a program more 
attentive to and compatible with global values and principles. While the party 
maintained a sense of conservatism with the importance that it assigned to Turkey’s 
cultural, historical and religious assets, it was more like a modernist and liberal in 
character in terms of its approach to elements of globalization which could be 
ascertained in the emphasis that it placed on democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
gender equality and market economy in domestic politics; and multilateralism, 
multidimensionality, trade liberalization, regional and global integration in foreign 
policy cast as the major goal and issue orientation of the party. Important in this 
formation was the finalization of the intraparty clash between the reformists and the 
traditionalists in WP and VP with the split of the movement and the transfer of the 
reformists to the JDP.
2
 With the congregation of the reformists in the JDP, and thus 
the exclusion of the traditionalist coalition from the processes of decision-making 
                                                          
2
 While the VP had also introduced itself with a policy orientation similar to JDP, the traditionalists 
were still exerting influence in VP with their occasional openings in favor of the preservation of 
traditional party ways. Oğuzhan Asıltürk was one of those traditionalists in VP drawing attention 
with his highly conservative explanations. In response to Kutan’s remarks about the desertion of 
the Just Order program in VP, for instance, Asilturk was rebelling by saying that “WP is closed 
down. Concerning WP, our friends can only talk for themselves. There cannot be any talk on 
behalf of the party” Ertürk, 18 July 1998.     
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and implementation, the JDP was provided with greater freedoms and capabilities to 
formulate a more globalist and contemporary party program. A more important 
reason in this process was of course the growth, as a result of experience and 
learning through time, of a political mentality characterized with a belief in and 
preference of western values and principles among the party cadres as a set of more 
effective, productive, developed and superior institutions. 
 
In August 2000, much before the establishment of the JDP, Erdoğan was saying that 
“I am executing a campaign for a new formation in the sense of developing a new 
political mentality, in the direction of building new approaches to domestic and 
international problems of our country” (Hürriyet, 9 August 2000). In Erdoğan’s 
words, Turkey was in need of an intellectual change. The new formation that he was 
working would be an awakening of Turkey in the context of catching up with the 
time and civilization (Hürriyet, 28 May 2001). Erdoğan was indicating that radical 
and marginal deals would not do any good and that there must not have been any 
fights but negotiation for the resolution of the problems of the country (Pamuk, 2001: 
179). In a speech in Antalya in May 2003, Erdoğan was saying that they had put off 
the National View dress and he was telling the party members to forget all such party 
programs and slogans. He went on  
There is no space in JDP for political and ideological ghosts which shadow 
the horizon of the people nor for unrealistic political and ideological 
dreams… It is not possible for ideological considerations or shallow world 
views to find space in JDP (Hürriyet, 17 May 2003).  
 
In his speech at the American Enterprise Institute in January 2004 titled as 
“Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom,” Erdoğan was 
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identifying democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance as universal 
values, as a common legacy of the humankind, produced with contributions by 
different civilizations. Describing Turkey as a member of one of these civilizations, 
he was indicating the resolution of the JDP to preserve, develop and disseminate 
these values in Turkey and in the world. In his speech, Erdoğan was highlighting that 
the JDP would not support a political program designed on narrow ideological 
frameworks for it was believed that such a party would not be able to address to the 
challenges of the time and needs of the people. For purposes of success, 
compatibility, competitiveness and survival, the JDP was required, like any other 
party, to adopt a more colorful, multidimensional and centrist line (Erdoğan, 2006: 
333-337).  
 
The world was witnessing a global political process whereby the ideologies like 
liberalism, conservatism and socialism were driven to interaction and dialogue 
leading to the emergence of hybrid and homogeneous political programs to which the 
JDP was not immune. While expressing the importance given to religion by his 
party, Erdoğan was expressing his opposition to ideological motivations intended to 
introduce religious regimes as well as the use of religious symbols for these 
purposes. The JDP was for a conservatism modern and open to change, a change of 
evolutionary and gradualist type (Erdoğan, 2006: 333-337). 
 
In similar terms, Gül was arguing that globalization was irresistible. Gül was 
expressing his belief in the possibility of local people to be modern and 
contemporary. (Hürriyet, 12 July 2001). Despite all the reforms adopted by the VP, 
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Gül was still critical of VP policies. According to Gül, there was not any contribution 
of religious politics to religious people and Turkey. Political parties were not 
instruments of teaching and spreading religion. Gül was considering himself and 
Erdoğan as more rational, realist and modern. Dervish lodge like party concept 
where the people put off their shoes in front of its door had to be changed (Sazak, 27 
August 2001). 
 
As it was specified by the party and leading deputies, the goal of the new party was 
to normalize Turkish political life. The new movement would not organize on the 
base and axis of a political mentality highlighting religion and religious figures, and 
addressing to religious feelings and beliefs. Priority would be given to economic 
concerns like economic stability, economic growth, unemployment, free market 
regulations, sustainable development, distributive justice, integration with the 
contemporary world as well as to those of others like education, health and social 
security. The party would not make politics according to ready economic packages 
like Just Order and National View but would implement dynamic and renewable 
economic policies within the framework of free market economic system. Turban 
and issues of that kind which were likely to generate conflicts and polarization would 
not be used as political tools and they would be handled in the context of the 
provisions of democracy, human rights and rule of law. The new movement would 
not try to fight with the regime (Bila, 15 July 2001; Abdullah Gül Hükümeti, 23 
November 2002; AK Parti, 16 November 2002; Milliyet, 22 November 2002).      
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5.4.3.4.1. Globalizing Trends in JDP’s View of Secularism 
 
A list of papers, booklets and brochures prepared by JDP deputies and supporters 
provide us with sufficient resources to find out the change in the secularist approach 
of the party and the impact of globalization in this process.
3
 In Project Turkey, it was 
indicated that no state could be established on religious grounds in our day. That was 
a necessity of modernity. Secularization was one of the most important aspects of 
political modernization to which the JDP was loyal much as any other party. An 
attempt to deny secularism would render the JDP out of date and hinder it from 
stepping up with the contemporary world. It was not possible for a non-secular state 
to gain legitimacy in domestic and international political arena. As a part of its 
membership to the contemporary world, the JDP was supporting the idea that 
religion had to be relegated to the observance of the matters of the other world while 
the state had to be responsible for the management of the material world that we live 
in. Religion had to refrain from attempts to develop political goals and demands 
while the state was also supposed to stay away from making impositions on the 
religion. For this reason, political parties and state authorities had to abandon acting 
and talking on behalf of religion (Project Turkey cited in Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001: 
238-243).    
 
                                                          
3
 The list of the resources include Türkiye Projesi (Project Turkey), Milli Siyasi Manifesto (National 
Political Manifesto), Gebze Program Taslağı (Gebze Program Draft) and JDP Party Program. Parts 
of these documents where the secularist view of the JDP is stated can also be found in Çakır and 
Çalmuk, 2001: 236-244.  
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In this context, the JDP was drawing attention to the undesirable consequences of 
real and potential attacks by the religion and the state towards the domain of the 
other. While it was possible for the state to make attempts to establish control and 
domination over the religion by restricting the rights and freedoms of the people for 
belief, conscience and worshipping; there were many examples to the employment of 
religious institution as a tool for oppression, discrimination and suppression 
particularly over those who don’t believe in the dominant religion (Metin et. al.; 
Gebze Program Draft cited in Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001: 243-244).  
 
For this reason, secularism was regarded by the party as a guarantee against religious 
and political oppressions, as one of the most important institutions of democratic 
government, human rights and rule of law. Secularism was an essential JDP goal for 
it was the guarantee of freedom of belief, religion, conscience, expression and 
organization. The party was expressing its resolution to avoid using religion, 
religious symbols or slogans for political purposes and its motivation to develop the 
concept of secularism in Turkey to the level of universal standards (JDP Party 
Program; Gebze Program Draft).  
 
 
5.4.3.4.2. Impact of Globalization in JDP’s Foreign Policy  
 
In foreign policy, the JDP has drawn attention with greater harmony with and 
participation to processes of globalization compared to its predecessors with its more 
systematic, pragmatist, embedded and determined approach. While this was the 
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product of a thinking which saw globalization as an inevitable phenomenon 
absorbing all the actors that it comes to contact with into its mechanisms and 
structures, it was also related with a belief that globalization was essentially good 
and conducive to the interests of those who agree to cooperate with it. Great 
advances in science, technology, communication and transportation were erasing 
national borders and bringing the societies closer together to establish linkages of 
sympathy, understanding, interest, interdependence, cooperation and integration. 
Traditional and spiritual values were compelled to scale down their reach to various 
domains of human life and, in fact, a careful examination would show that they were 
not against with global values, principles and processes (Gül, 2007: 49, 444; 
Abdullah Gül Government, 23 November 2002). According to Erdoğan, Turkish 
society wanted to adopt “a concept of modernity that does not reject tradition, a 
belief of universalism that accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that 
does not disregard the spiritual meaning of the life” (Erdoğan, 2006: 335). And Gül 
was similarly saying that “We were to prove that a Muslim society is capable of 
changing and renovating itself, attaining contemporary standards, while preserving 
its values, traditions and identity” (Gül, 2007: 37). 
 
In this context, the JDP has acquired fame with the frequent emphasis that it put on 
the importance of global political, economic and social norms and principles which 
include democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, transparency, 
accountability, gender equality, regional and global peace, prosperity, market 
economy and trade liberalization (Gül, 2007: 33, 49; Abdullah Gül Government, 23 
November 2002; JDP Party Program). These were the set of superb and gainly values 
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that had to be adopted and respected by all world countries. These norms and 
principles were also the part of a global political culture uniting the contemporary 
world in regional, international and bilateral organizations and motivating them to 
act in cooperation and partnership in serve to its spread and settlement over the world 
(Gül, 2007: 39, 50, 87; Aras and Görener, 2010: 84; Kalın, 2010: 100-101). The 
JDP’s agreement with globalization was such that the interests and the well-being of 
the country were identified as parallel to global interests (JDP Party Program).  
 
Multilateralism has been an important aspect of JDP’s foreign policy. As it is often 
stated, the states are encouraged to cooperation and partnership for purposes of 
political and economic development, but also to bring effective solutions to a 
growing type of global problems (Davutoğlu, 2004; Gül, 2007: 40, 77, 84; Aras, 
2009; Metin et. al). The list of those problems, as they are enumerated by JDP 
deputies, include terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, environmental disasters, 
organized crime, drug trafficking, human trade etc. and they could best be dealt with 
cooperation and partnership at an international level for which the party was long 
ready and eager (Gül, 2007: 48, 77).   
 
The JDP was declared to give special importance to Turkey’s relations with the 
leading global actor USA, for these reasons. While preserving the level of military 
alliance between two countries expressed in the membership of two countries to 
NATO and their partnership during the Korean War and the Cold War, there was a 
pressing need to improve the ties with closer relations in political, diplomatic and 
economic domains too (Gül, 2007: 24, 39; JDP Party Program; Zaman, 15 August 
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2002; Kohen, 3 November 2002). Two countries shared in their adoption of global 
political and economic norms and principles at home, but they were supposed to join 
in an international coalition for their spread and settlement in the world too, and 
particularly in the Middle East and Eurasia (Gül, 2007: 112, 408-410; Zaman, 16 
July 2001). Political and economic development was a right for world societies much 
as it was a necessity. This policy line would also contribute to Turkey’s domestic 
prospects too for the JDP deputies tended to deem development as a regional and 
global phenomenon that would be facilitated substantially in a favorable and 
hospitable environment. JDP was motivated to preserve the existing tone of relations 
between two countries also because of the expected contribution of the US-based 
IMF and the World Bank to Turkey’s domestic economic problems as two leading 
global debtors and creditors (Gül, 2007: 405).  
 
In the Middle East, a major goal of the JDP was to assist the introduction of various 
political reforms for more democratic, accountable and transparent regimes where 
the values and principles of human rights, rule of law, good governance, gender 
equality and free market economies are commonly accepted and implemented (Gül, 
2007: 92, 416; Bila, 3 June 2003; Milliyet, 29 May and 2 June 2003). JDP was 
pleased to serve as a model country for these purposes with its advanced structures 
and was ready to cooperate with international coalitions sharing the same 
motivations with it. (Aras and Karakaya-Polat, 2007: 478) The solution of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was another important goal for the JDP. The party was in 
support of the implementation of the Road Map prepared by leading global actors 
which included UN, EU, US and Russia. The party was also willing to play a 
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mediator role in the process by bringing the actors together and trying to persuade 
them to negotiation. As a country which had good relations with both countries, 
Turkey’s peace-facilitating potential was remarkable. The JDP was observing a 
domestic, regional and global interest in the termination of Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
(Gül, 2007: 79, 443; Aras and Görener, 2010: 85-86).   
 
In Cyprus, lastly, the JDP was for reaching a just and permanent solution to the 
problem. The JDP had initiated a number of schemes for this purpose and the party 
was in full support of the peace plan prepared by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
(Gül, 2007: 93, 102).   
 
 
5.5 Europeanization  
 
Europeanization could be distinguished as a regulated institution of globalization that 
aims to inhibit vagaries and inexpediencies of globalization in a particular European 
geography within the extraordinary institutional structure of the European Union. It 
essentially promotes the values and principles spreading with globalization such as 
market economies, democracy, rule of law, human rights, intergovernmental collec-
tivism as well as individual, group and gender rights and freedoms; but compared to 
globalization its relations with member states are more comprehensive, formalized, 
diplomatic, legal and strict with its specialized organs, decision-making processes, 
conditionalities and problem-solving mechanisms (Risse et. al., 2001: 3-4).  
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Risse et. al. interpret Europeanization in abstract as the development and emergence 
of European type distinct structures of governance on domestic legal, political and 
social structures of states which try to expand their Europeanness beyond a concept 
of geographical membership. (Risse et. al., 2001: 3). It could also be described as a 
process of institution building at European level. The most important agent of Euro-
peanization appears to be the European Union, but it could also take place without 
any direct links with EU too through participation in other European legal, political 
and economic international organizations as well as through bilateral relations with 
individual states. Not only the member states, but also the candidate states are im-
pelled by pressures of Europeanization like in case of Turkey which is conditioned to 
introduce a long list of reforms that it needs to implement before it becomes a mem-
ber (Grigoriadis, 2009: 6-7; Diez et al., 2005: 2-7).  
 
Börzel and Risse analyze the process of Europeanization at three different dimen-
sions that include policies, politics and polity. Elements of Europeanization in policy 
dimension include adoption of European standards, instruments, problem-solving 
approaches, policy narratives and discourses. In the domain of politics, Europeaniza-
tion is associated with the emergence of European processes of interest formation, 
interest aggregation, interest representation and public discourses. And at polity lev-
el, Europeanization is traced in the development of European public discourses, in-
tergovernmental relations, judicial structures, public administration, state traditions, 
economic institutions, state-society relations and collective identities (Börzel and 
Risse, 2003; also in Matei and Matei).  
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Europeanization is a process that all the European states are affected to some extent. 
For many states, questions circulate around its depth, scale, direction, time and pace 
(Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). What is common for all the countries in the process 
of Europeanization is that it accompanies a set of adaptive pressures that require the 
states aspiring to be European to introduce some changes and reforms in their domes-
tic structures. Whether a country is able to comply with adaptive pressures is argued 
to depend on the goodness of fit between European and domestic structures, i.e., 
whether the domestic structures of the countries bear remarkable similarities with 
European rules, norms and practices (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Diez et al., 2005: 3-4).  
 
It is hypothesized that the success of Europeanization for a country is closely associ-
ated with the nature of a list of mediating factors. These factors include the number 
of veto points in domestic structures, facilitating formal institutions, organizational 
and policy-making cultures, differential empowerment and learning (Börzel and 
Risse, 2003). Existence of multiple veto points in the decision-making processes of a 
country, first, is foreseen to obstruct the process as the political authority will be 
shared among a plenty of actors and a consensus or a winning coalition will be need-
ed to rule affirmative decisions (Tsebelis, 1995). Facilitating domestic formal institu-
tions, secondly, which might be ideational similarities or material resources that 
could be mobilized for the purpose, help establish rapid linkages with European insti-
tutions and accelerate the process (Caporaso and Jupille, 2001). If there is a tradition 
of decision-making on the base of consensus and cooperation in a country as a part of 
its political and organizational culture, thirdly, Europeanization will be more simple 
and peaceful for it will be much easier to make decisions in these type of societies 
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(Katzenstein, 1984). Fourthly, Europeanization could be facilitated by the support of 
a group of domestic actors who expect to have greater power resources with a pro-
cess of redistribution of powers instigated by Europeanization. And finally, a process 
of political socialization towards the adoption of European norms and values experi-
enced by various domestic actors could serve as an important agent supporting Euro-
peanization.  
 
Börzel and Risse contend that adaptive pressures imposed by Europeanization could 
meet with a number of reactions from the member states the types of which may in-
clude absorption, accommodation and transformation (Börzel and Risse, 2003). 
Member states can absorb European policies and ideas into their domestic structures 
when there is a high degree of fitness of good between European and domestic struc-
tures which does not require a substantial change in domestic structures. The pres-
sures of Europeanization could be met with policies of accommodation too when 
there is substantial commonalities between European and domestic structures though 
they may not be in perfect harmony like in case of absorption. In this case, European 
policies and institutions could be entrained to existing ones with a modest degree of 
change (Héritier, 1996). The member countries could tend to transform their domes-
tic policies, processes and institutions into substantially different European ones 
when there are substantial disharmonies between the two. In this case, the essential 
features and underlying collective understandings will be subject to change under 
adaptive pressures.  
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5.6 Europeanization as a Moderating Power on Islamic Politics in Turkey 
 
It will be far from error to say that Turkey’s process of Europeanization has contrib-
uted substantially to the erosion of the religious conservative vision of Turkish reli-
gious right. The adaptive pressures applied by the EU in form of demands for reform 
and acquis communautaire have been very influential in motivating the religious 
right to drop Islamic political ideals in favor of the adoption of global and universal 
political norms and values which include liberal democracy, human rights, gender 
rights, rule of law and secularism. The Justice and Development Party governments 
have demonstrated a remarkable resolution in adopting and implementing EU re-
forms through successive harmonization packages to the extent of imprinting them 
into the list of major goals that the party aims to achieve (Özbudun, 2007).  
 
One of the most important reasons for the pro-EU turn of Turkish religious right is 
that it deems Europeanization as an inevitable phenomenon that Turkey has to join 
without delay for the fulfillment of the objectives of development and progress. The 
religious right has reached to an awareness that Turkey’s EU membership will con-
tribute substantially to its economic, political, social, scientific and technological 
development (Gül, 2007: 93; Zaman, 3 March 2002). The traditional foreign policy 
perspective of looking at the world from glasses of Muslims and non-Muslims had to 
be dismissed with all its remnants, for this reason, as well as the longing for introduc-
ing an Islamic state and society in their classical meanings. The signs of this para-
digmatic change were very public during the Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition 
government and even before that when very material steps were taken for Turkey’s 
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integration with the EU and the west. Erbakan, for instance, was expressing his sup-
port for Turkey’s signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 with expected 
contributions of the agreement to Turkey’s economic development (Milliyet, 30 De-
cember 1995).   
 
Another important theme in the context is that the religious right in Turkey has expe-
rienced a process of learning by which they have come to appreciate the contempo-
rary legal and political norms originating from the west (Zaman, 16 July 2001). A list 
of political reforms were introduced by successive JDP governments in line with EU 
conditions in areas of democracy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality, free 
market, civil society, transparency, good governance etc. with declarations that they 
were indeed the part of advanced, universal and superb European norms and values 
that had to be adopted by any country (Gül, 2007: 37, 49). Reforms were implement-
ed not because they were imposed, but because the JDP had belief in their virtue and 
necessity. It was believed that EU was not standing for a common religion but for 
common values and institutions. Turkey was thus supposed to strengthen its ties with 
the west through greater integration (Gül, 2007: 29, 31, 247; Milliyet, 3 November 
2002). Turkey’s EU membership would even be advantageous for the JDP for it 
would introduce various freedoms in sociopolitical life Particularly on issues of 
headscarf, Imam-Hatip schools and religious education, a great deal of progress for 
freedoms was promised with the reforms (Usul, 2008: 179-180; Tocci, 2005: 80). 
Turkey’s integration with the EU was warranted also because of the necessity to deal 
more effectively with an increasing set of trans-border concerns and problems like 
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international terrorism, illegal narcotics trade, smuggling, human trade, organized 
crime, epidemics, poverty and environmental disasters (Gül, 2007: 229-230).  
 
This learning process concurs with the propositions of the theory of sociological in-
stitutionalism par excellence offered to explain the type of domestic changes that 
countries experience under Europeanization pressures. According to the theory of 
sociological institutionalism, Europeanization is closely associated with the emer-
gence of new norms, practices and social structures of countries bidding to be a 
member of the advanced |European society (Börzel and Risse, 2003). The theory 
offers two themes seminal for our purposes here. Firstly, it suggests that domestic 
institutions develop similarities with European institutions as a product of interac-
tion, exposition and communication in their formal organizational structures, princi-
ples of resource allocation, norms and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). And 
secondly, Europeanization leads to a process of socialization by which the domestic 
actors internalize superb European norms and rules so that they can become mem-
bers of the European society in a good standing. Through the processes of arguing, 
deliberation, persuasion and social learning, actors are socialized into new norms and 
rules of appropriateness and they tend to redefine their interests and identities ac-
cordingly (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Checkel, 2005).      
 
While appreciating European values, it was also expected by the religious right that 
the process of Europeanization would help break the tutelary powers of the Turkish 
armed forces in Turkish politics to bring it to its ideal space under the control of ci-
vilian authorities: The self-appointed role of the Turkish military as the guardians of 
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the regime, as its major legal excuse to intervene in politics, had to be mitigated 
(Gül, 2000; Heper, 2005: 223-24; Dağı, 2004: 143-147; Tocci, 2005: 80). The con-
tempt of the JDP deputies concerning the political involvements of the army was 
expressed as follows in a newspaper by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan:   
When the political will generates a vacuum, an entity fills it in traditionally. 
The most powerful entity that can do this job is the Turkish Armed Forces… 
This was associated with the weaknesses of the politics, not that of the mili-
tary… Today there is not a serious political crisis. There is a government in 
action which has taken 66 percent of the votes and the army agrees to return 
to its barracks. And so they are doing indeed. This was observed during the 
Özal period too (Sabah, 6 December 2002). 
 
It is observed that the JDP government has been successful in its goal to curb the 
tutelary powers of Turkish Armed Forces in various executive, legislative and judici-
ary processes through successive harmonization packages that aimed to bring civil-
military relations in Turkey to European standards. One of the most important 
changes introduced by the JDP government was about the role, status, composition 
and powers of the National Security Council (NSC). The harmonization packages 
increased the civilian members of the Council from five to nine as a result of which 
the military members lost their majority status in the Council. An emphasis is put on 
the advisory character of the Council by also reducing the degree of priority that the 
NSC advisory decisions are to be given. The frequency of NSC meeting is reduced 
from once a month to once in every two months. The office of the council secretary 
general is transferred from the military to a civilian member. To a lesser extent of 
importance, the NSC’s Secretary General representative is taken out of the Censure 
Board – RTUK to enable a greater space for freedom of expression (Özbudun, 2007: 
193-194; Müftülüer-Baç, 2005: 27).       
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5.7 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, two concepts were taken under scrutiny, i.e., globalization and Euro-
peanization with regard to their impact on the restructuring of the policy/ideological 
formation of the Turkish religious right. Globalization, first, is explored to be a very 
potent transformative power which introduces tremendous changes in the sociopoliti-
cal and economic structures of the contemporary world. Identified in brief terms as 
internationalization, universalization, liberalization of world economies, political 
systems and socio-cultural structures, globalization is explored to be a very instru-
mental factor in the course of change Turkish religious right has undergone from 
what could be called a radical conservative to a moderatist liberal movement. Global-
ization is deemed to be influential in the process particularly by its production of a 
politically moderate, centrist and statist Islamic bourgeoisie and intellectuals, on one 
side, and by driving the movement into a process of political socialization in line 
with contemporary values, principles and institutions, on the other.   
 
Europeanization, secondly, identified as a regulated institution of globalization pro-
moting the same values and principles with it in a more formalized, legalistic and 
bureaucratic way, is observed to incorporate very potent transformative powers in 
domestic structures of countries trying to Europeanize with the adaptive pressures 
that it imposes. These adaptive pressures require, first and foremost, the implementa-
tion of various reforms by the countries on behalf of liberal democracy, rule of law, 
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human rights, secularism and market economy considered as the base of European 
values and principles. Europeanization has been effective in the moderation of the 
religious right for it was observed that the process would significantly facilitate Tur-
key’s development in multiple domains. It would also provide the movement with 
powerful mechanisms against authoritarian reactions from the secularist establish-
ment. But more importantly, the religious right was introduced to a learning process 
to come to believe that European values were indeed advanced, superior and high 
standard values which had to be adopted for their virtues before anything else.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
THE NATURE OF THE PARTY CHANGE: FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
This chapter is assigned to the exploration of the change in party program and poli-
cies of the Turkish religious right in its foreign policy vision from the National View 
parties to the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AKP). The 
National View parties of the 1970s, 80s and 90s display a strong similarity in their 
adoption of a foreign policy view with substantial religious overtones which foresaw 
the unity and integrity of Muslim nations, in one side, and minimization of relations 
with the West on the other. The National View movement had a negative view of the 
West, with a conception that it was heavily infused with elements of Judeo-Christian 
traditions adversarial to Islam and Muslims. While it was necessary to maintain links 
with the West for the import of science and technology, Turkey had to turn its face to 
the Middle East for diplomatic, political, economic and social integration and coop-
eration.  
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The foreign policy line of the Justice and Development Party, however, is not based 
on a dichotomy of East-West described in cultural terms. The party deems all types 
of integration and links with the West as a precondition for Turkey’s development 
and progress. It has the goal to further improve Turkey’s ties with the West, with its 
campaign to establish deeper and firmer links with the UN, EU, NATO, or with indi-
vidual states. Yet the party pledges to further develop Turkey’s relations with Middle 
Eastern countries as well, for service to Turkey’s national interests and for regional 
and global peace, but also as a part of Turkey’s membership to a common historical 
and cultural legacy. Turkey’s social and cultural ties with the East are not considered 
as an impediment to its relations with the West. The party assumes an assertively 
multilateral, multidimensional and pragmatic foreign policy vision aiming to mini-
mize problems with neighbor states and believing in the significance of democracy, 
rule of law, human rights and other basic principles of universal rights and values as 
the parameters of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. 
 
 
6.1. The National View Movement   
 
 
6.1.1. The NOP, NSP and Welfare Party until 1990s  
 
Before the establishment of the National Order Party under the leadership of Nec-
mettin Erbakan in 1969, the religious right was finding place in the Democrat Party 
in the 1950s and the Justice Party in the 1960s. Advocates of the religious right had 
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been pretty active in right party cadres since the introduction of multiparty politics. 
The list of achievements they recorded, related to bringing religious freedoms and 
introduction of various policies with religious motivations, included the repeal of the 
penal code prohibiting the recitation of prayer calls in Arabic, removal of the ban on 
Pilgrimages, establishment of Imam-Hatip schools, introduction of voluntary reli-
gious courses in primary schools, permission for religious radio broadcasts, estab-
lishment of faculties of theology, and the provision of sanctuary and legal assistance 
to Said Nursi and his collections, among others (Cizre, 1996: 237; Yavuz, 2005: 90-
91).  
 
Necmettin Erbakan, who was elected as an independent parliamentarian from Konya 
in 1969, was finding the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel weak and insufficient in 
promoting the ideals of the religious right, and was thus motivated to establish a new 
party with an ambitious and challenging party program. To run a political campaign 
based on the promotion of national, moral and spiritual values, he established the 
National Order Party in 1969. The party was closed down after the 1971 military 
intervention on account of violating secularism, but it was reestablished under the 
name of National Salvation Party with almost the same party program and goals. The 
broader party organization and goals were promoted as in line with the National 
View Movement by the party leader.  
 
The main goal of the movement in foreign policy was explained by Necmettin Erba-
kan as service to the institution of peace and justice among nations and strengthening 
Turkey’s relations with its existing partners with a regional and global perspective. 
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The National View movement was in favor of instituting a stable, permanent, nation-
al, independent and honorable foreign policy for Turkey. In Turkey’s foreign policy, 
development of relations with the Middle Eastern countries was given particular im-
portance, with a view that such a policy would be in the best service of country’s 
interests, and also that Turkey shared a common cultural and historical heritage with 
them (Erbakan, 1975a: 229-230; NOP Party Program: Articles 98, 100; NSP Party 
Program: Articles 41, 42, 43). The movement was generally opposed to Western 
states and international organizations. The West was believed to be motivated to 
promote its own interests and had an underlying agenda to occupy, exploit, and 
weaken the non-west.  
 
The movement was against the improvement and deepening of relations with West-
ern states and organizations on grounds of economic, political and social integration. 
Relations with the West were legitimate only in cases of the promotion of the notion 
of justice among nations and the exchange of science and technology. The West was 
intoxicated with imperialist, exploitative and expansionist goals. It was not possible 
for a Muslim civilization to benefit from the peculiarities presented by the West be-
cause they were preconditioned with membership to Judeo-Christian traditions.   
 
 
6.1.1.1. The USA 
 
Erbakan was highly cynical of US activism in the Muslim world. In his view, the 
USA was motivated with evangelical and imperialist goals in the Middle East. It was 
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trying to weaken Muslim nations with underlying intentions to exploit their natural 
resources. According to Erbakan, the entire Muslim world was victimized by this. In 
Bosnia, the USA and other Western actors had closed their eyes to the annihilation of 
tens of thousands of Muslims. A weapons embargo was imposed on Bosnia by the 
USA with the excuse that weapons imports would only exacerbate the ongoing con-
flict; the attempts of the Muslim world to aid the Bosnians were denied. In the Azeri-
Armenian War in the 1990s, the USA was providing Armenians with logistics and 
weapons support from over Turkish air bases and harbors as well as through Opera-
tion Provide Comfort (Çekiç Güç) located in Northern Iraq with a self-helplessness 
of Turkish authorities. In Somalia, the USA was trying to capture rich oil fields as 
well as killing the local Muslims and trying to convert them to Christianity. In addi-
tion, the international coalition forces gathered in Somalia were used to oust the Is-
lamic Sudanese government (Erbakan, 1993a: 71-77).  
 
Erbakan was very critical of Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq too. US 
military presence in the region was no different than the PKK. Due to the food em-
bargo and the bombardment of Iraqi cities, over fifty thousand people, many of them 
children, had died. The USA was also supporting PKK activism in the region to use 
as an excuse for extension of their stay in the region. The US embargo against Iraq 
required Turkey to stop the functioning of Kerkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline to the 
detriment of Turkey again, for a huge energy source and revenue gate was lost with-
out any compensation. Operation Provide Comfort was a parallel rule over the re-
gional states under the authority of America. It was a very destructive agent against 
Turkish sovereignty and independence, and had to be removed. This was also a part 
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of the National View’s campaign of the institution of justice and right in international 
relations (Erbakan, 1993b: 86-87, 216-222; Dağı, 1998: 67-68).         
 
The Welfare Party was against the US-led global economic enterprises of the IMF 
and the World Bank. They were considered as agents of US imperialism without 
power to repair the economic and financial problems of the countries, but only to 
weaken their sovereignty and independence. The countries were made dependent on 
the West with these international organizations. Turkey’s cooperation with such or-
ganizations was producing the same effect, and attempts to further improve these ties 
would make Turkey a province and vassal of the West. Turkey could be a tool for the 
interests of other countries (Tekdal, 1985: 8-10).   
 
 
6.1.1.2. The Customs Union and European Economic Community 
 
The view of the movement on Turkey’s bidding for entry into the Customs Union as 
a part of the European Economic Community was very much negative. It was be-
cause the European Economic Community was a Christian club and a contemporary 
version of Western imperialism (Erbakan, 1991: 11-14). Membership to the EU 
would be a betrayal to the glorious history and culture, which was built through a 
centuries-old struggle against the West and its ideology. The idea of a Customs Un-
ion was introduced in Roman Catholic Congress before the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Rome by three leading Catholic prime ministers of the time: De Gasperi, Schu-
man, and Adenauer. By uniting centuries of warring Christian states, the Community 
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would end bloodshed among Christians, provide them with a scheme for greater eco-
nomic development, and in Turkey’s case, it would weaken its economy and render it 
politically and economically dependent on the West. The agreement for the Customs 
Union would destroy Turkey’s nascent industry before it was able to match with its 
European rivals. The major source of motivation to form the Community was the 
founding countries’ membership in Judeo-Christian-Greek tradition, characterized by 
enmity against the Orient and the desire to conquer the Islamic civilization (Erbakan, 
1975a: 235-250, 254-264; Erbakan, 1991: 90). Western international organizations 
were a set of concerted tools for the right of the mighty, for the exploitation of devel-
oping and poor countries. They were thus against Turkey’s mission of civilization to 
institute justice and right among nations (Erbakan, 1991: 93).  
 
There were some other pitfalls of the Community too. The European Economic 
Community was envisaging permanent membership for all countries, with an inten-
tion to melt all member countries in a single pot of European civilization in contra-
diction to Turkey’s historical, cultural and social structure. The movement would not 
let Turkey melt in Christianity (Erbakan, 1975a: 235-250, 254-264). According to 
one scenario, the European Economic Community was an invention of the Jewish 
bourgeoisie, who wanted to reintegrate Germany into world economy to become an 
instrument for the development of Jewish capital. According to the Jewish intellectu-
als, the way to progress was through unity of European states with fluidity in borders 
and peace and stability among Christian states, so that they would easily be able to 
transfer funds and commodities across borders and protect their population from po-
tential threats while also preparing the political and economic ground for the estab-
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lishment of the Great Israel. For the National View, even the circulation of Jewish 
capital in itself was reprehensible because its major means of revenue were interest 
and exploitation (Erbakan, 1975a: 250-254).  
 
 
6.1.1.3. The Cyprus Issue 
 
The NSP was a coalition partner during the controversial Cyprus issue in 1974. The 
party was a stauncher defender of Turkish intervention on the island than any other 
party in the government and the parliament. According to Erbakan, the initiative of 
the coalition government was exemplary and the NSP was proud of taking part in the 
political process of the intervention. The operation was considered to be necessary to 
stop the bloodshed, massacres and oppressions that the neglected Turkish community 
suffered on the island for decades. The diplomatic cause after the intervention and 
the separation of the island would be pursued in international political champers ac-
cordingly. The National View was totally against a united Cyprus state. The ultimate 
solution was achieved with the intervention and the separation of the communities. 
This was the most viable strategy to inhibit further internecine killings. Erbakan was 
heavily opposed to the inclination of other parties to make a new negotiation, con-
cession or rearrangement in the island (Erbakan, 1975a: 233-234; Erbakan, 1975b: 
182-184; Erbakan, 1993a: 73-74).    
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6.1.1.4. Israel 
 
The National View movement was highly critical of Israel since its early years. Israel 
was condemned due to its expansionist, oppressive and aggressive policies and goals. 
Israel was a source of regional and global threat that had to be stymied without let-
ting it turn the world into an atmosphere of bloody chaos. The origins of the contem-
porary state of oppression at Israeli hands was very carefully planned by famous Zi-
onists of the 19 century. The Jews would be settled in Palestine to use it as a base for 
expansion into the lands between the Nile and Euphrates. All the people and nations 
falling between these rivers would be taken under domination, deported and de-
stroyed for the establishment of the Great Israel state (Erbakan, 1975a: 250-254; Er-
bakan, 1991: 201).  
 
Though that dream was not likely to come true, Israel was doing all of these in the 
lands that it occupied in Palestine. The brother Palestinian people were subjected to 
decades of Israeli oppression, massacring, deporting, exiling, starvation and torture; 
most of them were forced to move to refugee camps in many countries all over the 
world. What was done in front of the eyes of the international community was unbe-
lievable.  
 
An equally important issue was the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and its declara-
tion as the eternal capital of Israel in 1980. National View would never accept it, and 
when they would come to power, they would be the most active international actor 
working for the liberation of Jerusalem. To this end, they had succeeded in deposing 
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a Turkish minister of foreign affairs with an interpellation in the parliament when 
their demand to totally cut the relations with Israel was rejected by the government. 
The National View was heavily opposed to even the smallest level of diplomatic re-
lationship with Israel. They were therefore very critical of a list of Turkish politicians 
such as Özal, Demirel, and Çiller, who were inclined to establish permanent and in-
timate relations with Israel (Dağı, 1998: 71-72).    
 
The peace process initiated in various times was nothing more than a deception hid-
ing Israeli goals of expanding further into Palestinian territories with new settlements 
and walls. The PLO was hopelessly expecting some returns from peace talks. Na-
tional View was thus in support of Hamas, who were determined to resist Israel with 
armed means. National View was opposed to some Arab states such as Egypt, due to 
their cooperation with Israel, to the disappointment of the Palestinians and other Ar-
ab states determined to liberate Jerusalem and occupied territories. Islam was not to 
be exchanged for anything. The movement would defend the rights of these nations 
in international platforms in line with provisions of national and international proto-
cols on human rights and freedoms (Erbakan, 1975a: 229-230; Dağı, 1998: 72-73; 
NOP Party Program: Articles 98, 99, 100; NSP Party Program: Articles 41, 42, 43; 
WP Party Program: Article 28).  
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6.1.1.5. Integration with the Muslim World 
 
The National View foreign policy vision was characterized by opposition to the West 
in general, as explained above. Western states and their global institutions were typi-
fied by unity around Judeo-Christian values, and they tended to be imperialistic and 
exploitative in their relations to the non-west and particularly the Muslim world. It 
was thus a matter of reason for Turkey to turn its face to the Muslim world for devel-
opment, and to add to its competitive capabilities against the baleful motivations of 
the West. Turkey had to lead to the establishment of an Islamic United Nations, Is-
lamic Customs Union, Islamic currency, international Islamic military alliance, and 
accompanying social and cultural institutions of cooperation and solidarity. This 
would make Turkey great once again, as in the times of the Ottoman Empire. Initia-
tives had to be introduced for the achievement of this ambitious program, which was 
likely to take decades with gradual progress. This was the recipe for Turkey’s eco-
nomic, industrial and political progress (Erbakan, 1991: 35; Dağı, 1998: 74-80; Er-
bakan, 1975a: 165-270).   
 
 
6.1.2. Welfare Party in Government  
 
The Welfare Party emerged as the winning party of the December 1995 general elec-
tions, taking 21.37 percent of the votes. The WP was followed by the Motherland 
Party and the True Path Party, taking 19.65 percent and 19.18 percent of the votes, 
respectively. When the Welfare Party failed to establish a coalition, the Motherland 
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Party and the True Path Party agreed to establish a coalition government that would 
last three months only. Necmettin Erbakan was appointed again by President Süley-
man Demirel to establish the government in June, 1996, and this time an agreement 
was reached with the True Path Party. According to the negotiation, Erbakan and 
Ciller would occupy the chair of premiership in turns for periods of two years, Erba-
kan being the first prime minister and the ministries to be distributed in-between. 
When the WP was introduced to the government, the party leadership had come to 
realize that it would not be able to pay strict loyalty to the traditional foreign policy 
discourse propagated in electoral campaigns and party programs. The party had met 
with some domestic, regional and global realities that compelled it to mitigate its 
radical foreign policy discourse in a number of areas (Tanıyıcı, 2003: 471-472).  
 
 
6.1.2.1. Turkish-American Relations and the Operation Provide Comfort 
 
One of these areas was Turkish-American relations and the status of Operation Pro-
vide Comfort. In February 1997, State Minister and WP foreign policy team deputy 
Abdullah Gül was organizing an official visit to USA together with State Minister 
Fehim Adak in search of dialogue. Upon his return, Gül was explaining his impres-
sion of the US view towards Turkey as very positive, unprejudiced and emphatic. 
Similarly, Necmettin Erbakan emphasized the need to establish an atmosphere of 
understanding and communication with the USA. The USA was recognized as a ma-
jor global power, and Turkey had to execute its relations with it on the base of per-
ceived reciprocal interests (Özcan, 1998: 184-185; Dağı, 1998: 101-102).    
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The policy adopted by the Party regarding the future of Operation Provide Comfort 
was also in flux. While in the opposition, the WP was heavily critical of the govern-
ment for its cooperation with and assistance to Operation Provide Comfort, and al-
ways voted “no” in the extension votes of the Operation in Parliament. The Opera-
tion was against Turkish political, economic and regional interests. It was a cam-
paign of terrorism against brother Iraqis and an agent of occupation rather than peace 
and relief. But when the WP joined the government, it was observed that it was not 
possible to drop the Operation at once, and that the cooperation had to continue with 
the USA. Therefore, the government agreed to extend the duration of Operation Pro-
vide Comfort for one more year. The electorate was calmed down with the explana-
tion of the government that there would be no more extensions after this. The Opera-
tion was not abandoned after a year, however, but was retooled as Operation North-
ern Watch, active starting with January 1997. The latter operation did not include the 
ground mission of the former, and it was tasked with reconnaissance over Northern 
Iraq and with enforcing the no-fly zone above the 36 parallel (Dağı, 1998: 102-104; 
Özcan, 1998: 185-187).  
 
A source of tension between the government and the USA were Erbakan’s official 
visits to Iran and the signing of a natural gas pipeline project, valuing 20 billion 
USD. The project was agreed to after the passing of a decision in the US parliament 
for the application of various sanctions on countries conducting trade with Iran with 
volumes over 40 million USD. Iran was accused by the USA of sponsoring interna-
tional terrorism. Against this, Prime Minister Erbakan responded by Turkey’s will-
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ingness to cooperate with USA in cases of Iranian terrorist involvements. But there 
would be no backing from the pipeline agreement (Dağı, 1998: 104).  
 
 
6.1.2.2. The EU and Customs Union 
 
Another WP foreign policy issue which underwent a substantial modification when it 
was submitted to the government was the view of the Party to Turkey’s EU member-
ship process and the Customs Union agreement. Turkey’s economic interests were 
seen in the integration of the country with regional and global economic and political 
power blocs. There was indeed a sign of change in the view of the party as early as 
its establishment in 1985. The new party leader, Ahmet Tekdal, elected in place of 
Necmettin Erbakan due to his ban from politics, favored the possibility of Turkey 
becoming an EU member as long as it was to remain an economic entity ensuring 
equal rights and benefits to member states (Tekdal, 1985: 8-10). The change in the 
approach was also associated with the emphasis put on the process by the coalition 
partner, the True Path Party. The benefits of the Union were abundant as long as it 
did not violate Turkey’s rights to sovereignty and national interests. For this reason, 
the WP gave its consent to the continuation of accession negotiations as agreed to by 
the1963 Ankara Agreement with the declaration of the 54
th
 Government Program. 
The Party’s view to the Customs Union agreement was also changing to parallel this 
(Tanıyıcı, 2003: 471-473). As explained by Necmettin Erbakan in a speech, the Wel-
fare Party was in favor of the Customs Union because Turkish economy would attain 
a healthier structure with it. The Party was in support of developing economic rela-
 187 
 
tions with Western countries. Turkey had to be a part of the Customs Union with a 
healthy, powerful and competitive industry (Zaman, 30 December 1995). 
 
 
6.1.2.3. Turkish-Israeli Relations  
 
Another important issue on which the WP had difficulty following its party program 
once it joined the government was Turkish-Israeli relations. Contrary to traditional 
policy goals of the Party to minimize relations with Israel for the liberation of East 
Jerusalem and the establishment of the Palestinian state, relations were following a 
trend of development and deepening, which appeared in form of developing military, 
political and economic relations. The Turkish Armed Forces were the most important 
agent of this process, who had seen an interest in developing relations with Israel.  
For the military, Turkey’s improving relations with Israel was more important than 
anything that Palestinians could provide. Israel was also considered as closer to Tur-
key in identity terms being modern and western as well as being troubled by the Ar-
abs and victimized by terrorism. Israel would provide intelligence and combat tech-
nology against the PKK terrorism claimed to be originating from Syria, Iraq and Iran. 
It was also expected that Turkey’s close ties with Israel would strengthen its relations 
with the USA (Robins, 2007: 299). 
 
There was an ongoing protocol with Israel even before the establishment of the 54 
Turkish Government. The trend continued at an intensifying pace with the introduc-
tion of the Welfare-True Path Government. The scale of military relations was very 
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broad, including weapons purchase, modernization projects, common military prac-
tices and trainings, and intelligence sharing. The WP was briefed by the Office of 
Chief of General Staff for the necessity of the protocols and there were not many 
chances for the Party to change the protocols except delaying the signing of agree-
ments and the meetings with Israeli officials (Özcan, 1998: 189-191; Köni, 26 Au-
gust 2010). Afterwards, Necmettin Erbakan’s attitude with Israel was changed, and 
Turkey had to initiate greater economic relations with Israel. Accordingly, develop-
ing economic relations would not mean that the WP had changed its desire that Israel 
withdraw from the occupied lands.    
 
 
6.2. JDP’s Foreign Policy 
 
The transformative effect of the above-mentioned variables on the formation of JDP 
foreign policy perspective has been much greater. The oppositional posture against 
cooperation and integration with Western political, economic and cultural institutions 
and search for their alternatives in the Islamic world has been totally abandoned. 
Turkey’s cultural and historical ties with the Muslim world are respected, but the 
content of relations with the Middle East is augmented with a group of other political 
and economic concerns. While trying to carry out the mission of the earlier parties to 
develop political and economic relations with the Middle East, the JDP also serves as 
a representative of the West campaigning for the necessity to institute political and 
social reforms on behalf of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good govern-
ance in the region. Though the National View parties were not against such stand-
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ards, they were more concerned with attaining Islamic ideals. Contrary to the denial 
of the National View to integrate with the West with a perception that the West was 
trying to undermine our existence, the JDP developed a vision of a world community 
with which Turkey has to establish rooted links in political, economic and diplomatic 
terms, let it be the UN, EU, NATO or individual states (Dağı, 2006: 92-93).   
 
One of the most important intellectual architects of JDP’s foreign policy vision based 
upon the background of these developments is a senior JDP foreign policy deputy, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has been entrusted with various foreign policy missions since 
JDP’s introduction to the government in 2002. Holding the office of Minister of For-
eign Affairs since 2009, Davutoğlu proposed a set of goals, styles and concerns to be 
adopted by the JDP Government in Turkey’s relations with regional and global ac-
tors. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey had to resolve its problems with neighboring 
countries and global political powers to zero, and it had to work for maximum coop-
eration and understanding to bring solutions to lingering regional and global prob-
lems. Secondly, Turkey had to assume a multilateral and multidimensional foreign 
policy activism by bringing actors from state, interstate and sub-state levels into ac-
tion, and functionally integrating all political, diplomatic, economic, social and legal 
goals and concerns. Thirdly, the notion of Turkey as the bridge between the East and 
the West had to be replaced by the idea of Turkey as a center country with the em-
ployment of its geopolitical, diplomatic, political and cultural assets. Turkey had to 
discover its potential power in its strategic location between Asia, Europe and Africa, 
and its inheritance of a common history and culture with the Middle East to become 
one of the leading global powers shaping world politics. Turkey’s power sources 
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were giving it enough space to be considered as a major power that had to be taken 
into account in regional and global political economic processes. Turkey was also 
enabled with mechanisms and offices of mediation, negotiation and good offices to 
serve in the resolution of regional and global crises. Fourthly, Turkish foreign policy 
had to take into greater consideration such political and social issues as promoting 
democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms in addition to traditional foreign 
policy goals. Turkey was standing as a model country in the Middle East with its 
embodiment of tradition and modernity, religion and secularism in a democratic po-
litical system. Finally, Turkey had to adopt a rhythmic and dynamic foreign policy in 
its fragile environment to match up with its challenges and opportunities. To this end, 
Turkey had to enhance its role and activism in international organizations. These new 
perspectives in the view of the Turkish religious right have constituted the backbone 
of the JDP’s foreign policy with slight modifications since 2002 (Davutoğlu, 2009a: 
501; Davutoğlu, 2004; Aras, 2009; Aras and Görener, 2010: 82-86; Migdalovitz, 
2010a: 2-4; Kalın, 2010: 98-101).  
 
 
6.2.1. European Union 
 
The AKP accepts contemporary legal and political paradigms like human rights, de-
mocracy and rule of law as universal values. Turkey’s prospective membership to 
EU is considered as a great opportunity for domestic political, economic and social 
transformation. It was for this reason that the head of the AKP, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, had speedily set out for visits to political leaders of EU members soon after 
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the announcement of AKP’s electoral victory in November 2002. It was declared by 
the party leadership that the priority of the party was not to bring an immediate solu-
tion to headscarf and Imam-Hatip schools issues, but rather to speed up Turkey’s EU 
accession process. In his meeting with European leaders, Erdoğan voiced the im-
portance his party attributes to EU membership and the willingness of his party to 
institute necessary reforms alongside the criteria formulated in Copenhagen 1993 
European Council and Helsinki (1999) summits which urge respect for and promo-
tion of democracy, human rights, rule of law, minority rights and a functioning mar-
ket economy to match up with the competitive European economy. This conditionali-
ty was repeated at the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit. After the establishment 
of the government, the JDP passed one by one the 4
th
, 5
th
, 6
th
, 7
th
 and 8
th
 harmoniza-
tion packages in the assembly two per year until July 2004. Some of the reforms in-
troduced include improvement of the powers of civilian bureaucracy vis-à-vis the 
state elites, abolition of the death penalty, abolition of State Security Courts, greater 
freedom of expression and greater rights for organization. The reforms have also 
brought various cultural and linguistic rights to Kurdish citizens for a constructive 
solution to the persistent Kurdish issue. The harmonization packages were assessed 
by an EU commission in October 2004 and Turkey was declared as a candidate to 
start the process of negotiations for full membership (Usul, 2006: 205-206; Duran, 
2008: 87; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009: 8; Dağı, 2006: 97-100).      
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6.2.2. Cyprus  
 
The JDP Government’s strong campaign for Turkey’s EU membership has brought 
some new controversies and developments in the Cyprus issue. The resolution of the 
Cyprus dispute was remaining the most important challenge standing in the way of 
membership, and the JDP was very eager to find a solution to the decades-old prob-
lem, even with a set of concessions granted by the Turkish community, which was 
standing as an obstacle on Turkey’s road to development and modernization (Bagdo-
nas, 2010: 239). The EU accepted Cyprus into the union together with 15 other new 
members with a process of negotiation led by the Greek Administration in the south. 
Being a member of the Customs Union, Turkey was urged by the EU Additional Pro-
tocol adopted on June 13 2005 to incorporate Cyprus in the Customs Union to indi-
rectly make Turkey recognize the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey signed the Additional 
Protocol but added that the signing of the protocol did not mean the recognition of 
Republic of Cyprus as the representative of the entire Cyprus. The EU in return indi-
cated that it recognizes only one state in the island, and that the protocol is a part of 
the Accession Partnership Document and Negotiating Framework ruled in October 
2005 in Luxemburg. This view of the EU was repeated in the November 2005 Pro-
gress Report too. In January 2006, the JDP Government declared its Cyprus plan, 
according to which the additional protocol would be accepted only if the internation-
al isolation of Northern Cyprus was abandoned. It was indicated in the plan that an 
agreement would be reached thereto only if the following four criteria were accepted: 
the opening of Turkish harbors to Greek ships, opening of Northern Cyprus harbors 
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to international trade, supply of economic support to Northern Cyprus by the EU and 
execution of the entire process in the body of the UN (Usul, 2006: 209-215).  
 
The Annan plan represents a very critical stage in negotiations. In case of the ap-
proval of the plan by both communities, a federal state of Cyprus would be estab-
lished with a negotiation similar to the 1960 London and Zurich Agreements. The 
Annan plan foresaw the establishment of a Presidential Council of six members, two 
Turkish and four Greek, distributed proportionately to population. Three other non-
voting members would be assigned according to population again. Secondly, the 
president and the vice-president would be selected by the Presidential Council, one 
from each community, to alternate in a period of five years. Thirdly, a bicameral leg-
islature would be formed consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The 
Senate would have 48 members, 24 from each community, and the Chamber of Dep-
uties would have 48 members elected in proportion to the ethnical ratio of the popu-
lation. Fourthly, a Supreme Court would be established with equal number of mem-
bers from each community with an additional three foreign judges appointed by the 
Presidential Council (Annan Plan, Articles 5 and 6).    
 
The plan was fully supported by the AKP. The plan was presented to the public on 
April 24 2004 in a referendum by both communities, with the result of 65 percent of 
yes votes by the Turkish community and 75 percent of no votes by the Greek com-
munity. In return for Northern Cyprus’s approval of the plan and willingness for ne-
gotiation, the EU admitted the Regulations for Economic Assistance and Direct 
Trade for Northern Cyprus. But the economic assistance was not provided, due to the 
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opposition of the Greek community. The EU then offered Northern Cyprus to give 
Varoşa (Maraş) to Greek Cypriots, stop the sale of Greek Cypriot properties in the 
North, and agree to the common usage of the Famagusta (Magosa) harbor by both 
communities for the application of the Regulation, but the offer was rejected by 
Northern Cyprus. The issue of economic assistance was approved lastly by the EU 
Commission with a decision taken in June 2006. The JDP Government’s determina-
tion for EU membership, its willingness to sit around the negotiation table for Cyprus 
for this matter, and its conciliatory attitude represents a very significant change in the 
course of the Turkish religious right. The JDP was still opposed by Turkish state 
elites, for it was viewed as inexperienced and naïve in promoting Turkey’s rights and 
interests in the island. Accordingly, the JDP was showing agreement to a set of con-
cessions that could have never been tolerated by the state elites nor by the real repre-
sentatives of the Turkish community in the Island (Usul, 2006: 211-212; Robins, 
2007: 297-298). 
 
 
6.2.3. Turkish-American Relations  
 
Relations between Turkey and the USA are most commonly identified as a strategic 
partnership that has changed little since the beginning of the Cold War. With the in-
auguration of the JDP government, the level and type of relations have been further 
developed, to be regarded as a “model partnership” by the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Ahmet Davutoğlu (Today’s Zaman, 4 July 2009). Turkey’s close ties with the 
USA were reaffirmed to carry on as during the Cold War and Post-Cold War for 
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global and regional security, order and stability, with its active membership to west-
ern security, political and economic community. Turkey would support US goals to 
promote political reforms in the Middle East for democracy, human rights, and rule 
of law, as well as assisting it in combating international terrorism, eradicating pov-
erty and bringing a solution to Palestinian issue. The JDP had experienced an inti-
mate transformation in adopting these abovementioned universal political values and 
principles to make them a priority cause compared to earlier National View parties. 
The agenda of cooperation and partnership appeared to be very broad with the USA. 
The JDP was first and foremost adopting US nomination of Turkey as a model coun-
try in the Middle East with its comparatively advanced political regime to unite de-
mocracy, secularism, Islam and modernity. Turkey would support with all its politi-
cal and diplomatic means the US campaign to break down authoritarian traditions in 
the Middle East for the introduction of democratic regimes that respect human rights, 
rule of law, international peace and security (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 2006: 99-111; Oğu-
zlu, 2008: 9).  
 
Partnership and cooperation would continue in line with Turkey’s NATO member-
ship, its deals with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as Turkey’s goals to be-
come a full member of the EU. The JDP government would support the US War in 
Afghanistan with its active participation in the coalition forces, and it would provide 
all other assistance to combat international terrorism, by which both countries were 
victimized. An agreement was reached to clean northern Iraq from PKK camps. Tur-
key would be provided with intelligence by the USA about PKK activism in North-
ern Iraq. The JDP’s strong campaign for EU membership to make Turkey a part of 
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the West by raising its political, and legal standards was equally welcomed and sup-
ported by the USA to produce a greater sense of cooperation (Kalın, 2010: 102-107; 
Oğuzlu, 2008: 7-8; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009: 12-13).  
 
Issues of the transfer of Caspian and Caucasian energy resources produced another 
avenue of cooperation and partnership between the countries. The two parties have 
been strident supporters of oil and natural gas pipeline projects passing from Turkey 
to the world markets. The issue was very important to break the global energy mo-
nopoly, to reduce the dependence of the neighboring countries on Russia, as well as 
to provide a scheme of energy diversity and security. The cooperation had started 
during the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to be maintained 
with the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, which would carry Azeri natural gas to the 
west (Kalın, 2010: 105).”  
 
The relations have not been without problems, however. Turkey had not agreed to 
open its territory for the passage and settlement of American troops to open a north-
ern front during the Iraqi war in 2003. The parliamentary bill did not pass the ap-
proval of the parliament as well as the president. bringing the relations to a period of 
cloudiness. Turkey was reluctant to support a US war against a Muslim country, es-
pecially if it had no support in international law. Another concern emerged after the 
start of the war, i.e., increasing PKK activism in Northern Iraq, an actor that benefit-
ed from the power vacuum to build up new terrorist camps and disturb the Turkish 
authorities and incite for trans-border operations. The USA was opposed to Turkish 
military operations in Northern Iraq under the pressure of the newly forming gov-
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ernment as well as the Kurdish leaders in the north, producing tension in bilateral 
relations (Robins, 2007: 294-295; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009: 12-13; Oğuzlu, 2008: 8).  
 
Another important issue that put a question mark on Turkish-American relations has 
been Turkey’s diplomatic policies to institute close ties with Iran. Turkey regarded 
Iran as an important trade partner. The transfer of Iranian and Turkmen energy re-
sources through Turkey would be an important revenue gate. But also, Turkey’s rela-
tions with Iran was characterized with peace and stability for centuries, something 
which the JDP was not willing to change. The US resolution to apply sanctions to 
countries which have a volume of trade with Iran over 20 million USD was opposed 
by Turkey. The tension in relations was increased with Turkey’s abstention from 
taking action against Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Turkey supported the Irani-
an claims that the enrichment program was solely for purposes of energy production, 
without having any plans to employ it in producing nuclear weapons. To this end, 
Turkey cast an abstaining vote during the IAEA voting on Iran in November 2009. 
The action was criticized by US authorities, and Turkey was urged to respect Ameri-
can concerns in the region (Migdalovitz, 2010a: 45-47; Oğuzlu, 2008: 9).  
 
 
6.2.4. The Middle East  
 
JDP’s foreign policy goals and policies concerning the Middle East display a great 
deal of differences from those of the National View in style and content. Though 
some elements, such as the aspiration of being the leader country in the region, have 
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been saved, they have been expanded in a tremendous scale to turn into an almost 
absolutely different thing. The National View movement was motivated by an idea of 
promoting a single Middle East, united around traditional, cultural and historical 
commonalities rooted in Islam, to be led by Turkey and to counterbalance a concep-
tion of a united Christian west. The most remarkable change in this process has been 
the denial of the notion of East-West enmity based on cultural differences, which is 
now interpreted by the JDP as a source of dialogue, friendship and partnership. The 
content of JDP’s foreign policy has been occupied with concerns of regional and 
global peace and prosperity, promotion of democratic, liberal and legal reforms, with 
a set of roles assigned to Turkey for these purposes.  
 
Based on its geopolitical assets and historical links with the Middle East, the JDP has 
envisaged a leadership role for Turkey in the Middle East. This is deemed, on the one 
hand, as a necessity for our national interests if such issues as security, stability, en-
ergy etc. are taken into account in a regional and global perspective, but it is also 
because the JDP regards Turkey an integral part of the Middle East society, towards 
which it has some responsibilities. It was not reasonable for Turkey to turn its back 
to its history, culture, and, of course, religion. While developing its relations with the 
regional states by paying homage to these material and spiritual issues, the JDP has 
prepared a Middle East role for Turkey to serve as a protector and a mediator for the 
resolution of regional conflicts and clashes, to facilitate peace, security, stability, 
prosperity and economic development. In carrying out this duty, the JDP takes the 
international law and the norms as its base and pays attention to not putting Turkey 
into a state of tension with individual states and international organizations of the 
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west. Turkey is considered as a part of a global mission to carry out the above-
mentioned goals. The JDP has also strongly supported the idea of a model Turkey in 
the Middle East with its ability to represent a balance between Islam, secularism, 
democracy and modernity. Turkey is portrayed as ready to serve as a spiritual and 
material power source, to fight elements of authoritarianism, backwardness and reli-
gious radicalism in the region (Aras, 2010: 82-86; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 133-134).  
 
The AKP has also undertaken a mission to erase the signs of Islamophobia in the 
West, which has been particularly powerful after 9/11, events to serve as an agent of 
dialogue among religions, cultures and societies. Islamophobia is deemed as closely 
associated with reactions and attacks directed towards Muslims in the world in last 
ten years. For this reason, the party started a campaign and organized a 2007 Interna-
tional Islamophobia Conference in Istanbul, which was joined by leading scholars 
and policymakers from all around the world. The idea of Clash of Civilizations pro-
posed by Samuel Huntington has been strongly opposed by the Party as a potential 
source of enmity and hatred among societies belonging to different religions, which 
could one day unexpectedly materialize in the form of a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
Thus, in order to combat the conflicts of religious origin and to promote friendship, 
dialogue and cooperation among nations belonging to different religions, cultures 
and civilizations, Turkey has been brought to the co-presidency of a UN Commission 
titled  Alliance of Civilizations in 2005, together with Spain (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 
2006: 109; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 164).    
 
 
 200 
 
6.2.4.1. Iran 
 
JDP has adopted the National View goal to institute close ties with the Muslim 
world, but this time the goal was implemented in a very pragmatist and interest-
oriented way. The idea of cooperation and partnership with Middle East countries 
has been integrated into a wider concept of regional and global peace and prosperity 
not to harm Turkey’s relations with the USA and the west in general. Major themes 
of Turkish-Iranian relations during the JDP government have been cooperation and 
partnership on issues of PKK terrorism, Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, and pro-
duction and transport of Iranian oil and gas. In line with the new foreign policy vi-
sion introduced by the JDP Government, Turkey is playing an important mediating 
and peace-building mission in Iran’s relations with global powers.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish-Iranian relations were shadowed by Turkey’s 
concern with the possibility of the spread of the Iranian revolution to its own territo-
ry. There was a growing literature on Iran’s ambitions, plans and projects to export 
its revolution to Turkey. Iran was accused by the secularist chambers in Turkey of 
providing money, arms and propaganda to radical religious groups in Turkey (Mum-
cu, 1997). The participation of the Iranian Ambassador to the famous Sincan events, 
and his speech against the secularist principle of the republic, which sparked the 28 
February Process and secularist campaign against Turkish religious right was at a 
time when the concerns were the highest. The relations were further harmed by 
claims that Iran was permitting PKK to use its own territory as headquarters and 
camps for their attacks on Turkey. Iran was, on the other hand, critical of Turkish 
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authorities for their provision of sanctuary to Mujahedeen al-Halq, an anti-regime 
organization aiming to overthrow the Khomeini regime in Iran, as well as Turkey’s 
close ties with Israel and the USA. In 1999, Turkey organized a campaign against 
PKK camps in Iran’s border towns, during which the two countries came to the brink 
of war. But the tension was soon recovered with the signing of a mutual security 
treaty (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 139-141). 
 
The relations have shown a trend of increasing development since then. The two 
countries were equally opposed to the US war in Iraq. The claim that Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction was falsified, and attempts to legitimize the war with a 
campaign of democratization and fight against tyranny had proven too bloody, lead-
ing to the killings of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. Countries were thus encour-
aged to closer relations also to take part in the international coalition for the estab-
lishment of the new Iraqi state, as well as calling for the withdrawal of US forces. 
But a more important issue in the agenda has been Iran’s nuclear enrichment contro-
versy. Turkey has mostly been in support of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program with 
the claim that the program is absolutely for peaceful purposes and that Iran does not 
have any goals of producing nuclear weapons. On a number of occasions, Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has also been very critical of the international coalition 
against Iran’s nuclear enrichment. Many of the countries that oppose Iran’s nuclear 
energy production were indeed owners of nuclear weapons, hypocritically demand-
ing that Iran give up establishing nuclear installations for peaceful purposes without 
any indication that they will ever give up their operational nuclear arsenal. An action 
had to be taken against Israel first which owned the biggest and only nuclear weap-
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ons arsenal in the Middle East to threaten regional security and peace (Migdalovitz, 
2010a: 18-20; Press TV, 19 May 2010).  
 
While expressing their opposition to the international pressure on Iran, the JDP lead-
ership is not, however, against the resolution of the conflict through diplomacy and 
peaceful means. The JDP government encourages Iran to work in coordination with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prove that its enrichment pro-
gram is totally for peaceful purposes and that it does not have any motivations to 
produce nuclear weapons. For this reason, Turkey cast an abstaining vote on the 
IAEA resolution urging Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment, which is claimed that 
it runs in a secret facility. Turkey believes in Iran’s readiness to respond to diplomat-
ic efforts and opposes imposition of sanctions on Iran. Turkey plays a critical mediat-
ing role by meeting and visiting leaders of western campaign against a nuclear Iran 
as well as the Iranian officials (Davutoğlu, 2009b: 131-132; Migdalovitz, 2010; 20-
23; Aras and Karakaya-Polat, 2007: 483-484).  
 
Another important issue between the two countries is the development of Iranian 
natural gas fields and facilities, and construction of new pipelines for the transporta-
tion of Iranian energy sources to the West. The economic concerns of the Turkish 
officials are very strong as Turkey is an energy-poor country, and also because the 
use of the Turkish land for the transfer of resources will mean a stable revenue gate 
to encourage it to further develop relations with Iran despite the anti-Iranian interna-
tional opposition. The volume of trade between the two countries rose from $1 bil-
lion in 2000 to over $10 billion in 2009. It is expected to increase many-fold in the 
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near future with increasing economic ties. As usual, the chief Turkish imports from 
Iran are oil, natural gas and related products. In 2001, the existing natural gas pipe-
line provided 17 percent of Turkey’s gas import. In 2007, Turkey won a tender for 
the development of Iran’s South Pars natural gas fields as well as a following pipe-
line project that would carry the amount of natural gas extracted. The pipeline would 
also carry Turkmen natural gas (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 141; Migdalovitz, 2010a: 
23-24; Davutoğlu, 2009b: 133). 
 
 
6.2.4.2. Syria 
 
Turkish-Syrian relations were strained until the end of 1990s because of a number of 
reasons that include Syrian claims over Hatay, Turkey’s South-eastern Anatolian 
Project and Syrian support for the PKK. Hatay was under French mandate after the 
First World War to gain its independence in 1938. In a referendum held in 1939, 
Hatay decided to join Turkey, which was opposed until recently by Syria, which 
claims that Turkey annexed the province with an invalid referendum. Turkey’s 
Southeastern Anatolian Project, secondly, was a source of trouble in relations be-
cause of the Syrian claims that Turkey was cutting the trans-flow of water to lower 
countries. And finally, Turkey was condemning Syria for its overt support to PKK 
and its provision of sanctuary to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus. The two 
countries came to the brink of war in the late 1990s for these reasons. But the tension 
was relieved, with Abdullah Öcalan expelled from Syria and his capture in Kenya to 
represent a turning point in bilateral relations. In 1999, Turkey and Syria signed the 
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Adana Agreement, that involved the cooperation of two countries in security and 
military matters to become the first of a set of negotiations that included cooperation 
and partnership in many areas (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 142-143; Robins, 2007: 
295).  
 
In 2000, the first time in the history of bilateral relations, Turkish President Necdet 
Sezer organized an official visit to Syria to attend the funeral of Syrian President 
Hafiz al-Assad, to be followed by a number of other high-level visits by both sides. 
In 2004, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Bashar al-Assad in Damascus to 
sign a free trade agreement for the development of bilateral trade relations between 
the countries. Relations continued with increasing political, diplomatic and military 
ties in ensuing years. The volume of international trade between two countries 
amounted to $1.8 billion in 2009. A set of protocols were signed for the construction 
of a gas pipeline and cooperation of the two countries in the oil industry. The Turkish 
businessmen were also allowed to invest in Syria to benefit from cheaper labor and 
materials thanks to the improving relations. The two countries agreed in 2009 on the 
conduct of three joint military maneuvers. During the conduct of these maneuvers, 
defense ministers of the two countries visited the 9
th
 International Defense Industry 
Fair held in Istanbul, and signed a letter of intent as a sign of cooperation in the de-
fense industry. In May 2009, President Abdullah Gül went for another visit to Da-
mascus with a delegate of Turkish ministers that included Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, after the invitation of Syrian President Assad in return for Assad’s 
visit in 2007 to keep the bilateral relations at a lively pace (Sabiibrahimoğlu; 28 
April 2009; Robins, 2007: 296; Migdalovitz, 2010a: 16-17).       
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6.2.4.3. Israel  
 
Turkish-Israeli relations entered into an intensifying process of development in the 
1990s in a very wide range of areas that stretched to as far as military partnership and 
cooperation. A list of military, political, economic and diplomatic agreements were 
reached of a nature not even seen among leading NATO members. In January 1994, 
Turkey signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Israel. It was followed by the 
signing of a Security and Intelligence Agreement in March 1994. In January 1995, 
another agreement was signed involving the training of Turkish special police forces 
and intelligence agents by Israel with their weapons and technical devices to be pro-
vided by Israel. The protocols signed in these years constituted the major framework 
of military and strategic relations between the two countries that involved Israeli 
supply of weapons and modernization of Turkish jets and tanks. The actor of these 
agreements on the Turkish side was most often the Turkish Armed Forces, which 
exploited a state of increasing control of political authority during the Erbakan-Çiller 
Government. The process was closely related with increasing PKK terrorism, and 
Syrian and alleged Iranian support of PKK, against which the army was compelled to 
take quick and effective measures. (Köni, 26 August 2010).  
 
When introduced to the government, the JDP has not attempted to take the earlier 
National View ideas about Israel into action. Israel was recognized as an important 
regional actor, trade partner and military ally. It was one of the main foreign policy 
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goals of the party to bring a permanent peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Israel has of course been condemned for its human rights violations and military ac-
tions verging on genocide, but a belief has always remained in favor of the possibil-
ity of a solution to the conflict through diplomatic ways and negotiations led by the 
international community. The JDP has been very willing to form regional and inter-
national platforms to bring the leaders of conflicting communities together for peace 
and negotiation. Turkey is leading the development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian in-
dustrial park for prospective cooperation for peace between the parties. Before the 
holding of the Middle East Peace Conference in 2007 in Annapolis, Turkey invited 
the leaders of Israel and Palestine, Shimon Peres and Mahmud Abbas, to speak in the 
Turkish parliament before the resolution of the conflict. Turkey’s mediating role was 
appreciated by all parties, and Turkey was invited to Annapolis as a party for the 
resolution of the conflict.   
 
Yet the purposes of the JDP have most often been axed by Israel’s dis-proportional 
measures against the Palestinians and extreme acts of human rights violations that 
induce them to cease their peace attempts. Turkey harshly condemned Israel’s Gaza 
campaign in 2009, which ended up with over a thousand Palestinians being killed. In 
the World Economic Forum 2009 held in Davos, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan expressed his anger to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Perez during a live 
broadcast, which produced a sensational effect worldwide. As Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan requested more time to speak, he interrupted to say that Mr. Peres spoke too 
loudly to cover his guilt and said that he will never come to Davos again.          
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The most dramatic event in the history of bilateral relations came in 2010, with Isra-
el’s attack to Mavi Marmara, when a group of civil society organizations headed to 
Gaza to break Israel’s Gaza blockade. The events leading to the killing of eight Turk-
ish and one Turkish-American activist represented the most terrible diplomatic and 
political crisis between the two countries. Turkey immediately summoned its Am-
bassador to Israel and closed the embassy in Tel Aviv. The Turkish President, Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed their deep concerns and re-
vulsion about the Israeli violation of the Law of Sea and their attacks on aid volun-
teers. Israel’s actions were widely condemned by the UN, EU and other global and 
regional actors too. Upon the events, Turkey declared that earlier military agreements 
for Israel’s use of Turkish air space and for the conduct of joint military exercise are 
cancelled (Migdalovitz, 2010b).  
 
Turkish-Israeli relations does not seem be going to recover in the near future. Israel 
does not wish to apologize for Flotilla attacks. And Turkey will not agree to normal-
ize the relations until Israel changes its attitude. Israel’s humanitarian aid attempt for 
the victims of Van earthquake has been rejected by the Turkish authorities for a peri-
od of time (CNN Turk, 26 October 2011). Another problem has surfaced with the 
united attempt of Israel and Cyprus for oil and natural gas exploration attempts in the 
south of the island after the signing of a bilateral agreement on the borders of an ex-
clusive economic zone in-between. Turkish-Israeli relations are in a process of fur-
ther soaring with the cancellation of various military agreements and protocols 
signed in the late 1990s.            
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6.2.5. Elements of Rupture in JDP’s Foreign Policy Activism 
 
The most recent literature points out that the JDP is experiencing a degree of change 
in its foreign policy style and content from a multidimensional and conciliatory focus 
to an independent and assertive one. This has been especially the case in Turkish-
American relations and the EU process (Öniş, 2011: 49-53). The decline in tone of 
Turkish-American relations has been mentioned in above section under the topics of 
Turkey’s reluctance to support the coalition forces in Iraq, US opposition to Turkey’s 
cross-border operations in Northern Iraq against PKK forces, Turkey’s close ties 
with Iran and support for Iran’s nuclear enrichment program which is believed to be 
for peaceful purposes, as well as Turkey’s intentions to establish close relations with 
Syria.   
 
Another rupture in the JDP’s foreign policy orientation has been the loss of momen-
tum in Turkey’s EU accession process. The JDP government has particularly been 
disillusioned with EU’s insistence on the unification of Cyprus at any cost as a con-
dition of the continuation of accession talks. The support of the Cyprus Turks for the 
Annan Plan was not appreciated. The JDP Government has also been disturbed with 
offers of privileged membership and pressures to accept the notion of Armenian gen-
ocide (Oğuzlu, 2008: 12-13).  
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6.3. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to elucidate the major changes in the policies and goals of 
the Turkish religious right in the area of foreign policy from the National View par-
ties of the National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Par-
ty and the Felicity Party to the Justice and Development Party. The major change in 
the foreign policy orientation of the party is explored in the shift from a predomi-
nantly cultural to a pragmatist and rational attitude. The National View parties had a 
vision of dichotomy between the East and the West. The East belonged to the Islamic 
civilization and the West was shaped by Judeo-Christian traditions for centuries, and 
the history of the world was written over an adversarial competition between these 
two poles. The West was driven by the will to exploit and weaken its adversary. The 
East, on the other hand, had a mission of civilization rooted in its Islamic heritage 
and exemplified in the history of Islamic states that did not foresee the annihilation 
of the non-Islamic nor the economic exploitation of the non-Islamic. It was a necessi-
ty of reason for Turkey to minimize its political links with western international or-
ganizations and actors such as the UN, EU, IMF, World Bank, USA and Israel, and 
turn its face to the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Turkey had to lead the for-
mation of alternative international organizations and entities in the Middle East as a 
source of power and development.  
 
The foreign policy vision of the Justice and Development Party is formed on substan-
tially different premises than those of the National View movement. The notion of 
East-West dichotomy is abandoned in favor of a Turkey that has strong ties with the 
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East and the West at the same time. The foreign policy decision-making team of the 
AKP sees Turkey’s interests in cooperative relations with the West and the East. The 
role of religion is minimized in shaping Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and 
global actors. The party deems democracy, human rights, and rule of law as universal 
values of humanity, with their origins in the West and therefore it is strongly in favor 
of Turkey’s membership to the EU, its active role in the UN and close relations with 
the USA and other global actors. The agenda of the AKP Government’s foreign poli-
cy is occupied with all security, political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, social 
and cultural concerns that lead Turkey to pursue a multidimensional, multipartite, 
peaceful and dynamic policy in world politics. The AKP government’s relations with 
the Middle East are indeed even more developed than the Welfare Party envisioned. 
Turkey’s powerful economy, stable political system, and secular democracy have 
been instrumental in its portrayal as a model country in the Middle East by the USA 
and the EU. With its pacific and conciliatory attitude and its close relations with Iran, 
Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Israel, the AKP Government is also an often solicited office 
of mediation for peace talks and negotiations in the Middle East.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
NATURE OF THE PARTY CHANGE: RELIGION AND SECULARISM 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the transformation of Turkish religious right 
from National View parties of 1970s, 1980s and 1090s to the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (JDP) of post-28 February Process in its perspective to matters of religion 
and secularism. The research has shown that there is a remarkable change in the ori-
entation of the religious right in its view to religious politics in the sense that while 
the National View parties interpreted religion as one of the major components of 
their social, political and economic policy goals, JDP’s relationship with religion has 
been relatively limited. In the case of the National View movement, the limits of 
religious politics has ranged between a concept of Islam as a type of belief taken un-
der guarantee with secularist principle of the Constitution, to Islam as a source of 
major political action. The aspects of party goals related with freedom of belief, con-
science and religion were described in detail in party programs and publications. The 
movement became an object of opposition originating from the secularist establish-
ment because of some provocative speeches by its members inviting the establish-
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ment of an Islamic sharia regime as well as because of certain governmental and mu-
nicipal policies adapted by party deputies involving application of some Islamic 
norms in public places. 
 
Established by a group of breakaway party members from the Welfare and later Vir-
tue Party, the JDP declares its dissociation from the idea of Islamic sharia regime and 
jihadism. The JDP manifests its respect for and loyalty to modern and universal po-
litical, legal, social and economic institutions inherited from the west. As a part of its 
conservative roots, the JDP has been running an ambitious campaign for headscarf 
freedom, Imam-Hatip schools and Quran Courses. But the JDP pursues its goals for 
these freedoms and rights as it is believed that they are given as a product of Tur-
key’s membership to some universal values and principles of political conduct such 
as democracy, human rights and secularism.        
 
 
7.1. National View Movement 
 
The National View parties of National Order Party, National Salvation Party and 
Welfare Party were the leading actors of Turkish religious right from 1970s to late 
1990s. The limits of National View’s religious politics stretched between a concept 
of social and cultural representation of Islam to a political campaign for the refor-
mation of legal, economic, educational and administrative aspects of public life ac-
cording to religious beliefs and norms. This radical tendency in one extreme of this 
religious politics was manifested in certain speeches, policies and electoral cam-
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paigns of the party members with their calls for the establishment of an Islamic sha-
ria regime and organization of Jihad for this matter. Successive parties of the move-
ment were thus brought to the court case with accusations of violating the secularist 
principle and threatening to bring down the state.      
 
 
7.1.1. Secularism in National View 
 
The National View had a very critical stance towards secularist interpretations and 
practices of the state elites in Turkey. A regime of oppression was ruling in Turkey 
under the guise of secularism. While secularism was supposed to serve as a guaran-
tee for freedom of belief and religion, right to religious education and the separation 
of religion and state; the secularist practices in Turkey were exhibiting the opposite 
tendency. There were many examples to this. For instance, the women who wore 
headscarf in their photos were not issued passport. A sizable number of Prayer Lead-
er and Preacher Schools built since 1982 were not opened to education though there 
was a huge demand from the people. There were many obstacles against going on 
Pilgrimage. Road transportation to Saudi Arabia was not permitted. Only travel via 
airways was permitted and it was made very expensive during the Pilgrimage season. 
In a secular democratic state, people were endowed with rights of freedom of expres-
sion, education, organization and of the abilities to live and pray according to reli-
gion. It was not possible to talk about a guarantee of human rights in a complete and 
modern sense in Turkey (Erbakan, 1994: 78-83; NOP Party Program: Article 6; Er-
bakan, 1975a: 49-56; WP Party Program: Article 4; Öniş, 1997: 754).  
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Turkey was one of the two countries in the world where the word secularism was 
cited in the constitution, the other one being France. Many western countries includ-
ed clauses on official religion of the state in their constitutions. Turkish secularism 
was a very cheap imitation of the West which never gave the right of the principle. 
Turkish secularism was characterized as Byzantinism by Necmettin Erbakan accord-
ing to which the religion and belief was transferred under the control of the state 
while they had to stay in separation. It was a source of resentment for the pious to be 
administered by a non-religious body of institutions. What was done on behalf of 
secularism was indeed a violation of a basic democratic principle where the people 
were supposed to benefit from basic rights and liberties let them be about religion, 
thought or anything else. It was a goal of the National View movement to introduce 
reforms for a clear definition of secularism that would not leave any space for misin-
terpretations and erroneous policies (Erbakan, 1994: 78-83; Erbakan, 1975b: 153-
155). 
 
To this end, the Welfare Party prepared a constitutional amendment negotiation pro-
posal where a set of very fundamental changes were offered regarding the articles of 
secularism in the constitution. In the proposal, a multiple system of law was offered 
that incorporated a secular and a religious law in its fabric. It was considered as a 
basic human right to have a multiple system of law (Refah Partisi: 4). The word 
secular (laik) in Article 2 of the Constitution was to be removed and the concept of 
secularism described in Article 24 was to be replaced with a softer interpretation of 
secularism that included the freedoms of expressing, promulgating, learning and 
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teaching religious beliefs and views as well as organizing, living and praying accord-
ing to religious beliefs (Refah Partisi: 70, 79). The Article 4 of the Constitution pro-
hibiting the amendment of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution – which describes 
the form and characteristics of the state among which secularism and republicanism 
is most important for our purposes – as well as any proposals for their amendment, 
was to be removed (Refah Partisi: 71). And finally, the provision in Article 24 pro-
hibiting the establishment of social, economic, political or legal order of the state on 
religious basis, in part or whole, was also to be amended (Refah Partisi: 79-80; Say-
başılı, 1998: 40-43).      
 
The National View was against the provision on religious exploitation too incorpo-
rated in article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code. This article was based on an assump-
tion that people were ignorant and very open to manipulation without any ability to 
reason and make choices. Everybody had to have the right to express their thoughts 
and to listen to the views of others no matter what they could be. And they had to be 
free with their independent choices too. This provision of the Penal Code was in con-
tradiction with the constitutional rights of the citizens to freedom of thought and ex-
pression (Erbakan, 1975a: 54-56). Secularism understood this way was respected as a 
prerequisite of the democracy which was in fact an important goal of the movement 
to realize. People had extensive social and political rights in liberal democracies. The 
state was to be minimized to the execution of some essential goods and services only. 
State mechanisms would not necessarily have any rights to impose a particular ideol-
ogy over its people, neither materialist nor spiritual.  
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The movement was opposed to the traditional secularist view portraying Islam as a 
reactionary force against science and reason for which it had to be cast out of politi-
cal and social life. Islam was indeed in the origins of the material and spiritual sci-
ences both. Many of modern sciences and areas of knowledge like astronomy, phys-
ics, chemistry, mathematics, medicine, history and geography had been developed by 
Muslim scholars of the Middle Age. The sciences inherited from the ancient Egypt, 
India, Greece were translated, studied, advanced and systematized by the Muslim 
world to be exported to the West through various channels of interaction. Contrary to 
the idea that religion promoted ignorance and backwardness, religion was indeed the 
source of material and spiritual perfection. Religion was the way for prosperity (Er-
bakan, 1975a: 67-82; Erbakan, 2006: 15-20).  
 
 
7.1.2. Education  
 
The party attached a great importance to religion in all levels of education. The es-
sentials of party goals related with religion and morality included the following: Re-
moval of elements of materialist education to be replaced by a moral, acceptable and 
pragmatist educational curriculum, attachment of greater importance to courses of 
religion and morality, expansion of the number and type of Imam-Hatip schools, 
establishment of more and much developed religious faculties and graduate schools. 
The movement would campaign to  
bring up new generations who are proud of their great and glorious history, 
loyal to their past, preserving their traditions and customs with respect and 
faithfulness, devoid of all types of imitation, aware of their national character 
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and always bearing the consciousness of belief and determination to do better 
than the day before (Erbakan, 1975a: 92-93). 
 
The educational system in Turkey was materialist. Particularly in sociology and psy-
chology lessons, the students were exposed to a heavy atheist and anti-religious 
learning: The origins of the man were traced to the apes. There was not anything as 
religion. It was produced by the men who were fearful of the natural events such as 
fires, floods, earthquakes for which they had started to pray the powerful and de-
structive objects around. Kaaba was initially an imitation of ancient Greek tradition 
who were filling in the Acropolis with the idols that they were worshipping. And the 
emergence of the faith in oneness of the God was a product of social evolution from 
these traditions. For the National View, these teachings had nothing to do with sci-
ence and reality. The religion of Islam as based on belief in one God was existing 
much before the ancient Greeks as we know it from the Prophets Moses, Abraham, 
Noah and Adam (Erbakan, 1975a: 93-95; Erbakan, 1975b: 16-19).       
 
As a product of the materialist view in education, a generation of people was grow-
ing up with contempt for Turkish moral, social, cultural and historical values. There 
was a remarkable decline of moral standard: Chastity (iffet) as the basis of a healthy 
family and social life was neglected. The youth were growing disrespectful of their 
elderly people with their long hairs and whiskers. In addition to these, the schools 
had turned to hot beds of anarchy and terrorism due to the spread of radical leftist 
currencies of thought. It was a goal of the National View to give an end to these by 
promoting education of religion and morality in schools. That would be one of the 
most effective weapons against social and political disorder in the country. This 
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would also help to produce a citizenry loyal to their country, and honest and incor-
ruptible in the economic life (Erbakan, 1975a: 90-97; Erbakan, 1976: 19-22; NOP 
Party Program, Articles 19-26; NSP Party Program: Articles 65-73). The leading 
spiritual member of Turkish religious right Zahit Kotku was saying that  
(A Muslim) refrains from sins; ill-gotten (haram) and prohibited things. He 
tries to acquire superb virtues like mercy; compassion; love; respect; mutual-
ization; unity in property, spirit and body; brotherhood, communitarianism; 
acquaintanceship; intimacy; generosity; chastity and innumerable other quali-
ties. 
 
A child is no different from an animal in its birth. It lives with its salacity and 
lust like animals. It does not have its reason yet. When he reaches to his ado-
lescence, he is given a choice between good and bad; angel and devil to be-
come a dignified or a miserable and lowly being. (Kotku, 171-173)        
 
The sources of this educational policy of the National View was finding its place in 
Articles 10 and 14 of 1961 Constitution which stipulated that the state prepares nec-
essary conditions for material and spiritual development of the people and that every 
citizen has the right to develop his material and spiritual being. And similarly, rights 
and freedoms of expression, thought, belief and conscience of the citizens were writ-
ten down in Articles 11, 19, 22, 26, 29 of the Constitution (Erbakan, 1975a: 92; NSP 
Party Program: Articles 65-73).   
 
Minimum hours of religious courses would be increased, their time would not be 
shifted to night time after the normal school hours, those who attended to those 
courses would not be persecuted by leftists teachers; and the number of Imam-Hatip 
Schools, Faculties of Theology, and Islamic Graduate Schools would be increased 
much as the number of universities of technical and general sciences. The scientific 
competency and qualifications of Imam Hatip Schools and Islamic Graduate Schools 
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would be developed upon needs and necessities. In addition, personnel of the Direc-
torate of Religious Affairs would be improved in terms of their material and spiritual 
conditions (Erbakan, 1975a: 92-93; Erbakan, 1975b: 14-25; Erbakan, 1976: 22-25).  
 
 
7.1.3. Economy and Development 
 
National View put a strong emphasis on religion and morality in the sphere of econ-
omy too. A high standard of morality would serve to the well-functioning of the 
economy by ensuring the loyalty of the people to integrity, right and justice in places 
where there were legal gaps that could have been used for evil intentions otherwise. 
At the same time, there was a broad area of interaction in the economy not regulated 
by the laws that could work only with the adoption of superb moral principles on the 
part of the citizens (Erbakan, 1975a: 109-111).  
 
The view of the National View to economy was even more sophisticated as it was 
argued that there was a particular economic system in Islam unique in itself with 
clear lines of separation from communist and capitalist economies. Contrary to the 
communist economies, Islamic economy was not the enemy of the private property. 
Ownership of the private property was promoted and rights of the people thereto 
were inviolable. Entrepreneurialism was encouraged because the wealth it generates 
was the road to perfection in many material and spiritual things. Capitalist econo-
mies, on the other hand, were contaminated with various spiritual illnesses like ex-
travagance, luxury, self-preservation and gratification. They were also associated 
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with a set of macro scale problems like interest, inflation, unemployment, huge gaps 
in income distribution, and poverty to produce lots of other social problems (Erba-
kan, 1975a: 149-157; Erbakan, 1975b: 66-77; NOP Party Program, Articles 48-50; 
WP Party Program: Article 19). One of the founders of National View Movement 
who encouraged his friends and followers to political activism Zahit Kotku was stat-
ing that: 
For good and all, ‘contentment (kanaat) is a non-depletable treasure.’ It is the 
source of peace in this and the other world. Discontentment and cupidity are 
two disasters which don’t leave any peace and safety in the person himself 
and in the society that he lives in… The money earned through interest, alco-
hol, gambling and such things does not bring anything except ravage. The 
best way is the way of contentment. If contentment is sustained canonically 
(helal yoldan), it does not impede accomplishing great things. We must make 
sure that nobody is oppressed of his right; one must not be engrossed in raun-
chiness, sinfulness, extravagance in sauciness when he becomes rich, and he 
must not be above himself with haughtiness (Kotku, 1994: 42-43).     
 
The “just economic order” of the National View movement had explored five diseas-
es that needed to be treated for a viable and promising Turkish economy. It was the 
goal of the party to implement this policy when it was introduced to the government. 
These diseases were interest, unjust taxation, money printing, currency exchange and 
present banking system. First of these, interest, was closely associated with high in-
flation, poverty, and social unrest. The interest was the process of making money 
through the trade of money rather than production. It was generating inflation be-
cause the investors were adding the rate of interest on the price of commodities to 
make profit. In addition, it was not right to make money from the debtors with ever-
growing rates of interest. The poor were getting poorer crashing down under interest 
payments and the rich were getting richer in an unjust way without any labor. The 
right thing was the process of earning money through production and manufacturing. 
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The National View would remove the concept of interest from the Turkish economy 
(Erbakan, 1975a: 152-157; Erbakan, 1991: 22-27; Öniş, 1997: 754).  
 
Investment in stock market would be an alternative to interest. The trade of bonds 
and securities was a real trade, and profits that came with it were profits based on 
real economic interactions. This system would be developed in our country for the 
transformation of the banking system. Though the money would be collected in the 
banks again, it would be invested in production this time (Erbakan, 1975a: 152-157).  
 
As far as the taxation policy was concerned, secondly, the state was levying taxes on 
various goods and services though it was not involved in their production, which was 
not right. Also, the rich were paying less of taxes whereas the poor were paying more 
of it while it was supposed to be the other way. The National View would therefore 
reform all the law of taxation and funding. A third problem was about free money 
printing by the state. It was no different than stealing the money of the people when 
it was done without any material property to match it. That would also cause infla-
tion and greater poverty on the part of the poor (Erbakan, 1991: 24-25).         
 
The problem with the banking system, on the other hand, was that it was based on 
earning revenues with high interest rates. Instead of investing the money in interest 
earnings, the national view movement would transfer it to the development of indus-
trial capacity, infrastructure and other types of investments that would serve to our 
development. Due to high interest rates, the people trying to run a business with bank 
loans such as the tradesmen, industrialist, businessmen and the farmers were facing 
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the problem of rising costs. And this was inhibiting production, employment and also 
leading to devaluation and inflation. In a just economic order, banks would be inte-
grated to a system of profit sharing in which they would establish joint ventures with 
entrepreneurs through which they would be directly involved in production. This 
would decrease the cost of production and also the inflation (Erbakan, 1975a: 152-
157; Erbakan, 1975b: 78-81).  
 
 
7.1.4. The Welfare Party Bill of Indictment for Closure 
 
The National Salvation Party was closed down after 1980 military intervention on 
the grounds that the party had turned to a base for religious radicalism. The successor 
Welfare Party established in 1985 was, however, to introduce a more radical party 
organization which was implicated with accusations of campaigning for the introduc-
tion of Islamic sharia regime at the peak of its electoral populism. Until the closure 
of the party in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, the party broadened its electoral 
base and radicalized its party program to be interrupted by the National Security 
Document of the Turkish Armed Forces known as 28 February Process. Some of the 
actions and policies of the party members included in bill of indictment presented by 
the General Public Prosecutor for the closure of the Welfare Party can be cited here 
to illustrate the radical Islamist tendencies of the movement. According to the Public 
Prosecutor, the Welfare Party was in violation of the secularist principle of the Turk-
ish Republic and was attempting to establish an Islamic sharia regime:  
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If we are to have a short look at some of the accusations in the Bill of Indictment, in 
a speech on 23 March 1993 in the national assembly, first, the head of the Welfare 
Party Necmettin Erbakan was stating that every citizen had to be able to live in a 
system of law that he preferred based on his belief and thoughts. There had to be a 
multiple system of law that could be used by members of different social and reli-
gious groups. Second, on 13 April 1999, Necmettin Erbakan was saying in a party 
group meeting in the Assembly that Just Order would be instituted in peace or with 
bloodshed, kindly or by use of force. All the means would be used for this matter. It 
was the people of Turkey who would decide it and Welfare Party would use power 
when it was necessary (Refah Partisi Kapatma Davası, 1998: 32).  
 
 
 
 
7.1.5. Other Controversial Issues 
 
There was a list of other policies that has not been subject to WP closure case, but 
still to incite opposition from other members of the state elites: The party had a 
heavy antidrug campaign. Strict regulations were brought against alcohol sale in pub-
lic restaurants and it was totally prohibited in state restaurants. Some Atatürk sculp-
tures were removed from public spaces for various reasons (Karakaş, 2007: 24-25; 
Mecham, 2004: 344). Necmettin Erbakan was meeting with representatives of Egyp-
tian Muslim Brothers soon after he was introduced to the premiership. He was invit-
ing leaders of religious brotherhoods to the residence of prime minister for iftar. And 
before the Sincan events, a parliamentary bill was presented for freedom to use head-
scarf in public places. WP was trying to open the road for military careers to students 
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of Imam Hatip schools (Karakaş, 2007: 26). Others included RP’s attempts to build a 
mosque in Taksim square, to change working hours in accordance with Ramadan, 
and the roadside markings in big cities to reflect an Islamic view (Öniş, 2001: 286; 
Mecham, 2004: 343).  
 
As the mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was taken under investigation be-
cause of his reading of a poem from Ziya Gökalp in December 1997. He was tried 
and sentenced to imprisonment to also lose his office of the mayor of Istanbul. At 
another occasion, he was quoted to say: “You will be either Muslim or secularist. 
You cannot be both at the same time” (Mecham, 2004: 345, 347).  
 
According to Welfare Party perspective of secularism, wearing of headscarf in 
schools and public offices was not a violation of secularism, but was a part of free-
dom of conscience and belief. The party was therefore organizing political cam-
paigns for freedom of headscarf use in these places as a part of its party goals. Con-
stitutional Court stated that use of headscarf in public places was against the secular-
ist principle of the constitution and political campaign of the welfare party was thus 
violating secularism. According to the Constitutional Court, the Welfare Party was 
exploiting the religious feelings of the people for this purpose.  
 
The Virtue Party established after the WP displayed substantial changes from its suc-
cessor. The most striking difference of the party was its support to integration with 
the EU and the West. But the Virtue Party was also closed because of the rejection of 
Merve Kavakçı to remove her headscarf in the National Assembly. She was not pre-
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vented by the members of the Virtue Party. And she gave the oath of representative 
with her headscarf despite opposition by the left wing representatives (Öniş, 2001: 
287-288; Mecham, 2004: 348). 
 
 
7.2. The Justice and Development Party 
 
The JDP has adapted a more moderate party program and set of goals compared to its 
predecessor National View movement. The JDP has been declaring since its estab-
lishment that it is opposed to any attempts pertaining to the introduction of an Islam-
ic sharia regime. It disclaims any links with Islamism as a political doctrine. The 
general ideological line of the party is identified by the party itself and the intellectu-
als as Conservative Democracy. Aspects of JDP’s conservative democracy can be 
read in JDP’s founding “Development and Democratization Program” decorated with 
strong emphasis on and respect for democracy, secularism, rule of law, human rights, 
freedom, pluralism and diversity. JDP exemplifies a basic difference from earlier 
national view parties in the sense that it traces the development of these modern po-
litical paradigmatic values and principles to the west to which it declares its loyalty 
and service. The party believes in the idea that its policy goals can fully be accom-
plished in a liberal democratic political system (Dağı, 2006: 89).  
 
As a part of its conservative origins, the JDP voices its continued interest in our tra-
ditional, cultural, historical and moral values in which religion lingers as a leading 
source of formation. Most leading examples of this new orientation are manifested in 
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its campaign for headscarf, Imam-Hatip schools, religious education and Quran 
Courses. However, the JDP differs from the earlier parties of Turkish religious right 
in the sense that it runs its campaign for its goals within the limits of rights and free-
doms presented by the existing political system. The party leaders argue that the rea-
son for them to come in conflict with the secularist establishment is the authoritarian 
leanings of the assertive secularists rather than the motivations of the party to violate 
secularism and democracy (Çınar and Duran, 2008: 33; Duran, 2008: 82-83; Hale 
and Özbudun, 2009: 20-21; Özbudun, 2006: 547-548).  
 
In addition to this policy transformation, the party illustrates a significant change in 
the political style of the Turkish religious right. The party expresses its opposition to 
radical political changes in favor of respect for common sense, prudence and gradual 
change (Dağı, 2005: 30). Some others interpret this as transition from a provocative 
to a conciliatory style of politics in terms of the ways the party tries to achieve its 
major goals. For this reason, the party pays utmost attention to keep away from hot 
debates with the state elites in its search for religious rights and freedoms even if it 
may be considered that defense of those rights are not against democratic and consti-
tutional system in Turkey. Burhanettin Duran argues that JDP’s conservative democ-
racy is a program offered by the Turkish religious right to normalize the Turkish po-
litical life after 28 February process. For this reason, the Party is most careful not to 
make any reference to Islam as a legal, political and economic system (Duran, 2008: 
81-82).  
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JDP’s party policy orientation expressed in its concise form as conservative democ-
racy has also been a specter of change in the character of the party from a substan-
tially ideology seeking to a partly vote maximizing party. The party has been more 
concerned with the ratio of the votes it obtains in the elections with a perception that 
parliamentary majority is the most advantageous asset that a party can have in 
achieving its goals and policies. Thus it has been more concerned with the expecta-
tions of the electorate and has widened its sources of appeal by pulling the ideologi-
cal line of the party from extreme to center right. It is therefore observed to be more 
moderate and pragmatist compared to its predecessors Welfare Party and Virtue Par-
ty (Duran, 2008: 83; Kuru, 2009: 176-181; Dağı, 2005: 30-32).  
 
 
7.2.1.The Justice and Development Party’s View of Secularism  
 
The party displays a great deal of similarity with National View Parties in the way it 
frames secularism. Contrary the assertive secularist position of the state elites, the 
party interprets secularism as a guarantee of freedom of belief, conscious and thought 
and a protection against official and unofficial canals of oppression against religious 
life and practice. But the party pronounces its distance from the idea of introducing 
an Islamic sharia regime as well as other Islamic alternatives to social, political and 
economic institutions of public life in Turkey. It is a main goal of the Party to pro-
mote democracy, justice, human rights, freedom and free market economy. The Party 
declares its membership to the provisions and conventions of international society 
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with its modern political, economic and social institutions (Kuru, 2009: 176-181; 
Dağı, 2006: 95-97).  
 
The JDP’s approach to religion and secularism is stated as follows in the party pro-
gram: 
Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of hu-
manity and secularism as a prerequisite of democracy, as a guarantee of free-
dom of religion and conscience. Party is against interpretation of secularism 
as enmity against religion.  
 
Secularism is essentially a principle that ensures the members of any religion 
and belief to practice their prayers in peace, to promulgate their religious 
opinions and shape their lives accordingly and, for nonbelievers, to organize 
their lives as they want. Secularism is thus the principle of freedom and social 
peace.  
Our party is against the exploitation of religion and ethnicity as a political 
tool. It finds attitudes and behaviors harassing religious people and 
discriminations they suffer due to their religious beliefs and choices as against 
democracy, human rights and freedoms. On the other side, it rejects the 
exploitation of religion as a tool for political, economic purposes or for other 
interests as well as its employment as a means to establish pressure over those 
who think and live differently. 
…  
As a necessity of the principle of secularism, all the facilities will be provided 
for the citizens to acquire religious education. In primary schools and high 
schools, elective religious courses will be given to students with the permis-
sion of the custodians of students in addition to lessons of Religious Culture 
and Morality Knowledge (JDP Party Program).  
 
Bearing a concept of secularism like that behind the party program, the JDP has been 
running a political and social campaign for reframing the legal and constitutional 
provisions to ensure freedom of using headscarf in universities, repudiation of the 
YÖK barrier against the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, and improvement of the 
Quran Courses and religious courses in normal schools. However, the campaign of 
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the party for these matters is found in violation of the secularist principle of the secu-
larist state elites. Ahmet Kuru examines the ongoing political and legal clash be-
tween the two factions of Turkish politics by classifying them as passive and asser-
tive secularists with reference to issues cited here above (Kuru, 2009: 187-198; 
Yıldız, 2008: 52). 
 
 
7.2.2. Headscarf   
 
The headscarf controversy is very recent one. There was not a uniform measure 
adapted by the public authorities against wearing headscarf in universities until late 
1990s. Headscarf wearing was not a common sociological theme among university 
students until 1970s and 1980s which might be considered as a peak of political and 
economic liberalization started with the introduction of multiparty politics. In 1984, 
headscarf ban came into effect in universities but it was not applied by all the univer-
sities uniformly sometimes because of the protests of the students and sometimes 
because certain university administrations autonomously decided not to apply it. 
However, the ban has gradually been more commonly applied by the universities 
under legal and unofficial pressures of the assertive secularists. Headscarf ban was 
one of the hottest themes of late 1990s with daily news of students forced out of clas-
ses, campuses, exam rooms and ceremonies. In 2000, a university student Nuray Be-
zirgan was dismissed from her classroom with a group of her friends. She was then 
tried and sentenced to 6 months of prison because of distracting the education of her 
schoolmates with her violation of the dress code. In 2004, European Court of Human 
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Rights ruled that headscarf ban was necessary and it did not violate the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Upon the appeal of the student). European Court of 
Human Rights repeated its decision to another appeal made by another student (Çar-
koğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 100-102).    
 
Contrary to the view of the state elites, the JDP has the contention that wearing head-
scarf in schools and other public places does not bear any political character. It can 
never be considered as a part of a political doctrine that defends Islamic sharia re-
gime. In a liberal democratic society, citizens enjoy certain rights and freedoms that 
cannot be violated by any state or non-state organ. The way the people cover their 
body can never be instructed by a public authority. It is a most basic human right and 
a part of freedom of belief, conscience and thought. With such an approach to the 
headscarf issue, first related examination of the JDP came to the agenda with the 
events that followed the appointment of Erdoğan Teziç as the new head of Turkish 
Board of Higher Education, YÖK, in 2003. Soon after his appointment, Erdoğan 
Teziç widened the scope of headscarf ban by also prohibiting the use of wigs. He 
also added that a school principal must not wear headscarf even in the street let alone 
the school. The JDP found these measures as very extreme and followed by introduc-
ing a bill in the parliament to remove Erdoğan Teziç and reorganize the YÖK, but 
the bill was vetoed by Necdet Sezer under very heavy opposition from other mem-
bers of the state elites as well (Kuru, 2009: 187-193).  
 
Second important event related with the headscarf took place in December 2007 
when the Nationalist Action Party presented a constitutional amendment bill in the 
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parliament to prepare the legal ground for the abolition of the headscarf ban in uni-
versities. The initiative was fully supported by the JDP and also other right party 
members in the parliament. But the Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya ruled a warning that such an action would lead to the 
opening of a closure case against both parties. But despite the opposition, amend-
ments over two articles of the Constitution were approved by the parliament in Feb-
ruary 2008. The laws reiterated equality before the law and brought an end to dis-
crimination for reasons not clearly defined by the law to mean that it should be free 
to use headscarf in the schools and universities. After the approval of the amend-
ments by the President Abdullah Gül, YÖK took the initiative to apply the laws by 
distributing instructions to the universities to permit entrance with headscarf. But 
under heavy reactions from presidents of some universities, the RPP and the Demo-
cratic Left Party (DLP), the Constitutional Court repudiated the laws with a claim 
that they are in violation of the principle of secularism (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 
62-63).  
 
 
7.2.3. Imam-Hatip Schools 
 
The second issue leading in the agenda of JDP’s religious politics is the Imam-Hatip 
schools. The major problem pressuring the JDP deputies concerning its electoral base 
and party goals is the application of a barrier to the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools 
in their entrance to university examination something which was introduced during 
the 28 February process. The barrier is the application of a lower coefficient in the 
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calculation of the points of Imam-Hatip school graduates that substantially decrease 
their competitive advantage compared to graduates of other public schools. The ex-
tent of the barrier is such that those students cannot be admitted to certain universi-
ties and departments even if their answers to all the questions are correct.  
 
The secularist establishment argues that Imam-Hatip schools’ curriculum is filled 
with traditional Islamic and moral sciences and therefore their graduates must be 
employed as prayer leaders and preachers in public service. But the members of 
Turkish religious right argue that the curriculum of Imam-Hatip schools includes 
those social and science courses taught by other public schools and that the fact that 
they also receive religious courses as a matter of preference cannot be turned into a 
tool of violation in their preparation to university examination. It cannot be argued 
that people cannot learn religious and moral courses if they will not use it in their 
occupational life. It is a constitutional right of every citizen to learn and practice their 
religion as a part of freedom of conscience, belief, practice and thought. The JDP 
deputies interpret the application of the barrier of lower coefficient as a source of 
discrimination.      
 
For this reason, the JDP presented a bill to the parliament in 2004 to increase the 
coefficient of the Imam-Hatip schools as well as other vocational schools that would 
increase their chances though not lifting the barrier absolutely. The bill was met with 
a heavy media campaign by the secularist establishment. It passed the votes of the 
parliament with the support of other right parties as well, but it was vetoed by Presi-
dent Necdet Sezer. Another bidding was made in December 2005 by Minister of Ed-
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ucation Hüseyin Çelik who had ruled an instruction that would enable the students to 
transfer to normal public schools in the last year of their education. After taking 
some extra courses, they would take the university entrance examination under the 
same condition as graduates of non-vocational schools. The instruction was cancelled 
by the Council of State on the grounds that it does not abide by the secularist princi-
ple (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 63-64; Kuru, 2009: 193-196).   
 
 
7.2.4. Quran Courses and Other Controversial Issues 
 
The Quran Courses have been another leading goal in the agenda of JDP’s religious 
politics. In December 2003, the JDP Government started an initiative by way of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs to improve the condition of the Quran Courses. The 
measures taken for this purpose included the opening of night courses, the reduction 
of the minimum student number to open a course from 15 to 10, removal of the limi-
tation of two months, permission to open dormitories. But the initiative met with the 
barrier of the Council of State which cancelled all the policies adapted. Again in 
2005, the JDP introduced a bill in the parliament to reduce the punishment of open-
ing illegal Quran courses from two years to a prison sentence of six months and one 
year. The bill passed the parliament, but again it is vetoed by President Ahmet Nec-
det Sezer (Kuru, 2009: 196-198).    
 
A relatively less sensational issue that the JDP Government has drawn the reactions 
of the state elites is the attempt of the party to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages 
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from the cafeterias of the ministries and other state organs and to limit its consump-
tion in public places. In 2004, a regulation is passed by the JDP Government that 
puts limits and greater control over the alcohol consumption by giving the municipal 
and city-county councils the authority to issue liquor licenses and to determine the 
places to drink alcohol. Although it has been claimed that JDP is ruling these 
measures because of the prohibition of alcohol in Islam, the JDP Government draws 
attention to the health problems it generates as well as social and cultural problems 
that it leads. Alcohol market and consumption is thus taken under strict controls 
(Yıldız, 2008: 53; Karakaş, 2007: 32).  
 
There has been some other policies that may be associated with religious politics 
adapted by the JDP on some gender issues. They include legal proposals to divide 
parks and beaches with separate sections for men and women, and swimming pools 
with only-women and only-men days. Against the accusations, JDP deputies replied 
by saying that such measures were adapted in European countries also. A related 
theme was the introduction of adultery as a crime according to Turkish Penal Code in 
2004. But the clause was cancelled under heavy oppositions and clashes (Yıldız, 
2008: 53; Karakaş, 2007: 34; Cizre, 2008: 9).  
 
And lastly, JDP tried to make a bidding to appoint imams to new mosques that has 
been neglected from public attention as well those mosques that did not have imams 
for reasons. But it cannot be said that it has been successful due to the limitations 
imposed on the Directorate of Religious Affairs. To this end, JDP made an attempt to 
reorganize the Diyanet in order to make it an autonomous public entity by removing 
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it from the authority of the government. But the attempt was rejected and vetoed by 
President Necdet Sezer. 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
To summarize the main points of the chapter, it has been observed that there is a sub-
stantial change in the goals and policies of the Turkish religious right from National 
View parties to the Justice and Development Party with regard to their view to reli-
gion and secularism. While the National View Movement had a view of religion that 
had to be employed substantially in shaping Turkish social, political, economic and 
cultural life, the JDP assumed a more moderate party program with a limited appeal 
to religion. The JDP has strayed away from a discourse of religion as a political pro-
gram. It declares its opposition to the idea of Islamic sharia regime. The JDP has 
been campaigning for freedom of wearing headscarf in universities, removal of the 
YÖK barrier to graduates of Imam-Hatip schools and removal of limitations imposed 
on Quran Courses. But its campaign is carried out in abidance by the rights and privi-
leges provided by the democratic political system with a respect for human rights, 
secularism, rule of law, and pluralism. Contrary to the National View Movement, the 
JDP does not offer an Islamic alternative to economic life and does not foresee a sub-
stantial role for religion in Turkey’s road to development. JDP’s politics is most of-
ten interpreted as conciliatory, pragmatist, moderate and legalistic.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This dissertation is devoted to the examination of the change in the goal and issue 
orientation of Turkish religious right towards a strikingly more moderate and centrist 
political line with a theoretical, empirical and historical analysis. An attempt will be 
made here in the conclusion to summarize the main points of the work with a discus-
sion of the findings under the light of the set of theoretical tools and perspectives 
employed to operationalize them.  
 
Theoretical studies on party change proliferate over the type of changes that parties 
experience as well as the causes that produce them. Kenneth Janda points out to six 
areas that party change can take place including party political tactics, organizational 
structure, issue orientation, organizational identity, goal orientation or party organi-
zational death (Janda, 1980). This dissertation is given over to the examination of the 
change of Turkish religious right in two of these areas, i.e., the goal and issue orien-
tation (See Chapters Six and Seven). The literature on the causes that produce party 
 237 
 
change is yet much richer than the one devoted to the nature of party change. Among 
the causes that produce party change, three general categories draw attention includ-
ing leadership change, party coalition change and environmental change (Harmel and 
Janda, 1994). The focus of this work has been to explore the role and impact of a set 
of environmental changes identified in the secularist reaction by the state elites, 
globalization and Europeanization among others.  
 
While trying to do this, we have benefited from a research by Harmel and Janda in 
which they examine the type of factors that come to play with prospects of party ide-
ological extremism as the major driving force of the goal and issue orientation of a 
party. Among these factors, three of them are seminal for our purposes, i.e., regime 
opposition, affluence and sectoral inequality. Harmel and Janda measure a correla-
tion value of -0.12, -0.20 and 0.32 between party ideological extremism and regime 
opposition, affluence and sectoral inequality in order (Harmel and Janda, 1982). In 
framing the theoretical design of the dissertation, the variable of regime opposition is 
employed in the operationalization of the rigid secularism of the state elites and the 
latter two variables, affluence and sectoral inequality are reprocessed, by making 
some theoretical additions, for their operationalization in the factors of globalization 
and Europeanization.         
 
Upon this theoretical formation prepared in Chapter Two, Chapter Three is assigned 
to the analysis of the rigid secularism of the state elites argued to be the leading 
cause of the transformation experienced by the religious right. Taking its origins 
from the Ottoman reforms, the state elites have developed a behavior and attitude of 
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secularism reactionary to religion and opposed to its political and social representa-
tions in the public similar to the example of militant French secularism. While the 
state elites have demonstrated a strong determination against attempts to introduce 
Islamic political norms and institutions in Turkey like its many examples in secular 
political systems, they have been against some social, cultural and spiritual aspects of 
the religion too. Its leading members including the armed forces, the judiciary, Re-
publican Peoples Party, some media organization, various professional groups and 
civil society organizations, the state elites enjoys a rich set of legal, political and 
technological tools and mechanisms to play their role in Turkish political life. The 
armed forces reserve their rights for political activism in their internal service codes 
and regulations while the judiciary can get involved in political processes through the 
Constitutional Court, with its legal powers to define and interpret secularism and 
monitor the abidance of political parties by the secularist principle as the two leading 
agents of the state elites. 
 
In Chapter 4, a detailed examination is offered to the secularist reaction expressed 
with 28 February Process with regard to the tide of change that it generated in Turk-
ish religious right. 28 February Process remains as the most striking example of the 
political involvement of the state elites for secularist purposes in a coordinated ac-
tion. Starting with the issuing of a National Security Document by the military mem-
bers of the National Security Council, the events went on with a heavy social, politi-
cal and legal campaign against the Welfare Party and its successors which ended up 
with the closure of successive parties, political bans to a number of leading politi-
cians, and introduction of various punishments and measures against perceived 
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threats. The movement was thus motivated to reformulate its goal and issue orienta-
tion with declared commitments to refrain from acts of religious radicalism and re-
spect the secularist and Republican principles written in the Constitution.       
 
In Chapter Five, globalization and Europeanization are taken under scrutiny concern-
ing their impact on the political line of the religious right. The first part of the chapter 
is given to the examination of globalization with a theoretical and empirical perspec-
tive by describing what it denotes in different domains and how it comes to play with 
the policy perspective of the religious right. If we review what globalization means 
in specific domains: Economic globalization is identified as increasingly greater in-
tegration and interdependence of domestic markets and production. Political globali-
zation, secondly, is characterized as the process of strengthening multilateralism 
among countries and spread of some global political norms and principles. Social and 
cultural globalization, lastly, is considered to be associated with the emergence of 
common forms of social and cultural structures among countries (Scholte, 1997; 
Dodge and Higgott, 2002; McGrew, 2000). Globalization is detected to be linked 
with the trend of moderation in Turkish religious right in so far as it has produced a 
statist middle class of entrepreneurs and intellectuals, and a process of political so-
cialization experienced by the religious right towards the internalization of the ele-
ments of western economic, political, social and cultural values and principles.  
 
Europeanization is examined in the second part of Chapter Five, which is considered 
to be a potent agent of change. Europeanization promotes such global principles and 
norms as market economy, democracy, rule of law, human rights, multilateralism etc. 
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but it is distinguished from globalization with its more comprehensive, formalized, 
legal and binding nature as well as being decorated with – in the case of EU – spe-
cialized organs, decision-making processes, conditionalities and bureaucracies (Risse 
et. al., 2001: 3-4). The impact of Europeanization on domestic structures of countries 
is observed in the adaptive pressures that it generates as well as a process of sociali-
zation that it introduces its potential members. In case of Turkish religious right, it is 
observed that the movement has shown a great tendency in responding to Europeani-
zation pressures for a number of reasons that include the contribution of the move-
ment to Turkey’s prospective development, the process of political socialization that 
it has generated and expectations that Europeanization would contribute to the 
reformation of civil-military relations in Turkey in line with its examples in the liber-
al world.   
 
After the examination of the most leading causes of change in the issue and goal ori-
entation of Turkish religious right, an attempt is made in last two chapters to explore 
the nature of change taking place in domains of foreign policy and domestic politics 
by starting with the view and policies of the National View movement in this process 
and continuing with the ways they are reformulated in the Justice and Development 
Party. In the domain of foreign policy, it is detected that the earlier members of Turk-
ish religious right, National View, were motivated to turn the face of Turkish foreign 
policy to the Muslim countries of the Middle East and minimize the relations with 
the west. The movement was supporting the idea that Turkey shared a common his-
tory and culture with the Middle East and that it was in its best interests to develop 
and proliferate relations with the Middle East. Relations with the west would be 
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maintained only in the areas of science and technology to be employed in industrial 
and economic development of the country while a very comprehensive and deep set 
of relations were to be maintained with the Muslim countries. Integration and unity 
with the west was detrimental to Turkey’s national integrity because the unity of the 
west was formed around their membership to Christianity. In addition, the west had a 
secret agenda to undermine the Muslim world to which Turkey should have never 
joined.  
 
Starting with the rise of the electoral appeal of the Welfare Party and its introduction 
to the government, the issue and goal orientation of Turkish religious right has 
wrapped into a substantially different one with the Justice and Development Party. 
JDP has abandoned the tendency to perceive a world divided along religious and 
cultural lines in a rational and pragmatist way. A need is emphasized to improve 
Turkey’s relations with the west but also the east. While not denying the importance 
of the historical and cultural values in its relations with the Middle East, Turkey is 
also accepted as a part of the western civilization with its political, diplomatic and 
military membership to global and regional international organizations as well as its 
bilateral relations with individual states.  
 
The change in the issue and goal orientation of the religious right in domestic politics 
is explored to be more extensive. The National View movement had a vision of Tur-
key undergoing major economic and industrial transformation with a strong attach-
ment to Turkey’s religious, moral and cultural values. Particularly during the Welfare 
Party coalition government, a heavy campaign was launched to transform the social 
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and cultural face of Turkey towards a more conservative and religious society that in 
some cases arrived at calls for support to the establishment of an Islamic Şeriat re-
gime voiced by the party members in election campaigns and party meetings.       
 
The Justice and Development Party, however, has learnt from the experience of Na-
tional View’s clashes with the state elites that the idea of introducing religious con-
tents in Turkish political system is heavily opposed by the state elites who may cast 
their reactions through military interventions, party closures, prison sentences, politi-
cal bans and expropriations among others. The Justice and Development Party has 
been in favor of minimizing the role of religion in party’s orientation to various is-
sues and in framing major party goals. The notion of establishing an Islamic Şeriat 
regime is abandoned. Party’s relations with religious politics revolved around at-
tempts for introducing liberties, rights and opportunities about headscarf, Imam-
Hatip schools and religious education all of which have been conducted within the 
mechanisms permitted by secular democratic system.   
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Against the accusations directed on issues of religious education and Imam-Hatip 
Schools, it was stated by the WP that the party was absolutely loyal to the secularist 
principles of the Constitution and that all the policies adopted were in abidance by 
legal and constitutional norms. It was indicated in the Bill of Indictment that  
Religious education is the most serious impediment in front of raising up sec-
ular and democratic thinking people… and that a state cannot be secular if it 
agrees to millions of its students having religious education and get their 
structure of thinking accordingly (Vural, 21
st
 May 1997)   
 
According to WP, this accusation did not have any legal ground because religious 
education was a right given by the Constitution. It was indicated in the Constitution 
that 
“Education and training of religion and morality is conducted under the su-
pervision and inspection of the state. Education of religion and morality is 
among the compulsory courses given in primary and secondary schools. In 
places other than these, religious education could be given only according to 
the choice of the people or the demand of the legal custodians of the children” 
(1982 Constitution, Article 24, Paragraph 4).   
 
For this reason, Public Prosecutor’s view that religious education was harmful and 
that it was the most serious impediment to science and that it was against secularism 
to give religious education to millions of students was not based on any legal ground. 
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The WP was not in violation of but loyal to the secularist principle with its promo-
tion of religious education (WP Apology).  
 
As to the claim of the Public Prosecutor that the WP was in violation of the secularist 
principle with its disregard for the recommendations of the National Security Council 
about the closure of Imam-Hatip schools, not opening new Imam Hatip schools here-
inafter, stopping actions in this direction and agitating the public with speeches on 
this subject; it also did not have any legal ground and WP was not in violation of the 
secularist principle. That was because it was not obligatory to apply the recommen-
dations of the NSC. NSC was an advisory and consultative organ and it was not a 
crime not to follow its recommendations (WP Apology).       
 
When we look at the response against accusations about speeches made by various 
party members, it was generally stated in the Defense that either there was not any 
substantiated evidence about them or that they were misinterpreted by the public 
prosecutor as a violation of secularist principle. 
 
According to the Public Prosecutor, Erbakan’s speech for the introduction of a sys-
tem of multiple laws was against secularism. But it was argued in the Defense that 
the speech was made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and as a part of the 
immunity rights of the representatives, it could not be subject to judicial processes. A 
right to immunity was legally given to deliberate on issues in the process of policy 
making. Even more important, the speech was not intended to replace the secularist 
principle of the Constitution as there was not a direct reference to change the secular-
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ist principle. As to Erbakan’s speech that “Just order will be established… It will be 
decided by Turkey… whether the transition will be soft or hard, sweet or bloody,” 
the reference here was to just order rather than the şeriat order. And it would be in-
troduced with democratic means through elections. Blood was the work of the rival 
parties who would try to interrupt the materialization of the just order with all the 
traditional bloody means they were accustomed to use but who would still be dealt 
with legal means. When we look at the list of accusations directed to Şevki Yılmaz, 
Hasan Huseyin Ceylan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şükrü Karatepe and Şevket Kazan, as it is 
incorporated in the Defense, there were very serious problems with the evidences 
provided and arguments offered. First of all, two of the speeches attributed to Şevki 
Yılmaz were made when he was not a member of the WP. And as to the third speech, 
there was a video cassette about it only which was not known when and where it was 
recorded. As to accusations about others, there was not again any evidence except 
some video cassettes which were not known when and where they were recorded for 
which they could not be accepted as evidence. The accusation directed to Ahmet 
Tekdal concerning his reference to “right order” did not mean Şeriat and could not be 
interpreted as an attack to secularism. Thus the WP was never in violation of the sec-
ularist principle contrary to what the Public Prosecutor claimed (WP Defense).  
 
